Modelling the Impact of Labour Market Policies in the Netherlands by Jongen, E.L.W.
Modelling the Impact of Labour Market
Policies in the Netherlands
ISBN 978 90 3610 198 1
Cover design: Crasborn Graphic Designers bno, Valkenburg a.d. Geul
This book is no. 482 of the Tinbergen Institute Research Series, established through
cooperation between Thela Thesis and the Tinbergen Institute. A list of books which
already appeared in the series can be found in the back.
VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT
Modelling the Impact of Labour Market
Policies in the Netherlands
ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT
ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan
de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
op gezag van de rector magnificus
prof.dr. L.M. Bouter,
in het openbaar te verdedigen
ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie
van de faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Bedrijfskunde
op donderdag 30 september 2010 om 13.45 uur
in de aula van de universiteit,
De Boelelaan 1105
door
Egbert Lothar Wolfgang Jongen
geboren te Den Helder
promotor: prof.dr. F.A.G. den Butter
copromotor: prof.dr. E.J. Bartelsman

commissie: prof.dr. P.A. Gautier
prof.dr. B. Jacobs
prof.dr. J.C. van Ours
prof.dr. C.N. Teulings
prof.dr. J.J.M. Theeuwes
paranimfen: drs. J.P. Ederveen
dr. D.J. van Vuuren


Preface
One year into my Ph.D. study I ran into my Master’s Thesis supervisor Joan Muysken.
He was wondering how I was doing, probably felt like a fish in the water. Well, I was
swimming all right, but in all directions at the same time. There was so much to learn
and explore. Handicapped by a strong love for variety, and a high discount rate, this
thesis took some more time than planned. However, satius sero quam numquam! I am
happy with the end result, with all the chapters fitting nicely in a common theme. And
what better time to reconsider the policies dealing with the risks associated with losing
and finding a job than during the Great Recession, with labour market policies back on
top of the policy agenda.
If this project took longer than expected, it was not because of a lack of support. First
and foremost, I am very grateful to my supervisors Frank den Butter and Eric Bartels-
man, whose constructive comments and suggestions and continuous optimism are greatly
appreciated. I am also very grateful to Peter Diamond for giving me the opportunity
to walk amongst the greatest at MIT in Cambridge. I hope he is not postponing his
retirement because of all the nice dinners we had, summing up to the GDP of a small
to medium sized developing country. I am also very grateful to Boris Majcen and Janez
Šušteršič for arranging my stay at UMAR in Slovenia. Going over all the steps in growth
accounting and medium term projections was great fun, as were the nice lunches, espe-
cially when čevapčiči were involved. I am also very grateful for the support of the former
and current director of CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, Henk
Don and Coen Teulings. They allowed me to spend part of my working time on my thesis
and to go abroad for two long periods. Furthermore, they were always supportive of my
Ph.D. study in general.
During this project I also enjoyed the company of many other great colleagues, first
at the Tinbergen Institute and Free University Amsterdam (and NAKE), and later on at
CPB. At the TI, many happy memories are associated with Ruta Aidis, Doreen Arnoldus,
Arianne de Blaeij, Elfie Bonkie, Charles Bos, Dennis Botman, Jasper Dalhuizen, Robert
Dur, Paul Frijters, Edwin van Gameren, Thomas de Graaf, Pieter Gautier, Klarita Gërx-
hani, Martijn van der Heijden, Rutger Hoekstra, Pierre Hoonhout, Bas Jacobs, Lennart
Janssens, Bas van der Klaauw, Udo Kock, Gijsbert van Lomwel, Luc Moers, Robert
Mosch, Peter Mulder, Marthen Ndoen, Katrin Oltmer, Ioulia Ossokina, Jolanda Peeters,
Jeroen Roodhart, Silvia Rosetto, Klarita Sadiraj, Ibolya Schindele, Arjen Siegman, Mar-
cel Theebe, Xander Tieman, Aljaz˘ Ule, Matthijs van Veelen, Suncica Vujić, Aico van
Vuuren, Daniël van Vuuren, and many, many more.
At CPB, during this project I enjoyed the guidance and support of Johan Graafland,
Albert van der Horst, Peter Kooiman, Ruud de Mooij, Ruud Okker and Ed Westerhout.
xFurthermore, I am grateful to Johan Graafland and Edwin van Gameren for co-authoring
Jongen et al. (2003), which forms the basis of Chapter 5. I am also grateful to Sabine
Visser for co-authoring Jongen and Visser (2010), which forms the basis of Chapter 4,
and Annemiek van Vuren for co-authoring Jongen and Van Vuren (2009), a shorter Dutch
version of Jongen (2009) which forms the basis of Chapter 3. Many thanks also to André
Nibbelink, for his help with all the numerical and other problems we needed to overcome. I
am also indebted to Berend Hasselman, whose help with the creation of egsty prevented
this LATEX text to look like MS Word. At CPB, I also enjoyed the company of many
more colleagues who made and make it such a nice place to work, all the great people of
‘Sector 1’, Stefan Boeters, Peter Broer, Sybren Cnossen, Sjef Ederveen, Elena Esposito,
Miriam Gielen, Pierre Koning, Barthold Kuipers, Debby Lanser, Mauro Mastrogiacomo,
Rocus van Opstal, Simone Pailer, Johan Verbruggen, Maya Verhoeve, David Vonka, Floris
Zoutman, and many, many more.
I am also very grateful to my family for their love and continuous support. My parents
Bert and Liesbeth, like everybody, were always quite confident I would see this through.
But I am sure that they are relieved that it is now really done done. I also enjoyed the
many stops at my sister Annika during my travels between Amsterdam and the Hague. We
look forward to entertaining the new family members Bo and Jools. Finally, perhaps the
highest return of my Ph.D. studies was a quick one. Silva, thank you for all your support
and love, you are such a wonderful person! Now we can enjoy more time together, and
with our great children Sasha and Zoey.
Egbert Jongen
The Hague
July 2010
Contents
Preface ix
Contents xi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 The labour market and the role of policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Methodology and scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Outline of the book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Stylised facts 7
2.1 Stocks and flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Unemployment insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Employment protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 Active labour market policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3 Unemployment insurance 19
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2 UISA: definition and accounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.1 What are UISA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2.2 The effect of UISA on lifetime incomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2.3 Some accounting exercises using data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 How can a UISA system improve welfare? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3.1 Stiglitz and Yun (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3.2 Bovenberg and Sorensen (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.4 Empirical studies into the costs and benefits of UI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4.1 The costs of insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4.2 The benefits of insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.5 A lifecycle model with unemployment risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.5.1 General setup of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5.2 Labour market entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.5.3 Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.5.4 Middle age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.5.5 Old age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5.6 Retirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
xii Contents
3.5.7 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.6 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.6.1 Ex ante homogeneous agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.6.2 Ex ante heterogeneous agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.6.3 Summarizing the simulation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.7 Limitations of the analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.8 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Appendix 3.A First, second and third best in a simpler model . . . . . . . . . . 75
4 Employment protection 79
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.2 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2.1 Informal overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.2.2 Value functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.2.3 Surplus sharing and specific investments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2.4 Free entry and exit conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.2.5 Flow equilibrium and balanced budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3 Qualitative analysis of BGP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.3.1 The relevance of the tenure profile of EPL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.3.2 Social planner and EPL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.4 Quantitative analysis of BGP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.4.1 Equilibrium conditions and partial derivatives . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.4.2 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.4.3 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.5 Limitations of the analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.6 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Appendix 4.A.1 Solving the differential equation (4.9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Appendix 4.A.2 First best . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5 Active labour market policies 117
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.2 A closer look at some Dutch ALMPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.2.1 Relief Jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.2.2 Training programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.2.3 Employment subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.3 Modelling ALMPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.3.1 The flow model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.3.2 Matching technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.3.3 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.3.4 Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.3.5 Wage determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.3.6 Government policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.4 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.4.1 Relief jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.4.2 Training program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
xiii
5.4.3 Employment subsidies for low-productive workers . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.4.4 A comparison of the policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.4.5 Comparison with findings of other studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.4.6 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.5 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Appendix 5.A Stocks and flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6 Summary 153
6.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.1.1 The labour market and policy in the Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.1.2 Unemployment insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.1.3 Individual accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
6.1.4 Employment protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.1.5 Active labour market policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.2 Policy implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.3 Topics for future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
References 160
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 173
xiv Contents
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The labour market and the role of policy
The labour market is not a spot market where workers supply labour and firms demand
labour at market clearing wages. Instead, before workers and firms can produce they
have to go through a costly search process. Indeed, at any point in time we observe that
unemployed workers and vacant jobs coexist. Then, after a match is formed it is typically
not for forever. Advances in technology may make a certain production process obsolete,
as may a shift in preferences, or workers may find a better match outside the firm or
retire. After the match dissolves the worker and/or the firm again have to go through a
costly search process to find a productive match. As a result, workers go through spells
of employment and unemployment, and jobs enter and exit.
In these processes of creation and destruction of matches various things can go wrong.
Workers may not be able to get income insurance for the periods of unemployment.
Workers and firms may not able to protect the returns of what they sink into the match
via a contract, or may face liquidity constraints, leading to under investment in the
formation of general or match specific human capital. Furthermore, workers and firms
may fail to internalise the external effects their search has on the rate at which other
workers and firms can form matches.
In a labour market with failures, labour market policy can play a productive role.
The main policies that play a role in the processes of match creation and destruction are
unemployment insurance, employment protection legislation and so-called active labour
market policies.1 Public unemployment insurance fills the gap left by the private in-
surance market. Employment protection and active labour market policies are partly
complementary to public unemployment insurance. Specifically, the insurance gives rise
to moral hazard, with the inflow into unemployment being too high and the outflow being
too low. Employment protection in the form of firing taxes may prevent an excessively
high inflow into unemployment insurance. Active labour market policies in the form of
hiring subsidies or compulsory participation in public employment may prevent an exces-
sively low outflow from unemployment insurance. But employment protection and active
labour market policies may also play a role on their own. Employment protection in the
1For an excellent introduction to modern labour economics with a much wider scope see Boeri and Van Ours (2009).
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form of severance pay provides insurance against the loss of the returns of firm specific
human capital. Active labour market policies in the form of public training programs can
mitigate under investment in human capital. Hiring and firing taxes or subsidies may
further be used to correct market prices for e.g. the search externalities involved in match
creation and destruction.
However, setting the right policy mix is not an easy task. The information on crucial
elements in the costs and benefits is often limited. Furthermore, next to efficiency consid-
erations, equity considerations may play a role as well. Also, policy outcomes may not be
the outcome of careful second best optimisation, as policy making is subject to political
economy failures, where one group of workers (e.g. insiders) uses labour market policy
for rent seeking at the expensive of others (e.g. outsiders), trying to sell rent seeking as
efficiency gains.
In this thesis we study the impact of labour market policies in the Netherlands. We
seek to determine the impact on the stocks and flows on the labour market, productivity,
output and welfare. We also look for the optimal level of certain policies and compare
optimal to actual levels. We do so by constructing and calibrating models that capture the
main mechanisms through which these policies affect the workings of the labour market.
In our analysis we employ modern labour market theories, and recent data sources and
empirical studies.
1.2 Motivation
A main motivation for writing this thesis is the limited knowledge on the impact of labour
market policies in the Netherlands. Various authors have added pieces to the puzzle.
Regarding unemployment insurance, Van den Berg (1990), Lindeboom and Theeuwes
(1993) and Bloemen (2008) study the negative effect on job search, and Graafland and
Huizinga (1999) study the effect on wage pressure. Furthermore, Kock and Den Butter
(2001), De Koning et al. (2006) and Rezwani (2006) study the popular reform proposal
of unemployment insurance savings accounts, but are either informal or do not take into
account behavioural changes. Hassink (1996) and Alessie en Bloemen (2004) study the
impact of employment protection, but their analysis is only partial. Also regarding the
impact of active labour market policies, we have only partial knowledge.2
So far no effort has been made to put the pieces together, fill in the missing pieces to
the best of our knowledge, and determine the overall effect of these policies on variables
like employment and welfare in the Netherlands. This is rather surprising given that
unemployment insurance, employment protection and active labour market policies seem
to stand out from an international perspective, as we will see below. In this thesis we take
up the task of putting the pieces together, fill in the remaining gaps based on international
studies, and determine the overall impact of Dutch labour market policies.
2Van den Berg et al. (2004) and Abbring et al. (2005) study the impact of sanctions for the unemployed, but these are
typically not considered part of active labour market policies. A recent micro-econometric study into a Dutch active labour
market policy is Klaauw and Van Ours (2010).
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1.3 Methodology and scope
We use modern labour market theories on job creation, job destruction and wage formation
in the construction of our models. In all chapters we study the impact of policies in general
equilibrium, where the plans of the agents are consistent on the micro and the macro level,
and the government budget is balanced (no manna from heaven). Although we derive
some analytical results in simplified versions of the models, the focus is on numerical
simulations with calibrated versions of the richer models. We use recent studies on stocks
and flows on the Dutch labour market and Dutch and international studies on elasticities
to calibrate the richer models. All chapters contain a sensitivity analysis to determine
how sensitive the results are to key assumptions and parameters. The analysis is confined
to comparisons of steady states or balanced growth paths, we do not consider transition
paths.
In the different chapters we focus on different mechanisms, where some are at work in
some but not in others, depending on the relevance for the topic at hand. In particular,
when we analyse unemployment insurance we focus on worker behaviour. In line with
other papers that study optimal unemployment insurance we focus on job search and job
creation. Job destruction is exogenous, and so are wages. Workers can not buy private
unemployment insurance, but can self-insure via borrowing and saving. However, the
extent to which they can use this mechanism may be hampered by liquidity constraints.
Then, when we analyse employment protection we focus on firm behaviour. Now firms
determine job creation, and job destruction becomes endogenous. Furthermore, since the
effect on wages plays a crucial role in the overall impact of employment protection, wages
are endogenous. Apart from bargaining over wages and making specific investments,
workers play no active role in the analysis of employment protection. For simplicity,
workers are assumed to be risk neutral and do not face liquidity constraints, so there
is no role for saving and borrowing. We allow for distortions in specific investments and
distortions resulting from unemployment insurance. In this setup we study different types
of employment protection, which have different effects.
Finally, when we study active labour market policies, both firms and workers play an
active role. We consider the impact of active labour market policies on both job creation
by firms and job search by workers, in various states of the labour market. For simplicity,
job destruction is exogenous and workers can not borrow or save. Wages however are
again endogenous and play an important role in the overall effect.
1.4 Outline of the book
Following this introductory chapter we first present some internationally comparable data
and indicators for the labour market and labour market policies, with a focus on the
Netherlands, in Chapter 2. We then consider in turn the topics of unemployment insurance
in Chapter 3, employment protection in Chapter 4 and active labour market policies in
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 summarizes the main findings, the key policy implications and
topics for future research. Figure 1.1 gives a schematic overview of the relation between
the labour market policies we consider and the labour market. Below is a more detailed
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Figure 1.1: Overview of labour market policies in this book
outline of the chapters of the thesis.
Chapter 2 first presents data on the stocks and flows on the labour market. We show
the dramatic changes in unemployment in the Netherlands, and the rather low flow rates
between employment and unemployment. We then review internationally comparable
indicators on the generosity of unemployment insurance, the strictness of employment
protection, and public expenditures on various types of active labour market policies,
and show that these stand out from an international perspective. Hence, the Nether-
lands seems a particularly interesting country to study these labour market policies.
Furthermore, they are also usual suspects when it comes to cross country variation in
flows between employment and unemployment. In the subsequent chapters we consider
whether unemployment insurance is too high, employment protection is too strict and
active labour market policies are indeed active.
Chapter 3 starts with the topic of unemployment insurance and individual accounts.
We start with a general introduction to the topic and continue with a discussion of related
theoretical and empirical papers on unemployment insurance and unemployment insur-
ance savings accounts. We then outline a lifecycle model with unemployment risk that we
use in the subsequent analysis. We derive the optimal behaviour of workers in terms of
consumption, saving and job search in each lifecycle phase. After a discussion of the cali-
bration of the model, we present simulation results on the optimal level of unemployment
benefits, and consider how this optimal level varies with the degree of risk aversion, moral
hazard, the presence or absence of liquidity constraints and labour market dynamics. We
also consider the optimal lifecycle profile of unemployment insurance benefits, and the
optimal benefit levels for different skill types in an extension with heterogeneity in skills.
After we study optimal unemployment insurance we continue with the topic of un-
employment insurance savings accounts. Specifically, we study the impact of the system
suggested by Feldstein and Altman (1998) where unemployment insurance premiums are
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replaced by forced savings. Individuals can run a debt on their individual account, positive
terminal balances go to the individual pension account and negative terminal balances
are nullified. The latter is still financed by a premium. We show how this affects the opti-
mality conditions for worker behaviour, and proceed with simulations for different forced
savings rates. We consider the effects on e.g. unemployment, unemployment insurance
premiums and welfare.
Subsequently we consider the optimal mix of forced savings and the level of unem-
ployment benefits, and consider how sensitive the results are to key assumptions. After
the simulations we discuss the limitations of the analysis, and how these might affect the
results. A final section concludes. In an appendix we work out the first, second and third
best (individual accounts) unemployment insurance in a simplified version of the model
we use in the main text.
Chapter 4 then turns to employment protection. We start with an introduction to the
topic of employment protection and related theoretical and empirical studies. We then
outline the vintage model with specific investments we use in the subsequent analysis,
and consider privately optimal job creation, job destruction and specific investments.
We first do a qualitative analysis of the balanced growth path. We show the differ-
ences between severance pay, firing costs and firing taxes. We also present an empirical
analysis which lends support to the hypothesis that the impact of these different types of
employment protection differs. We further consider the relevance of the tenure profile of
employment protection. The impact of flat employment protection, popular in theoreti-
cal work, is quite different from employment protection that rises with tenure, popular in
practice. Finally, we contrast the social planner solution with the market outcome, and
consider the second best role of employment protection.
We then proceed with a calibration of the model, and study the impact of employment
protection in a setup where there is a big underinvestment problem in specific investments,
one where there is a moderate under investment problem and one where there is no under
investment in specific investments. We show the effects of changes in the different types
of employment protection on employment, productivity and welfare. We also study the
impact of experience rating, where unemployment insurance premiums are replaced by
firing taxes. Finally, we consider an extension with endogenous labour force participation,
which some empirical studies suggest is relevant for the overall effect on employment.
Again, we conclude the chapter with a discussion of the limitations of the analysis, how
these may affect the results, and some concluding remarks. Two appendices to the chapter
consider respectively the derivation of the surplus of a match and the social planner
solution.
Next, in Chapter 5 we consider active labour market policies. We discuss some related
theoretical literature, the empirical findings of the large body of microeconometric litera-
ture and the much smaller body of literature on the impact on the macro level. We then
proceed with an outline of the flow model that is at the core of the subsequent analysis,
consider the determination of the endogenous flow rates, and how active labour market
policies might affect them. After we discuss the calibration of the model, we consider the
simulation results for relief jobs, public training programs and employment subsidies for
low productive unemployed. We consider the outcomes on both the individual and the
aggregate level, and show that the results can be quite different. We conclude the chapter
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with a sensitivity analysis and some concluding remarks.
Chapter 6 summarizes the main findings of the thesis, discusses the key policy im-
plications for unemployment insurance, employment protection and active labour market
policies, and ends with topics for future research.
Chapter 2
Stylised facts
In this chapter we consider some stylised facts on stocks and flows on the Dutch labour
market, and the labour market policies that operate on these stocks and flows. The stylised
facts indicate in which respects studying labour market policies in the Netherlands are
of particular interest. Indeed, the Dutch case seems to stand out in a number of specific
respects of interest, which we consider below.
2.1 Stocks and flows
The Netherlands has witnessed dramatic changes in formal participation and inactivity
over the past decades. Figure 2.1 shows the large swings in the unemployment rate and
the employment-to-population rate.
As a result of oil price shocks, a global economic downturn and the need to cut back
a public sector that had grown out of proportion, unemployment in the late 1970s/early
1980s rose to numbers unprecedented in post-war history. Actually, the rise in unem-
ployment understates the dramatic rise in inactivity, as a large number of workers also
flowed into disability and early retirement, and many workers were forced to reduce their
number of working hours. Figure 2.2 shows the dramatic rise in the number of disability
benefit recipients, along with the dynamics in the number of unemployment insurance
and welfare benefit recipients. Many other European countries witnessed a similar rise in
unemployment and inactivity.
From the mid 1980s onwards, unemployment started to come down again, though the
level remained quite high up to the mid 1990s, and many scholars hypothesized on the
hysteresis in unemployment in Europe. But then a remarkable thing happened again, as
unemployment started to fall to levels not seen since the 1970s. Indeed, in most European
countries unemployment had come down substantially over the period up to mid 2008, see
Boeri (2008), though the unemployment rate remained sizeable in the Big Four (France,
Germany, Italy, Spain). Over the past decade, the Netherlands has had one of the lowest
unemployment rates, lower even than say the US, though of course, unemployment has
risen again due to the recent worldwide recession initiated by the recent liquidity crisis
(see also CPB, 2010a). Indeed, unemployment is right back on the policy agenda, and
unemployment rates are on the rise again.
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Figure 2.1: Unemployment and employment-to-population rate (in %, individuals aged 15-64)
in the Netherlands (projection for 2010). Source: CPB (2010a,b).
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Figure 2.2: Elements of inactivity in the Netherlands (as a % of the sum of employment and
benefits in labour years, projection for 2010). Source: CPB (2010a) and own calculations.
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Table 2.1: International comparison job and worker flows ratesa
Job flows (annual)
Country Period Coverage Employer unit Job creation Job destruction
Netherlands 1979-1993 Manufacturing Firms 7.3 8.3
Australia 1984-1985 Manufacturing Establishments 16.1 13.2
Canada 1974-1992 Manufacturing Establishments 10.9 11.1
Canada 1983-1991 All employees Firms 14.5 11.9
Denmark 1983-1989 Private sector Establishments 16.0 13.8
Denmark 1981-1991 Manufacturing Establishments 12.0 11.5
Finland 1986-1991 All employees Establishments 10.4 12.0
France 1984-1992 Private sector Establishments 13.9 13.2
France 1985-1991 Manufacturing Firms 10.2 11.0
France 1985-1991 Non-manufactur. Firms 14.3 11.8
Germany 1983-1990 All employees Establishments 9.0 7.5
Italy 1984-1993 Private sector Firms 11.9 11.1
New Zealand 1987-1992 Private sector Establishments 15.7 19.8
Norway 1976-1986 Manufacturing Establishments 7.1 8.4
Sweden 1985-1992 All employees Establishments 14.5 14.6
UK 1979-1983 Manufacturing Establishments 10.2 11.5
US 1973-1993 Manufacturing Establishments 8.8 10.2
US 1979-1983 Private sector Establishments 11.4 9.9
US 1979-1983 Manufacturing Establishments 10.2 11.5
Worker flows (annual/quarterly)
Country Period Coverage Sampling freq. Accession Separation
Netherlands 1979-1993 Manufacturing Annual 16.3 15.7
Denmark 1980-1991 Manufacturing Annual 28.5 28.0
Norway 1987-1994 Manufacturing Annual 21.0 23.0
Norway 1987-1994 Banking Annual 21.0 22.0
USb 1979-1983 Private sector Quarterly 22.3 21.4
USb 1979-1983 Manufacturing Quarterly 24.7 24.6
USc 1985-1993 Private sector Quarterly 18.4 18.7
USc 1985-1993 Manufacturing Quarterly 12.9 14.2
and insurance
aSource: Davis and Haltiwanger (1999, Table 2 and Table 9). Flow rates in % of employment.
For the source papers from the different countries see Davis and Haltiwanger (1999). The data
for the Netherlands are from Gautier (1997).
bData for selected states.
cData for Maryland.
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Figure 2.3: Average monthly inflow rate into (as a % of the labour force) and outflow rate from
(as a % of unemployment) unemployment: 1990-2004. Source: OECD (2007) and own
calculations.
Although not the theme of this thesis, the other remarkable development over the past
decades is the dramatic increase in the employment-to-population rate since say the mid
1980s. The fall in unemployment is only part of the story. Trailing behind in female
participation rates for a long time, almost one million women joined the labour force
in the Netherlands since the mid 1970s, pushing the employment-to-population rate up.
What is perhaps remarkable about this is that this does not seem to have stopped the
fall in unemployment, via e.g. increased competition for jobs.1
Hence, in terms of the level of unemployment, The Netherlands seems to have been
doing rather well in the past decade, though inactivity due to e.g. disability remains a
concern.2 However, how about labour market dynamics, e.g. job creation, job destruction,
and workers flows?
Following the studies into job creation and job destruction for the US, see e.g. Davis
et al. (1996), a remarkable finding was that the European job creation and destruction
rates were of similar magnitude (see e.g. Burda and Wyplosz, 1994, and the overview
in Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999, whereas Blanchard, 2007, explicitly states his surprise).
Data on job and worker flows for the Netherlands have been collected and organised by
e.g. Hamermesh et al. (1996), Broersma and Gautier (1997), Gautier (1997), Broersma
et al. (2000), Kock (2002), Gomez-Salvador et al. (2004), and Kee (2008). Although
1See Den Butter et al. (2008) for an analysis of competition between employed and non-participants for jobs.
2The inflow into disability has dropped off significantly, following the dramatic tightening of entry conditions. However,
it will still take some time before the old disabled flow into retirement and there seems to a mounting problem with disabled
youths, see e.g. Suijker (2008).
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gross flow data are notoriously hard to compare due to e.g. differences in time, sampling
frequency, sector and firm or establishment size,3 Table 2.1 gives a selection of the papers
brought together by Davis and Haltiwanger (1999). For the Netherlands, they use the
study by Gautier (1997).
When we look at job creation and destruction, it seems that they are a bit lower than
in other countries. However, as Davis and Haltiwanger (1999) note, flows are typically
lower for manufacturing than non-manufacturing and when we look at firms rather than
establishments4, as in Gautier (1997). The study by Gomez-Salvador et al. (2004),
covering the more recent period 1994-2000, suggests that job creation and destruction in
the Netherlands is average in the EU-15. When we look at worker flows, the accession and
separation rates in the bottom of Table 2.1 seem a bit lower in the Netherlands, though
we have only a few countries to compare with.
Figure 2.3 presents some other data on worker flows in the Netherlands, where we
only consider flows between employment and unemployment. Here we plot the aver-
age monthly inflow rate into unemployment and the average monthly outflow rate from
unemployment, over the period 1990-2004.5 The outflow rate is calculated under the
steady-state assumption. This leads us to understate the outflow rate, since the stock of
unemployment was still based on the higher inflow rates from the past. But this holds for
most countries, hence the effect on the ranking is perhaps not that much affected. The
careful recent study by Elsby et al. (2008) shows positions for the countries very similar
to those in Figure 2.3 (see their Figure 1 on p. 34).6 Keeping this in mind, we note that
these data suggest that the flow to and from unemployment in the Netherlands are among
the lowest in the OECD. A low flow rate into unemployment may not be perceived as
a problem, although it may indicate a sclerotic economy where workers keep working in
older less productive vintages, but depressed job finding probabilities for the unemployed
typically are. Hence, to conclude, it seems that the Netherlands does rather well in terms
of unemployment, though perhaps not so much in terms of inactivity, but hiding behind
the low unemployment rate are rather low flows between employment and unemployment.
2.2 Unemployment insurance
One of the concerns is that perhaps an overly generous unemployment insurance system
is causing the rather low outflow rate from unemployment in the Netherlands. Table 2.2
gives indicators on UI generosity in a selection of OECD countries in 2004. UI generosity
has been calculated for a worker who is 40 years old and has held a job for 22 years. In
3Bruil et al. (2009) show that even within a country, job flows can differ quite a bit depending on the definition of a job
in terms of a minimum number of hours per week or a minimum number of months per year.
4Though the study by Hamermesh et al. (1996) suggests that within-firm reallocation comprises only 11% of total job
reallocation.
5Following Blanchard and Portugal (2001) these are calculated as the number of unemployed less than one month over
the labour force and the number of unemployed less than one month over the total number of unemployed.
6A number of recent papers studies the flows in and out of unemployment more carefully, see Fujita and Ramey (2006,
2007), Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) and Shimer (2008). Unfortunately, none of them considers the Netherlands. Kock
(2002) considers some related data for the Netherlands in depth.
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columns 1 to 3 we have respectively the initial net replacement rate for this worker after
losing the job, the maximum duration of UI benefits that the worker is entitled to, and
the average net replacement rate over the first 5 years of unemployment.
We see that the Netherlands is indeed one of the more generous ones. It has one of the
higher initial replacement rates, though the difference with most of Continental Europe
is not that big, but it is much higher than in the Mediterranean countries and the Anglo-
Sakson countries and Japan. The differences between countries are larger when we look
at the maximum duration of UI entitlement, where again the Netherlands is one of the
more generous ones. And also when we look at the average net replacement rate over an
unemployment spell that has lasted 5 years, the Netherlands is one of the more generous
ones. Hence, these data provide some support for the hypothesis that the low outflow
rates from unemployment in the Netherlands might be partly due to the generosity of
the unemployment insurance system. To complete this story, we should note that in
April 2006 there was a reform of the unemployment insurance system. The maximum
potential duration for individuals with the highest tenure was reduced from 60 months
to 38 months, but the gross replacement rate for the first 2 months of unemployment
was raised from .70 to .75. However, an analysis of CPB (2005) suggests that the overall
generosity of the benefit system has not changed.7 Hence, the system is still one of the
more generous ones.
In Chapter 3 we will study whether the current system is too generous, where we look
at both sides of the medal. More generous benefits imply more moral hazard, but also
more risk sharing.
2.3 Employment protection
Another potential candidate for the apparent low flow rates between employment and
unemployment in the Netherlands is employment protection. Employment protection
refers to the institutions related to the dissolution of matches between firms and workers.
Examples are administrative and legal procedures including notice periods, severance pay
and firing taxes. These arrangements may be the result of government legislation, but
may also result from collective labour agreements or individual contracts.
Comparing employment protection arrangements across countries is a difficult task,
given the broad range of relevant institutions and country specific peculiarities. In a
valiant effort, the OECD has constructed a measure of employment protection. The over-
all OECD indicator is a weighted average of 18 basic items, which are scored on a scale
from 1 to 6, where a higher score implies more strict EPL. The items are then grouped
into employment protection for regular contracts, specific requirements for collective dis-
missals, and regulation of temporary work agencies and fixed-term contracts. Although
the OECD indicator suffers from a number of serious limitations,8 but it is widely used
7Still, the profile of benefits has changed, in line with some studies that suggest that a downward sloping profile is
optimal (e.g. Shavell and Weiss, 1979). However, Shimer and Werning (2008) have recently shown that a downward sloping
profile is not optimal once we allow for private savings.
8For example only legislated employment protection is included, the scoring scheme is subjective, as is the weighting
scheme of the individual items. Furthermore, the experience rating in unemployment insurance in the US is not included.
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Table 2.2: UI entitlement for a 40-year-old worker, 2004a
Initial net RRb Max UI durationc Average net RR 5 years un.d
Netherlands 74 24 66
Australia 45 0 46
Austria 63 9 57
Belgium 61 ∞ 61
Canada 63 9 48
Denmark 70 48 70
Finland 70 23 65
France 75 23 57
Germany 69 12 66
Greece 55 12 35
Ireland 49 15 64
Italy 54 6 22
Japan 62 8 48
Norway 68 36 58
Poland 59 12 54
Portugal 83 24 68
Spain 67 21 49
Sweden 75 28 63
Switzerland 77 24 69
United Kingdom 54 6 53
United States 54 6 36
aSource: OECD (2006). For a 40-year-old worker with 22 years of experience.
bInitial net replacement rate (net benefit/net wage). In April 2006 the gross initial
replacement rate for benefits has been raised from 70 to 75 percent in the Netherlands.
cMaximum duration of unemployment insurance benefits.
dAverage net replacement rate during the first 5 years of unemployment. In April 2006
the maximum UI entitlement has been reduced, from 60 to 38 months. Calculations by
CPB (2005) suggest that the overall generosity of UI remained virtually unchanged due
to the increase in the gross replacement rate in the first two months of unemployment
from 70 to 75 percent in the same reform.
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by researchers and seems to pick up some significant effects in cross-country regressions.
The components of the index show some interesting sides of employment protection in
the Netherlands.
Figure 2.4 shows the dual face of employment protection in the Netherlands. On the
one hand, employment protection for regular contracts is rather strict. On the other hand,
regulations related to temporary work agencies and fixed-term contracts are limited. In-
deed, as in many other countries, reform of employment protection over the past two
decades has been mainly partial.9 The overall index has fallen for most OECD countries
since the late 1980s, but the fall is mainly the result of relaxing the rules governing tempo-
rary work. A great deal of recent academic papers have considered whether these partial
reforms made things ‘better’or ‘worse’. Zijl (2006) studies the impact in the Netherlands.
She concludes that temporary contracts have reduced unemployment durations, but seem
to act neither as stepping stone nor as dead-end job. The focus of our Chapter 4 is on the
impact of employment protection for the other types of contracts, regular contracts. In-
deed, although the share of temporary work has risen quite steeply over the past decades,
in 2004 still only 15 percent of all employment was in temporary contracts. Hence, we
focus on the impact of employment protection for the larger part of contracts.10
Figure 2.5 shows two other interesting sides to EPL in the Netherlands. One of
the reasons why the Netherlands scores high in EPL for regular contracts is the high
score for procedural inconveniences related to dismissal. Indeed, in this figure we even
score ‘number 1’in this respect.11 A recent reform attempts to reduce these procedural
inconveniences. Employees no longer have to go to court to make sure that they are
eligible for unemployment insurance. However, even assuming that this policy change
achieves the effect the policy makers are looking for, it is not directly clear that this is
the best course of action. Indeed, in Chapter 4 we will look at the productive role firing
taxes may play in reducing an excessive inflow into unemployment insurance.
Figure 2.5 further shows that at least on average, the Netherlands does not really
stand out in terms of severance pay and notice periods.12 The level of severance pay has
received a lot of attention in the recent policy debate. The social partners have tried to
reach an agreement on a reform in 2007, but in the end they could not agree on a reform
package. Recently, judges dealing with layoffs have suggested some reform of severance
pay. Workers will receive a bit less, and judges will also take into account the financial
situation of the firm. Figure 2.5 suggests that perhaps the need for reform in terms of
the average level of severance pay for employees is not that big. Furthermore, in Chapter
4 we will show that it is doubtful that severance pay plays an important role in the low
flows between employment and unemployment on the Dutch labour market.
9See Deelen et al. (2006).
10Actually, in Chapter 4 we do pay attention to differences in employment protection for new and older matches. However,
we do not consider the impact of a so-called two-tier regime where jobs with and without EPL co-exist.
11We focus on continental Europe and exclude Slovakia, the only country that gets an even higher score in 2003 for
procedural inconveniences from OECD (2004).
12Though severance pay for older workers with long tenure can be quite high though, see Deelen et al. (2006).
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Figure 2.4: The dual face of employment protection in the Netherlands in 2003 (index running
from 0=low to 6=high). Source: OECD (2004).
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Figure 2.5: Procedural inconveniences, and severance pay and notice periods in 2003 (index
running from 0=low to 6=high). Source: OECD (2004).
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2.4 Active labour market policies
Finally, when it comes to so-called active labour market policies (ALMPs), the story of the
Netherlands is again an interesting one. Where the changes in unemployment insurance
and employment protection legislation have been relatively minor over the past decades,
there were massive changes in ALMPs. But first, what exactly are ALMPs? According
to Martin and Grubb (2001, p. 12) these "... comprise a wide range of policies aimed at
improving the access of the unemployed to the labour market and jobs, job-related skills
and the functioning of the labour market ... ." Eurostat uses the following classification
for ALMPs
1. Public employment services This includes both the administration of various types
of benefits, like unemployment insurance, and job placement, counselling and voca-
tional guidance, sometimes in the policies below.
2. Training This can be either subsidized training in the public sector or the private
sector, for disadvantaged groups.
3. Job rotation and job sharing Various types of job pools.
4. Employment incentives Employment subsidies of limited duration, targeted at e.g.
the long-term unemployed.
5. Supported employment and rehabilitation Subsidized employment for physically and/or
mentally disabled workers.
6. Direct job creation Relief jobs in the public sector.
7. Start-up incentives Subsidies and assistance to give incentives to the entrepreneurs
amongst the target group to start-up their own business.
The first type is typically not counted as ALMP, since it also entails the expenditures on
administration, next to expenditures on job search assistance. The above classification
makes clear that the concept is quite broad, consisting of quite a heterogeneous group of
policies.
In line with the recommendations of e.g. the OECD (1993) to enhance and expand
ALMPs, these policies took a high flight in the Netherlands in the 1990s. Unemployment
had started to come down, but a hard core of long-term unemployed seemed to remain.
Figure 2.6 shows the dramatic rise and fall of spending on the ALMPs we will consider
in this thesis. For the period up to 1999 we use data from the OECD. Eurostat has
been cooperating with the OECD and collecting data since 1998, and we use their data
for the period 1998-2006. There are some differences in the classification of the different
types of ALMPs, as shown by the differences in the years 1998-1999 when the series
overlap. In particular, expenditures on training programs seem to differ a lot between the
classifications. With this caveat in mind, let us consider the patterns. Perhaps the most
noteworthy change is in spending on direct job creation. Relief jobs quickly became the
most popular ALMP in terms of public spending after the mid 1990s. However, by the
turn of the century this policy had fallen out of favour. In Chapter 5 we will consider
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Figure 2.6: Spending on ALMPs (as a % of GDP) in the Netherlands: 1990-2006. Source:
OECD (2001) and Eurostat (December 2008).
Table 2.3: Spending on active labour market policies (as a % of GDP), 2006a
Type of ALMP NL EU-15
1. Public employment services .47 .22
2. Training .13 .22
3. Job rotation and job sharing .00 .00
4. Employment incentives .13 .13
5. Supported employment and rehabilitation .49 .06
6. Direct job creation NA .08
7. Start-up incentives NA .04
Total (excl. 1., 6. and 7.) .75 .41
aSource: Eurostat (December 2008).
18 CHAPTER 2. STYLISED FACTS
why. Although less dramatic, spending on employment subsidies, for example wage cost
subsidies for employers that hire a long-term unemployed, also was on the rise in the
1990s, and dropped off after the turn of the century. However, in recent years they have
been on the rise again, perhaps for good reasons, as we will see in Chapter 5. Finally,
although we do not have a consistent series for expenditures on various training measures,
there seems to have been a pattern with rising and subsequent falling expenditures on
these programmes as well. We will also consider the impact of public training programs
in Chapter 5.
In recent years, spending on active labour market policies has come down considerably.
However, Table 2.3 shows that ALMPs have remained a pretty popular public spending
category in the Netherlands. We compare expenditures by type of ALMP with the average
for the EU-15. When we look at the total, by 2006 the Netherlands still spent much more
on ALMPs than the average in the EU-15. This difference would increase further when
we would also include spending on public employment services, a part of which goes to
activation measures. Looking at the different categories, we see that expenditures on
training are by now below the EU-15 average, and employment incentives have become
average due to the recent surge. Figure 2.6 suggests that spending on relief jobs has come
down a lot. What also stands out is the large spending on supported employment and
rehabilitation. Indeed, these expenditures have also been on the rise, from 1.8 billion
euro in 1998 to 2.6 billion euro in 2006, making it the biggest spending category in 2006.
Clearly an important and interesting story as well, but not one we will pursue in this
thesis. Given these developments, the impact of active labour market policies seems
another interesting topic to study in the Netherlands.
Chapter 3
Unemployment insurance and
individual accounts
3.1 Introduction
During their working life, many employees run a non negligible and persistent income risk
due to unemployment. The main policies that target this risk are unemployment insur-
ance (UI), active labour market policies and (ALMPs) employment protection legislation
(EPL). In this paper we focus on the system of UI. In particular, we consider the optimal
level of unemployment insurance and how so-called unemployment insurance savings ac-
counts (UISA) affect the workings of the labour market and welfare. Under a system of
UISA individuals are forced to save part of their income into an individual account out of
which benefits are paid during unemployment. Individuals are allowed to have a negative
balance which gives liquidity insurance for periods of unemployment. Furthermore by
nullifying negative balances at the end of the working life, as suggested by Feldstein and
Altman (1998), some risk pooling and redistribution, lifetime income insurance, remains.
Bovenberg and Sorensen (2004) and Stiglitz and Yun (2005) have shown that a UISA
system can raise welfare in theory. We will consider the main mechanisms in these papers
and some potential caveats below. The focus of this paper is on the quantitative impact
of individual accounts on the labour market and welfare. Unfortunately we have very
limited empirical knowledge on the impact of individual accounts for unemployment.1 To
study the impact of individual accounts we therefore develop and calibrate a lifecycle
model with unemployment risk to simulate the impact of individual accounts. In the
model individuals decide on consumption, savings and search effort, where individuals
may be constrained in their choices by credit constraints. The latter plays a crucial role
in the impact of individual accounts. We calibrate the model on the panel data from De
Koning et al. (2006) on the incidence and duration of unemployment in the Netherlands,
and the international literature on the extent of moral hazard and the insurance gains
from unemployment insurance.
1A notable exception being the recent study on the system in Chili by Reyes Hartley et al. (2010). They find that
individual accounts indeed improve incentives for job search, in line with the analysis below. However, this is not sufficient
to answer the question of whether or not they are welfare improving, a question we take up below.
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This is not the first paper on UISA in the Netherlands, see e.g. Kock and Den Butter
(2001), Rezwani and Hendrix (2002), Van Kuringen (2005), De Koning et al. (2006)
and Rezwani (2006). However, these papers still leave many questions unanswered. The
analysis in Kock and Den Butter (2001) gives an interesting discussion of pros and cons but
given their informal analysis the net effects remain unclear. Rezwani and Hendrix (2002),
Van Kuringen (2005), De Koning et al. (2006) and Rezwani (2006) give interesting data on
resulting account surpluses and deficits given current transitions between unemployment
and employment, but do not consider the impact of a UISA system on behaviour and
welfare. In this paper we try to go beyond the previous analyses to answer the question
whether individual accounts can improve welfare and how much if anything can be gained.
The analysis also tries to go beyond previous simulation analyses of a UISA system
for other countries. Brown et al. (2006) calibrate a model for a number of large European
countries where individuals are either 0, 50 or 100 percent unemployed over their working
life, which leads to an unrealistic distribution of unemployment over individual lifecycles.
Furthermore, they ignore credit constraints and do not compare a UISA with an optimised
UI system, which raises some questions on the welfare gains they find. Hopenhayn and
Hatchondo (2002) consider UISA in an extension of Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) to
multiple unemployment spells, and calibrate the model to Estonian data. Unfortunately,
they do not give the optimisation problem and first order conditions for the adapted model
with the UISA system, and the discussion of the simulation outcomes is an overview of
numerical results without discussing the mechanisms driving the results. Hopefully this
will be overcome when the paper is published. Until then, in this paper we try to be clear
on the mechanisms driving our results, and we go beyond the analysis of Hopenhayn and
Hatchondo (2002) by allowing the search technology to differ between age and education
groups and we calibrate the model on Dutch rather than Estonian data.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 3.2 we first consider the bare bones of
a system of individual accounts, illustrate how it works using some hypothetical lifecycles
and review some empirical bookkeeping exercises on how UISA affect the distribution of
lifetime incomes for different countries. Section 3.3 then considers how a UISA system
can improve welfare in theory. In Section 3.4 we review the empirical findings on the
moral hazard and insurance gains of UI, and the role of credit constraints. We use these
findings, and the incidence and duration data of De Koning et al. (2006) to calibrate a
lifecycle model with unemployment risk, in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 gives the simulation
results for UI and UISA. Section 3.7 then discusses some limitations of the analysis and
how these might affect the results. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 UISA: definition and accounting
In this section we consider what is meant by a UISA system, how such a system affects
lifetime income with the help of some hypothetical lifecycles, and review some account-
ing exercises using actual data on the impact of a UISA system on the lifetime income
distribution.
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3.2.1 What are UISA?
The unifying element of all proposals for UISA is that workers (and potentially employers)
are forced to save into an individual account when they are employed, rather than paying
a tax or premium. From this account individuals can draw funds during periods of
unemployment. Beyond this there are a large number of design options in a UISA system,
which we consider below.2
Savings into the UISA can be voluntary or mandatory. Mandatory savings may be
necessary to prevent individuals from claiming funds in times of unemployment via e.g.
welfare benefits, sickness benefits or disability benefits (to the extent that individuals have
a choice there). Mandatory savings may also be necessary when there is an element of
redistribution in the system, like nullifying terminal balances. Furthermore, mandatory
savings may be called for when individuals are myopic.3
The rules for withdrawing funds like eligibility conditions, replacement rates and max-
imum benefit durations are typically assumed to be the same as under the UI system that
is to be replaced. When negative terminal balances are nullified (more on this below), we
still need monitoring and counselling of workers that potentially end up with a negative
terminal balance. With more lax eligibility conditions (e.g. voluntary quits) or more
favourable withdrawal rights (e.g. a higher replacement rate) the group of workers that
may end up with a negative account will grow and moral hazard among this group will
increase.4
An important design question is how to treat negative balances, during working life and
at retirement. When individuals can not have a negative balance at any point during their
working life, the benefits from an UISA scheme as a device for intra personal redistribution
are severely limited and all interpersonal redistribution disappears. A scheme that does
allow for negative balances during working life increases the possibilities to use the UISA
scheme for intra personal redistribution, liquidity insurance. Furthermore, one can still
maintain some interpersonal redistribution on a lifetime basis by bailing out individuals
that end up with a negative terminal balance, lifetime income insurance. The downside
of this is that the moral hazard from the UI system remains for individuals who expect
to end up with a negative terminal balance. Furthermore, the taxes needed to bail out
the individuals with a negative terminal balance still reduce the private gain from holding
or finding a job. On the upside may be that the remaining lifetime income insurance
is targeted at individuals that face large or frequent unemployment shocks, they are the
2For a discussion of the pros and cons of different choices in a UISA system see e.g. Orszag and Snower (1997), Brown
et al. (2006) and Bovenberg et al. (2008).
3A downside of mandatory savings is that some individuals may be forced to save too much which they can not undo
with their free savings/borrowings. One way to mitigate excessive savings is to set an upper limit on the individual account
balance beyond which the individual is no longer forced to save into the UISA. Another option is to integrate the UISA
with the pension system.
4In this respect, one type of eligibility deserves special mention: early retirement. Individuals in the Netherlands can
decide to retire early, and the system typically assumes that the UISA funds become available at retirement. Some people
fear that individuals may use UISA to retire even earlier still. However, below we will argue that the incentives under a
UISA system to retire early may very well be lower than under an UI system. The former mainly has an income effect
(typically assumed to be small) whereas the latter also has a substitution effect (typically assumed to be large, at least
relative to the income effect).
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ones that end up with a negative terminal balance.
Some authors suggest a scheme where the UISA tops up a minimum benefit level
financed out of taxes/premiums (Van Kuringen, 2005), or a scheme where only the with-
drawals during say the first 6 months of unemployment (Sorensen et al., 2006) or after
the first 6 months of unemployment (to keep the role of UI as a subsidy to search for
alternative employment) are debited to the account. In this case there will be more moral
hazard but also more insurance relative to a UISA scheme where all UI benefits are part
of the system.
The discussion above makes clear that there are many different ways to devise a UISA
scheme. In this paper we will focus on a scheme along the lines of Feldstein and Altman
(1998). In their scheme we have mandatory savings, entitlement conditions according
to the current UI scheme and individuals are allowed to have negative balances during
their career. Furthermore, individuals that end up with a negative terminal balance at
retirement are bailed out, this is financed by a tax.
3.2.2 The effect of UISA on lifetime incomes
To illustrate how the Feldstein and Altman (1998) UISA system works we consider how it
affects the lifetime income for the following three hypothetical individuals. Lucky Luke is
a highly educated worker who only suffers from a brief unemployment spell after finishing
university and is employed for the rest of his life. Medium Mike is a somewhat less
fortunate worker who not only suffers from an unemployment spell early in his career,
but also suffers from a longer unemployment spell later on. Finally, Tough Ted faces
recurring unemployment spells. To be more specific, we assume that all three types of
workers enter the labour market at the age of 20 and exit when they turn 61. Workers are
uniformly distributed over the three types. They all have an annual wage equal to 1 and
an UI replacement rate of .7. Lucky Luke is unemployed for one year at the age of 20,
and employed for the rest of his career. Medium Mike is unemployed at 20 and at 21, and
also later on at 35 and 36, and employed in the other periods. Tough Ted is unemployed
at 20, 21, 35, 36, and also at 45 and 46. The incidence and duration of unemployment of
the three types are meant merely as an illustration.
Figure 3.1 gives the cumulated income gain for these three workers under a standard
UI system, financed by a premium levied on employed workers. When individuals are
employed they pay an UI premium to finance the UI benefits, in this case 6.9 percent (=
11 · 0.7/(3 · 41-11) · 100%) covers the expenditures of the UI fund.5 All individuals are
unemployed in the first period and hence start with an income gain from the UI system of
.7. Lucky Luke is employed in all subsequent periods and ends up paying L on net when
he exits the labour market at the age of 61. Note that this does not necessarily imply
that he would not like to participate in the scheme. When he does not know his type ex
ante he may want to participate because of the lifetime income insurance. Furthermore,
even when he does know he is Lucky Luke ex ante he may still want to participate if he
can not borrow income from future periods, he is willing to pay premiums later on to
56.9 percent is rather high when compared to actual rates, the incidence and duration of unemployment used are meant
merely as an illustration.
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Figure 3.1: Cumulated lifetime income gain or loss from UI
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Figure 3.4: Account balances and cumulated taxes, mandatory savings rate < UI premium
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have liquidity insurance when he is 20. Medium Mike is less fortunate than Lucky Luke,
but over his working life he is a net receiver from the UI find, he gets M on net. Tough
Ted is unemployed the most and ends up with a lifetime income gain from the UI system
of T .
When we flip the vertical axis, Figure 3.1 also gives the changes in lifetime incomes
when we would shift to a system of individual accounts without bailout, with the manda-
tory savings rate equal to the UI premium. In this case Lucky Luke gets to keep L at
the end of his working life, and Medium Mike and Tough Ted lose M and T respectively.
This may seem identical to abolishing unemployment insurance altogether, but there is
a difference. Under a UISA system individuals would still have access to liquidity dur-
ing periods of unemployment. Hence, although lifetime income under the UISA system
without bailout would (ceteris paribus) be the same as in the case where we abolish UI
altogether, the consumption and hence the utility stream could be different.
Figure 3.2 shows what happens to lifetime incomes when we introduce a system of
individual accounts with bailout at the end of working life. The mandatory savings rate
is set equal to the UI premium, 6.9 percent6, and to pay for the bailout the government
levies a tax on employed workers, which turns out to be 1.8 percent. Lucky Luke now gets
to keep his positive balance in the UISA at the end of working life, but still has to pay
some taxes to bail out Mike and Ted. Overall Luke now has to pay less into the system,
L′, because Mike and Ted will pay more into the system. Indeed, the mandatory savings
act like a tax for Mike and Ted, because they end up with a negative terminal balance.
In addition, they now also have to contribute to the tax to bail themselves out at the end
of their career, their effective tax rate rises from 6.9 to 8.7 (= 6.9 + 1.8) percent. In fact,
Mike used to be a net beneficiary of the UI system but now becomes a net contributor, he
now pays M ′ into the system. Tough Ted still pays less into the system than he gets out,
but over his working life he now only gets T ′ on net. Hence, ceteris paribus, individuals
that are infrequently unemployed gain in terms of lifetime income, and individuals that
are frequently unemployed and/or for a long time lose in terms of lifetime income, when
we move to this UISA system.
Figure 3.3 gives the individual accounts when the mandatory savings rate is set higher
than the initial UI premium, to 8.0 percent (1.1 percentage points more). In this case
all accounts are more positive/less negative. Hence, expenditures on bailouts and the
associated taxes to pay for them fall, from 1.8 to 1.3 percent. Luke is even better off than
under the UISA system above due to this drop in taxes. Although Mike now ends up with
a positive balance, he is still worse off than under the original UI system. He now paysM”
into the system on net, where he was receiving M on net under the original UI scheme.
Hence, ‘ends up with a positive balance’is not equivalent to ‘better off’. Ending up with
a positive balance only means that you pay for your own benefits over your working life.
Ted loses the most from the move to this UISA system, for him the rise in mandatory
savings is like a rise in taxes from 6.9 percent to 9.3 (= 8.0 + 1.3) percent. In the extreme
case that we set the mandatory savings rate so high that no one ends up with a negative
balance all interpersonal redistribution disappears, and we are left only with potential
intra personal redistribution over the life cycle.
6Again, this is merely an illustration.
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Figure 3.4 gives the reverse, when we set the mandatory savings rate lower than the initial
UI premium, in this case only 1.0 percent (5.9 percentage points lower). With this low
mandatory savings rate all individuals end up with a negative balance, even Lucky Luke.
Since there are no net contributors, the forced savings rate of 1.0 percent and the tax rate
for the bailout of 5.9 percent add up to the original UI premium of 6.9 percent. Indeed,
with a sufficiently low mandatory savings rate the system works out just like the initial
UI scheme. Hence, the UI system could be viewed as a special case of the UISA system.
3.2.3 Some accounting exercises using data
A handful of studies calculate the impact of moving to a system of UISA on the lifetime
income distribution, using data on lifecycle patterns of employment and unemployment.
We first consider the seminal study by Feldstein and Altman (1998) for the US, then
consider Vodopivec and Rejec (2002) for Estonia and conclude with the studies for the
Netherlands. Unfortunately, the studies consider different setups of the UISA in terms of
the mandatory savings rate and benefit levels/durations in labour markets that also differ
quite a lot. This makes it hard to compare the results. However, these studies still give
some idea of the magnitude of the lifetime income effects and the proportion of workers
that ends up with a positive/negative terminal balance with real life data.
Feldstein and Altman (1998) on the US
Feldstein and Altman (1998) consider the following setup for the UISA in the US. Indi-
viduals are forced to save 4 percent of their gross wages into their UISA. Withdrawals
are according to current UI rules across US states, typically a gross replacement rate of
50 percent and a maximum entitlement of 6 months. Furthermore, there is a five year
start-up period in which individuals contribute to their accounts, but UI benefits are still
financed by the government. Within this setup they consider five alternatives:
1. Forced savings apply to most of the wage income.
2. Forced savings only apply up to the median wage income, high wage income indi-
viduals are less likely to be unemployed.
3. A ceiling for individual account balance of 50 percent of wage income, sufficient to
cover one unemployment spell of 6 months.
4. A savings rate that depends on recent unemployment experiences, individuals that
are frequently unemployed are forced to save more.
5. Employers are forced to cover the UI benefits of the first five weeks of an unemploy-
ment spell of their (ex-)employees.
To determine the effect on lifetime incomes Feldstein and Altman use longitudinal data
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. They consider individuals that were a house-
hold head in 1967 and follow them up to 1991 (about 25 years). Taking the transitions
between employment, unemployment and non-participation (in this case retirement) as
3.2. UISA: DEFINITION AND ACCOUNTING 27
given, they come to the following results. Only some 5.2 (option 1) to 7.0 (option 4) per-
cent of the household heads end up with a negative balance at the end of the data period,
whereas some 1.4 (option 4) to 2.2 (option 2) percent experience a negative balance at
some point in the 25 year period but still end up with a positive terminal account (they
would benefit from the liquidity insurance from the UISA). Next they consider what this
means for the tax burden. Between 44 (option 1) and 58 (option 4) percent of ‘UI benefit
dollars’go to individuals that end up with a positive terminal balance. As a result, only
27 (option 1) to 39 (option 4) percent of benefits paid are now financed by taxes, the rest
is covered by individuals that end up with a positive account and by the contributions
made by individuals that end up with a negative balance when they are employed. This
drop in the tax burden will further improve employment incentives.7
Feldstein and Altman also calculate the impact on the distribution of discounted life-
time income. As noted in the Section 2.2 above, individuals that are infrequently unem-
ployed should benefit, and individuals that are frequently unemployed should lose, ceteris
paribus. Specifically, the latter will experience a rise in their total tax rate, since the
mandatory savings are de facto a tax for them. The lifetime income effects turn out to
be rather small, the largest change across all options is somewhat above 1 percent of
mean annual income. The lowest lifetime income quintile has a mean annual income of
12293 dollars (in 1991) and loses between 95 (option 1) and 132 (option 3) dollars. The
second and third quintile (from ‘below’) are typically slightly negative, whereas the fourth
quintile with a mean annual income of 40977 dollars gains between 94 (option 1) and 151
(option 3) dollars and the fifth quintile with a mean annual income of 71561 dollar gains
between 438 (option 3) and 468 (option 1) dollars.
Feldstein and Altman also consider the impact on account balances and taxes when
unemployment incidence would fall as a result of the UISA system. Specifically, they
consider how a 10 respectively 30 percent reduction in unemployment affects the results
for option 1 above. Let us consider the case of a 30 percent reduction in unemployment
days. In this case the share of individuals that end up with a negative terminal balance
drops from 5.2 to 3.7 percent, though still some 1.4 percent of individuals would have a
negative balance at some point but not at the end. The share of UI benefits that go to
individuals that end up with a negative account drops from 44 to 33 percent. The part
of UI benefits that has to be financed by the government drops further from 27 to only
14 percent. Indeed, with this behavioural change taxes for UI would largely disappear in
the US.
Vodopivec and Rejec (2002) on Estonia
Vodopivec and Rejec (2002) study the impact of introducing UISA in Estonia. In their
baseline simulation they assume that the contribution rate is set to 3 percent of the gross
wage up to a maximum account balance of 3.6 months of wages, which covers a 6 month
7A bit troubling is the assumption that for the first 5 years (starting in 1967), individuals pay in the account but
withdrawals are tax financed. This will make the account balances more favourable for individuals that are unemployed in
the first 5 years. Unfortunately, Feldstein and Altman do not discuss how this affects their results.
28 CHAPTER 3. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
unemployment spell with a replacement rate of 60 percent.8
Vodopivec and Rejec use data from the Estonian Labor Force Survey for 1995, which
covers retrospectively the period 1989 to 1995, and the Labor Force Survey 1997 and
1998. Potential pitfalls are recall bias and extrapolating from a period of transition
to a market economy. They use the data to construct synthetic lifecycles for workers,
connecting segments of work histories from workers with similar characteristics. They do
so for two periods: the early 1990s with low unemployment, and the late 1990s with high
unemployment.
Under the low unemployment scenario, 7 percent of workers ends up with a negative
terminal balance. Under the high unemployment scenario this number rises to 27 percent
of workers. 28 respectively 27 percent of individuals have a negative account at some
point in their career but do not end up with a negative terminal balance. Hence, a larger
proportion would benefit from the liquidity insurance from this UISA in Estonia than
from the UISA scheme of Feldstein and Altman (1998) for the US. Only 5 respectively
16 percent of all benefits paid needs to be financed by a tax under the two scenario’s, a
significant drop in tax rates.9
Vodopivec and Rejec also consider the effects on the lifetime income distribution when
compared to a hypothetical UI system with the same replacement rate, eligibility rules
etc. Under the low-/high-unemployment scenario the lowest quintile of the lifetime income
distribution loses .6/.9 percent of their lifetime income from the move to the UISA system.
The top quintile gains 1.7/2.8 percent of their lifetime income from the move to the UISA
system under the low-/high-unemployment scenario. The distributional gains and losses
for Estonia are larger than for the US.
The analysis from Vodopivec and Rejec (2002) illustrates that for a given mandatory
savings rate and given benefit levels/durations, a UISA system has a larger effect on the
lifetime income distribution when unemployment is high than when it is low. Furthermore,
in the high unemployment case more individuals end up with a negative balance and as a
result less individuals get better incentives under the UISA system. Hence, we should be
careful in extrapolating the results from Feldstein and Altman (1998) for the US to e.g.
continental European countries with typically much higher unemployment rates.
Studies on Dutch data
There are a number of studies that consider the effects of introducing an UISA on lifetime
incomes in the Netherlands: Rezwani and Hendrix (2002)10, Van Kuringen (2005) and De
Koning et al. (2006). Although the first two present some interesting data, we will not
consider them below, for two reasons. First, they use only one year of data on transition
probabilities to generate synthetic lifecycles. This raises the issue to what extent their
results depend on the state of the business cycle in the year from which the data are
8A replacement rate of 60 percent is higher than under the UI system in Estonia, a flat rate which Vodopivec and Rejec
calculate is less than 40 percent for the average worker.
9They also present some sensitivity analyses. For example, they show that the introduction of a grace period of 5 years,
following Feldstein and Altman (1998), leads to a fall in the share of workers with a negative terminal balance of up to 10
percentage points.
10See also Rezwani (2006).
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taken and may further lead to an underestimate of the persistence and recurrence of
unemployment shocks over the lifecycle. Second, they consider a UISA system where
individuals can not borrow.11 However, the ability to borrow is one of the key points of
a UISA system, to ensure that individuals have the same access to liquidity as under the
UI system. For these two reasons we will focus on De Koning et al. (2006) who use panel
data and allow for negative balances during working life, noting that the focus of their
paper is not on individual accounts though.
De Koning et al. (2006) use data from the Dutch IPO-panel for the period 1989-2000.
They know when these individuals were working and when they were receiving some kind
of benefits. Based on these data, they calculate transition rates between employment
and the different states of non-employment for the 12-year period, and subsequently they
combine the experiences of the different groups in the data to construct synthetic lifecycles
for the period from age 15 to 65. Here we focus on the results for the synthetic lifecycles.12
For their synthetic lifecycles they consider what would happen if we introduce a manda-
tory savings rate equal to the number of UI periods over the number of employed periods.
Some 60 percent never claims benefits and ends up with a positive balance. Another 13
percent claims benefits at some point but still ends up with a positive terminal balance.
Of the remaining 27 percent, 16 percent ends up with a negative terminal balance larger
in absolute terms than half on the benefits received. De Koning et al. (2006) distinguish
between two groups of individuals that end up with a negative terminal balance because
they argue that the latter group will never end up with a positive account due to be-
havioural changes. These results are not directly comparable with the results for the US.
In particular, benefit levels and maximum benefit entitlement are much more generous in
the Netherlands. But even with the same benefit entitlements, insofar as the difference in
labour market flows are not solely the result from differences in the UI system13, a UISA
will have a larger distributional effect on lifetime incomes in the Netherlands than in the
US.14
3.3 How can a UISA system improve welfare?
Now that we understand how a UISA works and have considered the effects on lifetime
incomes ceteris paribus, we now turn to the question of how a UISA can improve welfare.
The literature on individual accounts suggests that there are at least two ways in which
a UISA can improve welfare: i) more efficient liquidity insurance, and ii) more efficient
lifetime income insurance. Two recent papers provide a thorough analysis of the relevant
mechanisms. Stiglitz and Yun (2005) focus on liquidity insurance, whereas Bovenberg
11Though some solidarity remains in both papers. In particular, Rezwani and Hendrix (2002) consider a UISA system
where individuals are still covered by UI when they have insufficient savings in their UISA for the first 6 months, and Van
Kuringen (2005) considers a UISA system with a minimum UI after 6 months of unemployment.
12More on the 12-years data below, when we consider the calibration of our model.
13But for example also due to differences in employment protection.
14Then again, one could argue that this is because the distributional effect of the UI system in the Netherlands is much
larger than in the US.
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and Sorensen (2004) also consider lifetime income insurance. We consider the setup and
some key findings of both papers below.15
3.3.1 Stiglitz and Yun (2005)
Stiglitz and Yun (2005) show that the option to borrow against future income can im-
prove welfare when workers run a risk of unemployment. Their setup is as follows. In the
first period all individuals are working. In the second period individuals run the risk of
becoming unemployed. The risk of unemployment consists of an exogenous shock and a
job search decision by the worker who takes a random draw from a search cost distribu-
tion. After the second period everybody is employed again, independent of whether they
were employed or unemployed in the second period, for many periods up to retirement.
The motivation for this setup is that a large share of unemployment spells occurs when
individuals are young, and liquidity constraints may be particularly relevant for young
unemployed who did not have time to build up a large enough buffer stock of savings and
may not be able to borrow against the future returns of their human capital. Further-
more, by including an initial employment period Stiglitz and Yun are also able to study
the interaction with precautionary savings.
In this setting, Stiglitz and Yun first consider the optimal level of unemployment
insurance when there are no capital market imperfections. The optimal level of unem-
ployment insurance is lower when individuals are less risk averse, when the elasticity of
unemployment with respect to the UI benefit level is higher and when the duration of
unemployment is relatively short compared to the rest of working life.
Next, they consider whether it makes sense to give individuals access to their future
pension benefits when they become unemployed, integrating the UI system with the pen-
sion system. We could see this as a UISA where benefits are topped up by a loan, but
without bailout. Giving individuals access to their future pension benefits only makes
sense when individuals are credit constrained, otherwise they can implement the optimal
saving/borrowing scheme themselves. The point of allowing individuals to borrow is then
that "... a perfect capital market allows an individual to spread out the reduction in life-
time income over the working and retirement periods and thus to reduce the risk burden
associated with incomplete provision of insurance against unemployment. This is how the
capital market perfection improves the trade-off between insurance and incentive, thereby
enhancing welfare." (Stiglitz and Yun, 2005, p. 2049)
So the question is then whether or not the credit constraint is binding for unemployed
in their model? First of all, this is more likely to hold for unemployed youngsters, hence
the modelling choice. Furthermore, the young unemployed are more likely to be credit
constrained when optimal UI benefits are low and when they have less opportunities to
save in the first period for unemployment due to e.g. high mandatory pension savings.
For benefits they argue that the reserve is also true "[I]n the absence of integration, the
"third best" levels of first period savings and unemployment benefits will be higher than
15Since we are going to discuss another model in Section 3.5 below, we keep the analysis here informal. For the interested
reader, Appendix 3.A considers optimal UI in a first best world, in a second best world and the third best world with UISA
when there are liquidity constraints, in a simple setup with only two periods and two outcomes.
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they would be in the constrained optimum with integration." (Stiglitz and Yun, 2005, p.
2053) We consider the empirical relevance of credit constraints for the unemployed below
in Section 3.4.16
3.3.2 Bovenberg and Sorensen (2004)
Bovenberg and Sorensen (2004) show that next to more efficient liquidity insurance, indi-
vidual unemployment accounts can also provide lifetime income insurance more efficiently
than a tax financed UI system. In their setup there is no initial employment period, but
they add additional heterogeneity by introducing a potential scarring effect of unemploy-
ment on subsequent wages. There are three types of individuals: i) employed in both
periods (‘high income individuals’), ii) unemployed in the first period, employed but not
scarred in the second period (‘medium income individuals’) and iii) unemployed in the
first period, employed but scarred in the second period (‘low income individuals’). The
probability of becoming unemployed depends on initial search effort. In the second period
individuals can choose their working hours/employment duration.
Bovenberg and Sorensen show that replacing part of UI benefits in the first period by
a loan can improve welfare. The ability to borrow reduces the need for more distortionary
insurance, as in Stiglitz and Yun (2005). On top of this Bovenberg and Sorensen show
that individual accounts can give more efficient lifetime income insurance. However, for
UI this seems an artifact of their model setup. Individuals are unemployed in the first
period and employed in the second period. They can pay for the benefits in the first
period with a lump sum payment from their individual account or with a marginal tax.
The latter then distorts labour supply in the second period whereas the former does
not. The question is if this generalizes to a multi-period setting where individuals move
between employment and unemployment. When, as in e.g. the Netherlands, not only UI
premiums but also potential UI benefits rise with hours worked it is not directly clear that
the UI system distorts hours worked (the intensive margin).17 Hence, the more efficient
lifetime income insurance argument seems questionable. This is also the reason why we
do not consider endogenous working hours in the model in Section 3.5 below. The more
efficient liquidity insurance argument remains however. Below we consider the empirical
relevance of liquidity constraints for the unemployed. Specifically, we review the handful
of papers that looks at this question directly, and the handful of papers that looks at this
16Stiglitz and Yun also discuss some possible extensions of their analysis informally. One potential complication is myopic
behaviour, in which case the borrowed funds might still be perceived as a subsidy, and welfare analysis becomes difficult
when there are multiple selves over the lifecycle. They further note that one also has to look at distributional effects, in
their model all workers are homogeneous ex ante, though they argue that the distributional effects could in principle be
dealt with by an explicit redistribution scheme across groups of workers with different risk profiles. They also consider
the option of integrating not only unemployment and lifetime risk but also other risks into one individual savings account.
Indeed, they argue that "[U]nless the risks are perfectly positively correlated, ..., the integrated lifetime insurance system
will always bring some welfare gain." (Stiglitz and Yun, 2005, p. 2065, emphasis in original text) For the case of individual
accounts for various risks see e.g. Orszag and Snower (1997) and Sorensen et al. (2008).
17A similar observation is made in the related paper by Bovenberg et al. (2008, p.73 and footnote 3) "[B]y linking
benefits to contributions in an actuarially fair way, the savings accounts reduce the tax wedge on labour income. Social
security contributions essentially become benefit taxes. ... To the extent that existing social-security contributions finance
wage-linked benefits, they are in fact already, at least in part, benefit taxes."
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indirectly by considering the impact of unemployment on consumption. Furthermore, we
also consider how distortionary UI actually is in terms of increasing the use of UI.
3.4 Empirical studies into the costs and benefits of
UI
Below, we consider the costs and benefits of UI and the relevance of liquidity constraints
for the unemployed, all of which are relevant for the impact of a UISA. In Section 3.6
below, we use this information in the calibration of the model for unemployment risk over
the lifecycle.
3.4.1 The costs of insurance
Layard et al. (1991) reading from the older literature was that a 1 percent increase in
benefits raises unemployment durations by .2 to .9 percent. Holmlund (1998, p. 120)
is more cautious and suggests that "the "benefit effect" is hardly a firmly established
parameter." Indeed, he cites some studies that find no or even reverse effects, and gives
some rationale for this (for example, individuals are only entitled to UI after a period
of employment). He suggests that we should be careful given that there are few natural
experiments when it comes to variations in UI benefits. The more recent literature survey
of Krueger and Meyer (2002) suggest a value of .5. An interesting recent paper by Chetty
(2008) suggests that UI benefits only increase unemployment durations for individuals
that have no assets and no partner, i.e. for unemployed that are more likely to be credit
constrained.
Studies on the impact of maximum benefit durations also typically find a positive
effect on unemployment durations. For example, Katz and Meyer (1990) find that one
more week of UI benefits raises average unemployment durations by one day in the US.
Card and Levine (2000) find .5 days per extra week of benefits for the US whereas Lalive
and Zweimuller (2004) find .4 days extra per week for benefits in Austria. The positive
relation between benefit duration and unemployment duration is also supported by cross-
country studies, see e.g. Nickell and Layard (1999). Lalive et al. (2004) show that the
findings on the effect of maximum benefit durations is more mixed for studies on European
data (though most find a positive effect), and they review a substantial number of recent
studies. They further suggest that more recent studies (that take into account unobserved
heterogeneity, which is typically not the case for older studies) find on average a larger
effect (a range of .35 to 1.7) than the older studies (a range of .1 to 1.0).
For the Netherlands, Van den Berg (1990) finds that the elasticity of the unemployment
duration with respect to the level of UI is about .1, and the elasticity of the unemploy-
ment duration with respect to the level of unemployment assistance ranges from .1 for
high-educated workers to .5 for low-educated workers. Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1993)
estimate the effect of the benefit level and the remaining benefit duration on the exit rate
from UI. They do not find a significant effect of the benefit level, but they note that this
may be due to limited variation in the UI variable and collinearity among the explanatory
variables. They find that shortening maximum UI entitlement by one week reduces the
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expected unemployment duration by 1.3 weeks. In a recent study on Dutch data, Bloe-
men (2008) finds an elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the benefit level
in the range of .35 to .5.
Returning to the US, another type of moral hazard from UI works via spousal labour
supply. Cullen and Gruber (2000) consider the extent to which UI crowds out insurance
via spousal labour supply. They find that for every UI dollar the breadwinner receives,
the spouse works some 70 dollar cents less, quite a sizeable effect. Spousal labour supply
as insurance against unemployment may become increasingly relevant in the Netherlands
given the steep rise in female participation since the mid 1980s.
Finally, UI benefits may further increase unemployment by increasing labour costs and
hence reducing labour demand, either directly through higher UI premiums or indirectly
via higher wage claims by workers in the wage bargain, see e.g. the meta analysis in
Folmer (2009). Using a CGE model for the Netherlands which includes a wage bargaining
model De Mooij et al. (2006) find that a 10 percent reduction in UI and unemployment
assistance reduces unemployment by 7 percent, with a significant contribution from the
drop in wages to the overall drop in unemployment.
3.4.2 The benefits of insurance
Consumption smoothing
There are only a few papers that consider the insurance gains from UI empirically. Using
data on food consumption in the US, Gruber (1997) finds that a transition into unem-
ployment is associated with a sizeable drop in income of 6.8 percent, whereas remaining
employed has only a very small positive effect on consumption. What is the role of UI
in this drop? His estimations suggest that when we reduce UI benefits by 10 percent,
consumption in unemployment would drop by 2.7 percent. He also calculates the effect
when the replacement rate would go to zero, in which case consumption would drop by
22-26 percent. This implies that there is an insurance gain from UI. However, at the same
time this also implies that individuals have other means to smooth income over the states
of employment and unemployment.
Engen and Gruber (2001) find that the decline in consumption is 21 percent of the
decline in benefits. Furthermore, they find that reducing UI has a larger effect for single
heads than for married heads, consistent with the idea that spousal labour supply gives
additional insurance (see above).
Browning and Crossley (2001) study the consumption smoothing gains of UI using
data for Canada. An important extension is that they use information on asset holdings.
They find only a small average consumption effect from UI, a fall in the replacement
rate by 10 percentage points reduces total consumption by some .8 percent on average.
However, this effect is concentrated among individuals with no assets at the start of the
unemployment spell. A drop in UI of 10 percentage points decreases consumption by 2.9
percent for this group (reducing UI by 1 dollar reduces expenditures by 25 dollar cents).
They further find that breadwinners without a working spouse show a larger consumption
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response, though the effect for singles is insignificant.18
Bloemen and Stancanelli (2005) study the impact of job loss on food consumption
using UK data. They find that job loss is associated with a drop in food consumption of
17 percent, with a larger drop for households with zero or negative financial wealth. For
the whole sample, the replacement rate does not have a significant effect on the drop in
consumption. However, for individuals that have no positive wealth lower replacement
rates increase the drop in food consumption, with a 10 percent fall in the replacement
rate resulting in a 2 percent fall in food consumption (for single-earner households).
Studies on the importance of liquidity constraints
The studies by Chetty (2008) into the costs of UI in terms of moral hazard, and the studies
by Browning and Crossley (2001) and Bloemen and Stancanelli (2005) into the benefits
of UI in terms of consumption smoothing suggest that UI mainly affects individuals that
face liquidity constraints. We have no empirical studies into UI that distinguish between
individuals with and without assets for the Netherlands. Indeed, there are no empirical
studies into the consumption effects of Dutch UI. To get some idea of the relevance of
liquidity constraints for the unemployed in the Netherlands we consider two studies that
look at comparable data for the Netherlands, the US and Italy: Crook and Hochguertel
(2005) and Kapteyn and Panis (2003).
Crook and Hochguertel (2005) consider household debt holdings and the role of credit
constraints. They have data for both the demand and supply side of the market for credit
(credit applications and credit approvals). First they consider the demand side, credit
applications. They find that in the Netherlands, and even more so in the US, unemployed
individuals are less likely to apply for credit. This does not support the hypothesis that
unemployed individuals use credit to smooth their income. However, they can not exclude
the possibility that this is the result of constraints from the supply side.19
Next, Crook and Hochguertel (2005) consider the supply side, whether credit is denied
or less credit is given than demanded. They find that being unemployed has a small, pos-
itive yet insignificant effect on the probability of being denied credit in the Netherlands.
The effect is significant and larger in some specifications for Italy and the US. Further-
more, having an unpaid job does increase the probability of a credit application being
rejected in the Netherlands. Perhaps UI benefits and durations are so generous that we
do not notice the liquidity constraints that might surface when we significantly reduce UI
generosity. Then again, individuals in unpaid jobs and unemployed workers are probably
quite different groups as well, so perhaps we should not read too much into this.20
18Consumption is measured as expenditures. Browning and Crossley (2001) note that the drop in expenditures may be
all in reduced expenditures on durables. This may have little effect on consumption, individuals simply continue to live with
the old durables that depreciate slowly, and hence so does the consumption stream resulting from them. Unemployment
then merely shifts the purchase of durables backwards. They present evidence for this mechanism in the data of Browning
and Crossley (2000). Hence, the effect on expenditures may still overstate the effect on consumption.
19Some other findings of some relevance to this study are that credit applications fall with wealth (unsurprisingly) and
age, and when current income is above permanent income, in line with the standard lifecycle model of consumption and
savings. Income and education do not seem to have a significant effect on the probability of a credit application in the
Netherlands.
20Other findings are that income and education do not have a significant effect on the probability of credit denial in the
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Crook and Hochguertel (2005) conclude with an analysis of debt holdings, e.g. the result
of demand and supply. In all three countries the unemployed seem to hold less debt
conditional on the other variables, though the effect is insignificant for Italy and the US
and only borderline significant for the Netherlands. Whether this is because individuals
do not demand (additional) credit during unemployment, or whether this is the result of
credit constraints seems still largely an open question. Overall, a fair conclusion of Crook
and Hochguertel (2005) seems to be that there is no strong evidence that unemployed
workers run into credit constraints, though this may in part be the result of the generosity
of the UI system.
Kapteyn and Panis (2003) seek to explain differences in asset holdings in the Nether-
lands, Italy and the US. Their analysis is not as detailed as Crook and Hochguertel (2005).
In particular, they do not consider the unemployed separately. They argue that overall
liquidity constraints are more important in Italy than in the Netherlands or the US.
Summarizing, most studies find that higher UI benefits lead to higher unemployment.
A recent study by Chetty (2008) suggests that the moral hazard is concentrated among
individuals that are credit constrained. There is also some evidence that UI benefits help
to smooth consumption over periods of employment and unemployment, where again the
smoothing gains are concentrated among individuals that are credit constrained. Empir-
ical studies for the Netherlands also find that higher UI benefits increase unemployment.
However, there are no studies on smoothing gains of UI for the Netherlands nor do the
available studies distinguish between those individuals that are and those that are not
credit constrained. The few papers that look at liquidity constraints directly do not sug-
gest a significant role for credit constraints for Dutch unemployed, though this may in
part be due to the relatively generous UI system in the Netherlands.
3.5 A lifecycle model with unemployment risk
To study the impact of introducing a system of UISA on the workings of the labour
market and the welfare of individuals we construct a simple lifecycle model. We calibrate
the model to Dutch data on the incidence and duration of unemployment and the findings
in the international literature on the elasticity of benefit use and consumption with respect
to unemployment benefits and on the extent of risk aversion.
In the construction of the model we used the following criteria. First, the model has to
contain the main mechanisms through which UI and UISA affect the workings of the econ-
omy. In particular, we want to have risk averse agents so as to have insurance gains/losses,
moral hazard to prevent full insurance, and an endogenous consumption/saving decision
to study the interaction between free savings, UI and mandatory savings. Furthermore,
we want to have the option of binding liquidity constraints. Second, we want the model
to be parsimonious but also realistic. To keep the results tractable we divide the lifecycle
into only four phases, and shocks occur only at the beginning of each of the first three
phases. Still, we believe this setup below captures enough heterogeneity in unemployment
patterns over the lifecycle for a meaningful analysis of UISA. Indeed, we are able to take
Netherlands.
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Entry Young Middle aged Old aged Retired
‘Employed’:
employed N periods
‘Short term unemployed’: 
unemployed stuy*N periods + 
employed (1-stuy)*N periods
‘Long term unemployed’: 
unemployed ltuy*N periods + 
employed (1-ltuy)*N periods
Figure 3.5: Phases and shocks in the model
into account the differences in unemployment rates and durations between and within our
groups of young, middle aged and older workers. As a result the distribution of potential
terminal balances is in line with the findings of De Koning et al. (2006).
3.5.1 General setup of the model
Figure 3.5 gives the lifecycle phases we distinguish and the shocks that may occur. After
entering the labour market individuals go through four phases: i) youth, ii) middle age,
iii) old age and iv) retirement. All phases are of equal length N . At labour market entry
individuals draw a search technology with three possible outcomes: i) employment, ii)
short-term unemployment, or iii) long-term unemployment. The employed draw such a
favourable search technology that given their optimal search effort they immediately find
a job and hence are employed all through their young phase. The short-term unemployed
draw a search technology so that it is optimal for them to be short-term unemployed for
stuyN periods and employed for the remaining part of their young phase. Similarly, the
long-term unemployed draw a search technology so that given their search technology it
is optimal to be long-term unemployed for ltuyN periods and employed for the remaining
part of their young phase.
At the start of the middle age and also at the start of the old age phase individuals
draw another search technology with again the three possible outcomes of employment,
short-term unemployment and long-term unemployment. For simplicity we assume that
the probability of drawing one of the three outcomes does not depend on the draws
in the past21, though subsequent decisions/unemployment durations do depend on the
21In the calibration below, we do use data on the concentration of the unemployment risk over a 12-year period, but we
have no information on the correlation of the unemployment risk between these 12-year periods. However, empirical studies
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realizations in the past through asset holdings (but this effect is small). There is no
uncertainty beyond the old age period, individuals enter the retirement phase, after which
life ends. In all phases individuals have to choose their optimal consumption and savings
profile, given the technology and policy parameters. In the first three phases they also
have to choose their optimal search effort. We consider the optimisation problem for
the individual and the resulting first-order conditions for (privately) optimal behaviour
below.22
3.5.2 Labour market entry
When individuals enter the labour market they have expected lifetime utility
E[V 0] =
∑
dy
ρydyV
y
dy ,
∑
dy
ρydy = 1, dy ∈ {emp, stu, ltu}. (3.1)
where the superscript y indicates the lifecycle phase and the subscript d indicates the
search technology draw (employed, short-term unemployed or long-term unemployed),
ρydy are the probabilities of drawing the respective technologies and V
y
dy are the associated
remaining lifetime utilities at the start of the young phase.
3.5.3 Young
For the young we consider three setups in turn, adding more complexity in each step.
First we consider optimal behaviour given UI and in the absence of credit constraints.
Next, we consider optimal behaviour given UI but then with credit constraints. Finally,
we consider optimal behaviour given UISA and credit constraints.
UI and no credit constraints
After drawing a search technology young individuals decide on their optimal search effort
eydy , consumption path c(s) and end-of-period assets a
y
dy . Specifically, young individuals
suggest that individuals that were unemployed in the past are more likely to become unemployed again in the future, see
e.g. Heckman and Borjas (1980), and our model may understate the concentration of the unemployment risk over the
lifecycle.
22It may be important to note that there is no uncertainty on the unemployment duration once the search technology
is drawn. As most other papers that deal with unemployment insurance over the lifecycle (Bovenberg and Sorensen, 2004,
Stiglitz and Yun, 2005, Crossley and Low, 2005, but not for example Hopenhayn and Hatchondo, 2002) we assume that at
the start of the unemployment shock the duration of unemployment is known with certainty. This precludes a meaningful
analysis of the time profile of unemployment benefits (see e.g. Shavell and Weiss, 1979, Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997, and
Shimer and Werning, 2008). Indeed, in our setup the government could achieve the first best by setting up a system with
initial transfers depending on the search technology draw. We assume that this is not possible and instead consider only a
second best setting where the government sets the benefit level and the individual has some control over how many benefits
he or she gets by choosing the search effort. For the moment we leave a model with uncertain unemployment durations as
a topic for future research.
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solve the following optimisation problem
V ydy = max{c(s)}Ns=0,eydy ,aydy
{∫ N
0
u(c(s))ds− (e
y
dy)1+γ
1 + γ + E[V
m
dm(a
y
dy)]
}
,
γ > 0, 0 ≤ αdyeydy ≤ 1,
s.t. aydy =
∫ (1−αdy eydy )N
0
byds+
∫ N
(1−αdy eydy )N
(1− t1)wyds−
∫ N
0
c(s)ds, (3.2)
where u(.) is instantaneous utility, eydy is the search effort for search technology draw
dy, γ is a parameter to steer the marginal utility cost of search, E[V mdm(a
y
dy)] is expected
remaining utility in middle age, which depends on the search technology draw dm in middle
age and the (potentially negative) assets an individual takes from the young period to
the middle age period. αdy is the search technology associated with draw dy, a scale
parameter that translates a given amount of search effort into a given reduction in the
unemployment periods during the young phase, with the unemployment period during
the young phase equal to (1−αdyeydy)N . Furthermore, by are per period UI benefits when
young, wy are per period gross wages when young, and t1 is the linear tax rate for the
taxes used to finance UI benefits (see below). For simplicity we set the discount rate and
the interest rate on assets equal to zero.23
The value function depends on the sum of instantaneous utilities when young, the
cost of search and expected future utility which depends on the choice of end-of-period
assets. Note that the benefits of search only enter via the budget constraint for aydy , with a
higher effort eydy reducing the time spent in unemployment and thereby increasing lifetime
income. Below we will see that there is an additional gain from search when individuals
are credit constrained during unemployment.
The first-order conditions for optimal consumption, end-of-period assets and search
effort for the respective search draws are
c(s) = cydy , (3.3)
u′(cydy) = E
[
∂V mdm(.)
∂aydy
]
⇒ u′(cydy) = E[u′(cmdm)], (3.4)
eydy = max
{
0,min
{
(αdyNu′(cydy)((1− t1)wy − by))
1
γ ,
1
αdy
}}
. (3.5)
The first-order condition for consumption (3.3) shows that after a shock has been realized,
consumption will be constant until the next shock. From the optimal choice of end-of-
period assets (3.4) it follows that consumption will be set so that marginal utility of
consumption when young equals expected marginal utility of consumption when middle
aged, given the draw dy when young. Below we will see that the derivative of the value
function for the middle aged with respect to end-of-period assets when young equals the
marginal utility of consumption in middle age. The first-order condition for search effort
(3.5) shows that the individual will increase search effort until the marginal cost of doing
23More on this below in Section 3.7.
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so (the left hand side) equals the marginal increase in lifetime income times the marginal
utility of consumption when young. Since we do not allow negative unemployment periods,
optimal search effort hits a corner at 1
αdy
beyond which search is fruitless. Individuals
that draw the employed search technology are at this corner, they immediately find a job
at the start of the period. However, if the replacement rate would go to 1 they too would
choose to remain unemployed for some time. We further assume that effort has to be
positive.
From the first-order condition for search it is clear how tax financed UI benefits distort
search effort. Both the benefit by and the associated taxes t1 draw a wedge between the
private and the social gains from additional job search. However, since UI benefits also
imply a redistribution from individuals with a lower marginal utility of consumption
(employed) to individuals with a higher marginal utility of consumption (unemployed),
UI benefits may still be welfare improving (increase E[V 0]).
Credit constraint for the unemployed
Next, we consider the optimisation problem for a young worker when he or she is credit
constrained during periods of unemployment. For simplicity we will assume the extreme
case where a young unemployed individual can not borrow at all against future income.24
Individuals start with zero assets and benefits are lower than future wages, hence the
credit constraint is indeed binding.25
The young individuals now solve the following respective optimisation problems
V ydy = max{c(s)}Ns=0,eydy ,aydy
{∫ (1−αdy eydy )N
0
u(by)ds+
∫ N
(1−αdy eydy )N
u(c(s))ds
−(e
y
dy)1+γ
1 + γ + E[V
m
dm(a
y
dy)]
}
,
s.t. aydy =
∫ (1−αdy eydy )N
0
byds+
∫ N
(1−αdy eydy )N
(1− t1)wyds
−
∫ (1−αdy eydy )N
0
by −
∫ N
(1−αdy eydy )N
c(s)ds. (3.6)
The individual is now forced to consume only by during the initial unemployment period.
24Given the empirical findings on the consumption smoothing gains from UI this probably causes us to overstate the
insurance gains from UI. Then again, for the elderly we may understate the relevance of liquidity constraints since we
assume they have full access to their pension wealth. On average, the consumption response to changes in the UI benefit
level is in line with the empirical studies from Section 3.4, see the calibration below.
25In the calibration we will assume a rising wage profile which makes matters even worse for the credit constrained,
individuals would like to bring more income with low marginal utility from future periods to the present with high marginal
utility, but they can not. Note that this potentially leads to an optimal replacement rate larger than 1 in the model.
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The first order conditions now become26
c(s) =
{
by ∀ s ∈ [0, (1− αdyeydy)N >
cydy ∀ s ∈ [(1− αdyeydy)N,N ], (3.7)
u′(cydy) = E
[
∂V mdm(.)
∂aydy
]
⇒ u′(cydy) = E[u′(cmdm)], (3.8)
eydy = max
{
0,min
{
(αdyN(u′(cydy)((1− t1)wy − by)
+u(cydy)− u(by)− u′(cydy)(cydy − b)))
1
γ ,
1
αdy
}}
. (3.9)
The individual can only consume by while unemployed, and consumes a constant cydy in
the remainder of the young phase. Marginal utility of consumption during the subsequent
employment period is equalized with expected marginal utility in middle age. The search
effort of the individual will be higher when the unemployed is faced with a binding credit
constraint. Search now not only generates more lifetime income, but in this case also allows
the individual to smooth his or her consumption over the unemployed and the employed
period. This smoothing gain is captured by the terms u(cydy) − u(by) − u′(cydy)(cydy − b)
which is positive since we assume that agents are risk averse (u”(.) < 0). The model
is in line with the findings of Chetty (2008) that suggest that benefits affect the search
behaviour of credit constrained unemployed more than unconstrained unemployed.
With individual savings accounts
Finally, we consider the optimisation problem for a young worker who is credit constrained,
but now under a UISA system of the type we studied in Section 3.2. The individual is
forced to save p of his or her gross wage into an individual account when working and
benefits by are debited to this account. Negative terminal account balances at retirement
are nullified and this is financed by a linear tax on wage income t2.
With a system of UISA in place young individuals solve the following optimisation
problem
V ydy = max{c(s)}Ns=0,eydy ,aydy
{∫ (1−αdy eydy )N
0
u(by)ds+
∫ N
(1−αdy eydy )N
u(c(s))ds
−(e
y
dy)1+γ
1 + γ + E[V
m
dm(a
y
dy , uisa
y
dy)]
}
,
s.t. aydy =
∫ (1−αdy eydy )N
0
byds+
∫ N
(1−αdy eydy )N
(1− p− t2)wyds
−
∫ (1−αdy eydy )N
0
by −
∫ N
(1−αdy eydy )N
c(s)ds,
s.t. uisaydy = −
∫ (1−αdy eydy )N
0
byds+
∫ N
(1−αdy eydy )N
pwyds. (3.10)
26For simplicity we do not use separate notation to distinguish these optimal choices and hence also t1 from the ones
above.
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where uisaydy are end-of-period assets in the mandatory individual savings account, which
may be negative for unemployed individuals. The first-order conditions now become
c(s) =
{
by ∀ s ∈ [0, (1− αdyeydy)N >
cydy ∀ s ∈ [(1− αdyeydy)N,N ], (3.11)
u′(cydy) = E
[
∂V mdm(.)
∂aydy
]
⇒ u′(cydy) = E[u′(cmdm)], (3.12)
eydy = max
{
0,min
{
(αdyN(u′(cydy)((1− p− t2)wy − by) + u(cydy)− u(by)
−u′(cydy)(cydy − b) + φydy(pwy − by))
1
γ ,
1
αdy
}}
, (3.13)
where
φydy = E
[
∂V mdm(.)
∂uisaydy
]
. (3.14)
The interesting novelty is in the condition for optimal search effort. The term φydy is
the value of an additional unit in the individual savings account. This gives different
incentives for job search for individuals that expect to end up with a positive terminal
account and those that expect to end up with a negative terminal account.
First consider individuals that expect to end up with a negative terminal account,
their optimal search effort is
eydy = max
{
0,min
{
(αdyN(u′(cydy)((1− p− t2)wy − by)
+u(cydy)− u(by)− u′(cydy)(cydy − b))
1
γ ,
1
αdy
}}
.
For them, both the tax t2 and the mandatory savings p drive a wedge between the social
and private return from job search. And since p plus t2 is typically larger than t1 this
implies that their incentives for job search will be reduced.
Next, consider individuals that expect to end up with a positive terminal account.
Their optimal search effort is given by
eydy = max
{
0,min
{
(αdyN(u′(cydy)(1− t2)wy + u(cydy)− u(by)
−u′(cydy)(cydy − b)− αdyN(u′(cydy)− E[u′(cr)])(pwy + by))
1
γ ,
1
αdy
}}
,
after some rearrangements. Suppose for simplicity that u′(cr) = u′(cydy). The condition
above then shows that in this case the wedge from benefits and mandatory savings in the
job search decision disappears. What remains is the distortion from t2 which is typically
smaller than t1.27
27When individuals are myopic they may still perceive the mandatory savings as a tax and the benefit as a subsidy,
something we take up in Section 3.7.
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Now, individuals do not expect to end up negative or positive in all lifecycle paths, hence
the incentives in the model are a mixture from these two cases, depending on past and
future draws of the search technology. Furthermore, although the net effect on incentives
is not directly clear, below in the calibrated model we will see that most individuals end
up with a positive terminal balance and the net effect on incentives is positive.
Finally, it is important to realize that the effect of introducing UISA on search effort
will be smaller than an equivalent drop in lifetime income due to lower benefits. Lower
benefits not only reduce lifetime income but also make credit constraints more pressing.
The introduction of UISA does not increase the difference in consumption during unem-
ployment and employment, and thus does not benefit in terms of additional search effort
from more unequal consumption. Hence, we should be careful in using an empirical elas-
ticity from changes in benefits to the case of UISA. Indeed, Chetty (2008) suggests that
most of the effect of lower benefits works via the credit constraint that becomes more
pressing. Sorensen et al. (2006) use a rather conservative elasticity of unemployment
with respect to benefits of .1 in calculating the effects of introducing UISA in Denmark.
The analysis above suggests that they are right in doing so.
3.5.4 Middle age
Next, the individual enters the middle age phase. In middle age we assume that unem-
ployed individuals no longer face liquidity constraints, in part motivated by the empirical
studies above. Furthermore, in the base simulations with homogeneous agents, middle
aged and old aged individuals never have negative assets, so we might as well assume that
they are also potentially credit constrained, but this constraint is never binding.28 We
further do not consider the case with and without UISA separately, zero forced savings is
a special case that brings us back to the UI system. We assume that the search technology
draw dm in middle age is independent of the draw dy when young, for simplicity and be-
cause we lack the data to study the relation between the two. The only thing individuals
take with them from the young to the middle age phase are the free savings (or deficit)
and the forced savings (or deficit) in the individual account. The probability to draw dm
is ρmdm where dm ∈ {emp, stu, ltu}. The search technology draw is again exogenous (and
there are no endogenous separations).
Individuals in middle age solve
V mdm = max{c(s)}Ns=0,emdm ,amdm
{∫ N
0
u(c(s))ds− (e
m
dm)1+γ
1 + γ + E[V
o
do(amdm , uisamdm)]
}
,
s.t. amdm = ay +
∫ (1−αdmemdm )N
0
bmds+
∫ N
(1−αdmemdm )N
(1− p− t2)wmds
−
∫ N
0
c(s)ds,
s.t. uisamdm = uisay −
∫ (1−αdmemdm )N
0
bmds+
∫ N
(1−αdmemdm )N
pwmds,
0 ≤ αdmemdm ,≤ 1, (3.15)
28But this is under the assumption that they have full access to the assets that they accumulate for the retirement period.
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where do is the technology draw in old age, and E[V odo(amdm , uisamdm)] is expected remaining
lifetime utility in old age.
The first-order conditions for optimal behaviour of a middle aged person are
c(s) = cmdm , (3.16)
u′(cmdm) = E
[
∂V odo(.)
∂amdm
]
⇒ u′(cmdm) = E[u′(codo)], (3.17)
emdm = max
{
0,min
{
(αdmN(u′(cmdm)((1− p− t2)wm − bm)
+φmdm(pwm − bm))
1
γ ,
1
αdm
}}
, (3.18)
with
φmdm = E
[
∂V odo(.)
∂uisamdm
]
. (3.19)
Although past realizations do not have a direct effect on the probability of unemployment,
they do affect the search effort of workers in middle age via the asset position in an
individual’s free and mandatory individual account. In particular, when an individual
starts the middle age phase with more free savings consumption will be higher and hence
the marginal utility from search will be lower. This effect on search effort is however
small. More important is the asset position in the mandatory savings account. When
an individual starts with a more favourable UISA in the middle age phase, because he
or she was employed in the young phase, the more likely it is that he or she ends up
with a positive terminal balance in the UISA. In this case the wedge from benefits and
mandatory savings disappears in (3.18), and the search effort will be higher.
From the conditions above we can now determine that ∂V
m
dm
(.)
∂ay
dy
= u′(cmdm), so the value of
shifting one unit of assets to the future when young indeed equals the expected marginal
utility of consumption in middle age. Furthermore, ∂V
m
dm
(.)
∂uisay
dy
= φmdm , so the three φ
y
dy
associated with the three outcomes for dy branch into nine φmdm in the middle aged phase,
one for each combination of dy and dm.
3.5.5 Old age
Individuals then enter the old age period, which is the last working phase before retire-
ment. Also for old age we assume there are no liquidity constraints.29 Furthermore, after
the individual draws do there is no uncertainty left for the remainder of the lifecycle.
After the old age period there is only retirement and the end of life in the model. The
probability to draw do is ρodo where do ∈ {emp, stu, ltu}. This search technology draw is
also exogenous to the individual.
29Which, in the base calibration with homogeneous agents, is never binding anyway, assuming that pension savings are
fully liquid.
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Old age persons solve the following optimisation problem
V odo = max{c(s)}Ns=0,eodo ,aodo
{∫ N
0
u(c(s))ds− (e
o
do)1+γ
1 + γ + V
r(aodo , uisaodo)
}
,
s.t. aodo = am +
∫ (1−αdoeodo )N
0
bods+
∫ N
(1−αdoeodo )N
(1− p− t2)wods
−
∫ N
0
c(s)ds,
s.t. uisaodo = uisam −
∫ (1−αdoeodo )N
0
bods+
∫ N
(1−αdoeodo )N
pwods,
0 ≤ αdoeodo ≤ 1. (3.20)
This gives first order conditions
c(s) = codo , (3.21)
u′(codo) =
∂V rdo(.)
∂aodo
⇒ u′(codo) = u′(crdo), (3.22)
eodo = max
{
0,min
{
(αdoN(u′(codo)((1− p− t2)wo − bo)
+φodo(pwo − bo))
1
γ ,
1
αdo
}}
, (3.23)
where
φodo =
∂V rdo(.)
∂uisaodo
. (3.24)
Again, after the shock has occurred consumption will be constant, and marginal utility is
equated with (now certain) marginal utility in retirement by choosing the optimal asset
level at the end of the period. Furthermore, the search effort again depends negatively on
the wedge created by mandatory savings, taxes and benefits. But the wedge caused by
mandatory savings and benefits is nullified when the individual ends up with a positive
terminal account balance in the UISA.
Finally, again we can now determine that ∂V
o
do
(.)
∂am
dm
= u′(codo) and
∂V o
do
(.)
∂uisam
dm
= φodo . Each
φmdm in middle age branches again into three φodo in old age, so 27 in total, one for each
combination of search technology draw in the young, middle and old age phase.
3.5.6 Retirement
Finally, in retirement individuals solves
V r = max
c(s)Ns=0
∫ T
0
u(c(s))ds,
s.t.
∫ T
0
c(s)ds = ao + max{uisao, 0}. (3.25)
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This gives
cr = a
o + max{uisao, 0}
T
(3.26)
This implies that when the terminal account balance in the UISA is positive (uisao ≥ 0)
we have ∂V r(.)
∂uisao
do
= u′(cr). For lifecycles that end with a negative terminal account balance
we have ∂V r(.)
∂uisaoo
= 0. So the φ’s that branch out in each working life phase, are actually
expected marginal utilities of consumption in retirement of an additional unit in the UISA.
3.5.7 Equilibrium
Next to consistent optimal choices for consumption, end-of-period assets and search effort,
an equilibrium further requires that the tax rate is set so that tax receipts cover the UI
benefits, or negative terminal balances under the UISA. We assume that the population is
constant, there is no discounting and the four phases of the life-cycle are of equal length.
The tax rate that balances the budget is then simply the sum of the negative terminal
balances over the gross earned income of employed workers in all working lifecycle phases
(note that the terminal balances are the cumulative result of the preceding three lifecycle
phases). Note also that the UI system is just a UISA system with mandatory savings
p = 0, so we can use the same procedure for the UI and the UISA system.
3.6 Simulations
We calibrate the model above to Dutch data and run various simulations for an UI system
and a UISA system. We do this exercise first for an economy populated by ex ante
homogeneous agents and then consider an economy with ex ante heterogeneity in the level
of education and the associated differences in wage profiles and probabilities of becoming
and remaining unemployed. For both models we consider the optimal replacement rate
of UI, the impact of introducing a system of individual accounts, and the optimal mix
of mandatory savings and insurance. For the economy with ex ante heterogeneity we
consider the effect on expected utility per type of education and overall. For both models
types we also consider the impact of the presence or absence of liquidity constraints, and
for the model with ex ante homogeneous agents we also consider the impact of a different
value for risk aversion, the elasticity of the use of UI with respect to the benefit level and
an economy where the flows are twice as high (i.e. to compare the effect in a dynamic
US style economy and a sclerotic continental European style economy).
3.6.1 Ex ante homogeneous agents
Calibration
The instantaneous utility function is characterized by constant relative risk aversion
u(c) = c1−θ1−θ with θ > 0, so that u
′(c) = c−θ and u”(c) < 0.30 The empirical literature
30For simplicity we do not use e.g. Epstein-Zin preferences to disentangle inter temporal substitution and risk aversion.
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on risk aversion and inter temporal substitution suggests .5, 2 and 4 are all reasonable
parameter choices for θ, see e.g. Gollier (2001, Chapter 2).31 In our base calibration we
use a value of 2, but later on we also consider a value of 4, to see how sensitive the results
are to the degree of risk aversion.
Ter Rele (2007) gives wage profiles for a number of education groups in 2002, see Figure
3.6 below. For the young period we take the average wage of individuals aged 24-35, for
the medium period ages 36-47, and for the old period ages 48-59.32 This gives the following
monthly wages for the young, middle age and old age phase respectively: 1460, 1920 and
2240 euro. For simplicity we ignore technological progress and discounting and simply
take the cross-section of wages across ages in 2002 reported by Ter Rele (2007). Excluded
from wages are pension premiums, so total compensation is too low, but assuming that
pension premiums are basically a constant proportion of the wage, these wage profiles are
a good approximation of total compensation profiles.
To calibrate the incidence and duration of unemployment we use data from De Koning
et al. (2006), part of which is reproduced in Table 3.1. Table 3.1 gives the incidence of
UI, the average share of time spent in UI, and the share of UI users that use more than
2 years of UI, for their sample for the period 1989-2000. They report data by gender,
year of birth and an indicator for education. The data in Table 3.1 indicate that men are
more likely to use some UI than women.33 For those that do use UI, men and women
spend about an equal amount of time in UI during the 12-year period, and the share of
long-term UI users (> 2 years) is about the same as well. Regarding age, we see that older
workers are less likely to enter UI than younger workers. However, when older workers
use UI they use more of it than younger workers, which we can also see from the share
of older long-term UI users, in particular the cohorts born in 1925-1939. For the overall
use of UI in days per worker for the 12-year period, older workers seem to claim more UI
than younger workers. Regarding education, lower educated workers are more likely to
use UI and on average also spend more time in UI when they use UI.
In the model with ex ante homogeneous agents we use the data for the incidence and
duration by year of birth. For the young phase we take the data from the cohorts born
1970-1985 and two thirds of the cohorts born 1960-1969, for the middle age phase we take
the average from one third of the cohorts born 1960-1969, the cohorts born 1950-1959 and
one third of the cohort born 1940-1949. For the old age phase we take the average from
two thirds of the cohorts born 1940-1949 and the cohorts born 1925-1939. We shift part
of the cohorts to get three more or less comparable groups in terms of cohorts covered.
The group of employed in each lifecycle phase of the model is simply equal to the share
of individuals that did not use UI.
Next, we construct, with some abuse of terminology, a group of short- and long-term
unemployed. We divide the group of UI users per period in individuals that use UI less
than 2 years, the short-term unemployed, and individuals that use more than 2 years, the
31In Hopenhayn and Hatchondo (2002) relative risk aversion ranges from .5 for low wage workers to 4 for high wage
worker, where the values differ because they use an instantaneous utility function with constant absolute risk aversion.
32We do not take wages from before 24 and after 59 because it seems that low participation rates causes outliers to have
a large impact on average wages for those age groups.
33Which may be due to the higher eligibility of men due to longer employment durations.
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Figure 3.6: Annual wages over the lifecycle, by education and overall, 2002. Source: Ter Rele
(2007).
Table 3.1: Data from De Koning et al. (2006) on UI use: 1989-2000
UI users Ave. time in UI Time in UI Share > 2 year
Gender
Male .20 .15 .029 .26
Female .14 .15 .021 .28
Year of birth
1970-1985 .17 .10 .017 .09
1960-1969 .28 .10 .029 .19
1950-1959 .17 .14 .023 .32
1940-1949 .13 .19 .025 .46
1925-1939 .08 .40 .032 .72
Education indicatora
Low .23 .18 .042 .37
Medium .25 .12 .031 .22
High .18 .10 .018 .17
a The sample is divided into three groups of equal size according to their income, those with the lowest incomes are in the
low education group and those with the highest incomes are in the high education group. As noted by De Koning et al.
(2006) this may mistakenly put high educated women that work part-time in the medium or low educated group.
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Table 3.2: Parameter values and calibration outcomes
Parameter values
Employed Short-term unemployed Long-term unemployed
UI incidence ρ
- Young .79 .18 .03
- Middle age .82 .12 .06
- Old age .90 .04 .06
Replacement rate b/w .7 Wages
’Search elasticity’ γ 30. - Young wy 1.46
Risk aversion θ 2. - Middle age wm 1.92
Time units per phase N 168. - Old age wo 2.24
Calibration outcomes
Employed Short-term unemployed Long-term unemployed
UI duration (in months)
- Young 0 12 50
- Middle age 0 15 42
- Old age 0 18 76
UI rate (in %) 2.63 Tax rate t2 1.94
- Young 2.18
- Middle age 2.57
- Old age 3.14
long-term unemployed. Per age group we know the average share of time spent in UI, but
not for individuals that use more or less than 2 years separately. From the Ministry of
Social Affairs we have data on the number of individuals in a certain duration class in UI
for the period 2001-2006. These data suggest that the average unemployment duration
of individuals unemployed for less than 1 year for 20-34, 35-49 and 50-64 year olds is in
the order of respectively, 4, 5 and 6 months of UI. However, this is only for one spell. We
calibrate the data for a lifecycle period of 14 years. To get reasonable durations for short-
and long-term unemployed over a 14 year period we use 12, 15 and 18 months of UI for
young, middle aged and old aged short-term unemployed individuals, respectively. The
duration of long-term unemployed is then calculated so as to let the weighted average per
age group accord with the data of De Koning et al. (2006). The resulting probabilities
of becoming employed, short-term unemployed and long-term unemployed (ρ) and the
shares of time spent unemployed per age group are given in Table 3.2.34 The value for
γ, a technology parameter that determines the elasticity of UI use with respect to the UI
34We use the search technology parameter αd per lifecycle phase to calibrate the unemployment duration of employed,
short-term unemployed and long-term unemployed in each lifecycle phase.
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benefit level, is set to 30 which gives a benefit elasticity of .6, in line with the empirical
literature.35
The resulting UI rates increase with age: 2.18. 2.57 and 3.14 for the young, middle
aged and old aged respectively, with an average of 2.63. The tax rate t2 that balances the
budget is 1.94.36
Figures 3.7-3.9 give respectively the income, consumption and assets lifecycle patterns
for a selection of lifecycles. In particular we consider the profiles of individuals that are:
i) employed in all working phases of the lifecycle (EEE), ii) long-term unemployed in the
young phase and employed thereafter (LEE), iii) employed in the first two lifecycle phases
and long-term unemployed in old age (EEL), and iv) long-term unemployed in all working
lifecycle phases (LLL). We discuss some patterns of particular interest.
From Figure 3.7, we can see that young employed immediately start with an income
equal to the wage (for the young), the long-term unemployed first only receive benefits
and then join the employed and receive the wage (for the young). Income then remains
constant up to the age of 34 when they take a search technology draw again at the start
of the middle age phase. Note that the income streams for the young are the same for the
lifecycle phases EEE and EEL (and also for LEE and LLL) as the outcomes for the middle
and old age phase are still probabilistic when young. Also note that the income profiles
in old age for EEL and LLL almost lie on top of each other. Indeed, the additional wealth
that the EEL individuals take into old age relative to the LLL individuals (see below)
hardly affects their search effort in old age and hence their unemployment duration and
income pattern in old age.
Figure 3.8 shows the consumption patterns. Differences are stark between the young
employed and unemployed, a direct result of the assumption that young unemployed can
not borrow against future wages and hence can only consume their unemployment benefit.
We see that consumption jumps up in middle age for individuals that are lucky enough
to draw employed in middle age. Then individuals move into old age, relative to middle
age the differences between the individuals that draw employed and those that draw long-
term unemployed in terms of consumption are bigger. This is due to two effects. First,
long-term unemployment is longer for old age workers than for middle age workers (in
line with the data). Second, there are less remaining periods to smooth the income shock.
However, note that the drop in consumption due to the longer unemployment spell in old
age is less dramatic than the drop in consumption due to the liquidity constraint for the
young unemployed. Note also that consumption is the same in old age and retirement, as
there is no uncertainty left after the search technology at the start of old age is drawn.
Finally, comparing Figure 3.8 with Figure 3.7 we see that during working phases all
35We set this value somewhat above .5, which seems a focal point in the empirical literature, as most micro-econometric
studies do not take into account the effect of higher UI premiums on the use of UI.
36Van Kuringen (2005) presents data on macro expenditures on UI and the costs of running the system. The employer
pays 1.75% of the gross wage plus 2.45% over gross daily wages between 58 and 167 euros. The employee pays 5.85% over
gross daily wages between 58 and 167 euros. In total some 5.5 billion euro in 2005, with compensation for employees at
211 billion euro (CPB, 2007) this is about 2.6% of labour costs (for the private sector, the public sector runs its own UI
scheme). This is higher than in our model. Indeed, in our abstract model individuals are either unemployed and receiving
UI or employed, hence we ignore nonparticipation other than UI, this leads us to overstate the number of employed periods
relative to the number of unemployed periods.
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Figure 3.7: Monthly income (x1000 euro) over the lifecycle, with liquidity constraint
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Figure 3.8: Monthly consumption (x1000 euro) over the lifecycle, with liquidity constraint
3.6. SIMULATIONS 51
0
50
100
150
200
250
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
Age
EEE LEE EEL LLL
Figure 3.9: Assets (x1000 euro) over the lifecycle, with liquidity constraint
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
Age
EEE LEE EEL LLL
Figure 3.10: Monthly income (x1000 euro) over the lifecycle, without liquidity constraint
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Figure 3.11: Monthly consumption (x1000 euro) over the lifecycle, without liquidity constraint
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Figure 3.12: Assets (x1000 euro) over the lifecycle, without liquidity constraint
3.6. SIMULATIONS 53
individuals consume less then their wages, to save for retirement. Figure 3.9 shows this in
terms of assets. Assets remain at zero for young unemployed, but as soon as individuals
find a job they start accumulating assets. When they enter middle age the income shock
from unemployment is never that big that individuals run into trouble again by hitting the
liquidity constraint. So, as noted above, at least for the case with ex ante homogeneous
agents we might as well assume that they are also potentially liquidity constrained but
the fact that this constraint is never binding in any lifecycle path makes it irrelevant.
However, in real life at least part of these assets are in illiquid e.g. pension (and housing)
wealth, and unemployed middle aged or old aged workers may still face binding liquidity
constraints even though they have positive wealth. Also note that with perfect foresight
about lifetime length and without a bequest motive individuals build down their assets
to zero at the end of the lifecycle.
Figures 3.10-3.12 give respectively the income, consumption and assets lifecycle pat-
terns for the same lifecycles, but now in the absence of liquidity constraints. We briefly
discuss some important differences with the figures above from the model with liquidity
constraints. The income patterns are the same, by construction, because we change the
technology parameters αd to keep unemployment durations in the various lifecycle phases
in line with the data.
The differences start to appear in the lifecycle profiles for consumption. Without
liquidity constraints for the unemployed, benefits only determine part of consumption in
unemployment for the young. Indeed, the difference in consumption between the employed
and the unemployed is much smaller. Compared to lifetime income, the income shock from
the unemployment period when young is not that big. Also note that individuals that
draw the long-term unemployed search technology in all three lifecycle phases end up with
lower consumption in old age than in the case with liquidity constraints. This is because
they will have consumed more assets when they were young and long-term unemployed,
being able to borrow from future income.
The asset profiles show that the young unemployed now initially can run up a debt,
consuming more than their benefits, with the long-term unemployed still ending up with a
debt when they enter the middle age phase of the lifecycle. Further note that individuals
that draw the long-term unemployed search technology when young start borrowing, ad-
ditional consumption when young and unemployed is more important than in retirement,
but when they draw long-term unemployed again in middle age they start saving, the
need for additional consumption in retirement starts to dominate the need for additional
consumption when unemployed.
Varying the replacement rate
First we study the impact of changes in the replacement rate, and see if optimal outcomes
are in the vicinity of actual levels. Furthermore, we can also check some elasticities in the
calibrated model, like the use of UI with respect to the benefit level and the consumption
of unemployed with respect to the benefit level.
In our base simulation we assume that young unemployed are fully credit constrained.
Table 3.3 gives the outcomes for a selection of variables in the base simulation for different
levels of the replacement rate. For the base setup a replacement rate in the order of .6-.7 is
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optimal (the second best optimum). At this replacement rate the marginal insurance gains
from moving units of consumption of the employed to the unemployed equal the marginal
moral hazard losses due to reduced search effort. The first row gives the difference in
expected lifetime utility expressed in units of consumption.37 Low replacement rates are
not optimal because the marginal insurance gain is higher than the marginal loss due
to moral hazard. High replacement rates are not optimal because then the marginal
insurance gain is smaller than the marginal loss due to moral hazard. Furthermore, close
to the optimum, welfare losses from sub optimal replacement rates are small. Further
away they rise, up to 1.6% at a replacement rate of .1.
Table 3.3 also shows that a 10 percent increase in the replacement rate (from .7 to
.77) increases the use of benefits by 6.1% (from 2.63 to 2.79), in line with the findings
of empirical research. The tax rate rises faster than the unemployment rate, due to the
interaction effect of higher benefits and a higher number of recipients. The model also
gives us a consumption elasticity of benefits for the unemployed (not shown in the table).
In the base simulation, consumption of the unemployed rises by 2.8% when we increase
benefits by 10%. In the case where we assume no liquidity constraints for the unemployed
(see below), consumption rises by .7% when we increase benefits by 10%. The empirical
studies in Section 4 suggest a value for the consumption elasticity of benefits in this
range.38
In the last row of Table 3.3 we also give outcomes in the absence of moral hazard,
as an indication of the relative size of moral hazard.39 Specifically, this row shows the
difference in utility (in consumption units) between the outcome without moral hazard
for different replacement rates and the second best optimum with moral hazard at the
replacement rate of .6-.7. To get rid of the moral hazard we give the unemployed access
to the same level of consumption in unemployment, but the net transfer of unemployment
benefits and UI premiums (once employed) to the unemployed is kept constant during
the lifecycle phase. Hence, any savings on unemployment benefits due to higher search
effort and any additional UI premiums go to the unemployed, effectively removing the
search distortion. In this case we see that compared to the case with moral hazard, utility
is either virtually unchanged (for low benefit levels, where the extent of moral hazard is
limited anyway) or rises (for higher benefits levels). At a replacement rate of .6 the cost of
moral hazard is .1 percent of per period consumption, and at .7 it is .2. At a replacement
rate of .9 removing moral hazard changes the difference in utility with the second-best
optimum from -.5 to +.2. We can actually reach the first best level, by giving unemployed
a lump sum transfer equivalent to net wages for the duration of the unemployed period.40
37In particular, let V 00 be expected utility at the optimal replacement rate and V 01 be expected utility at some other
replacement rate. The first row then shows ((V 01 /V 00 )1/(1−θ) − 1) ∗ 100%.
38The drop in consumption upon entering unemployment also seems in line with empirical studies. In the presence of
liquidity constraints, consumption drops on average by 10.4% upon entering unemployment. Without liquidity constraints,
consumption drops on average by 3.6% upon entering unemployment. Gruber (1997) reports an average drop of 6.8% in
consumption upon entering unemployment.
39And the insurance gains from UI, at the optimum the marginal loss in moral hazard equals the marginal insurance gain.
40This is also true when there are credit constraints. In our calibration all employed workers consume less than their
income, and hence the inability to borrow from future income is no longer binding when income is the same in employment
and unemployment.
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Table 3.3: Varying the replacement rates of UI, base simulation
Replacement rate UI .1 .3 .5 .6 .7 .77 .8 .9
Util. dif. in cons. units a −1.6 −0.4 −0.1 0.0 0.0 −0.1 −0.1 −0.5
UI rate (in %) 1.81 2.01 2.30 2.45 2.63 2.79 2.87 3.30
Tax rate (in %) .20 .66 1.22 1.56 1.94 2.25 2.40 3.09
Util. dif., no moral hazard a −1.6 −0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
a Utility difference relative to the second best UI system, expressed in consumption units.
Table 3.4: Varying the replacement rates of UI, risk aversion +100%
Replacement rate UI .1 .3 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Util. dif. in cons. units a −23.2 −2.4 −0.5 −0.2 0.0 0.0 −0.3
UI rate (in %) 1.79 1.93 2.27 2.45 2.63 2.86 3.24
Tax rate (in %) .20 .64 1.22 1.56 1.94 2.39 3.03
a Utility difference relative to the second best UI system, expressed in consumption units in %.
Table 3.5: Varying the replacement rates of UI, moral hazard +50%
Replacement rate UI .1 .3 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Util. dif. in cons. units a −1.3 −0.2 0.0 0.0 −0.1 −0.3 −0.8
UI rate (in %) 1.61 1.78 2.13 2.36 2.63 2.99 3.66
Tax rate (in %) .18 .59 1.15 1.51 1.94 2.50 3.41
a Utility difference relative to the second best UI system, expressed in consumption units in %.
Table 3.6: Varying the replacement rates of UI, no liquidity constraints
Replacement rate UI .1 .3 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Util. dif. in cons. units a −0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.1 −0.3 −0.7
UI rate (in %) 1.98 2.13 2.33 2.46 2.63 2.88 3.36
Tax rate (in %) .21 .68 1.23 1.56 1.94 2.42 3.15
a Utility difference relative to the second best UI system, expressed in consumption units in %.
Table 3.7: Varying the replacement rates of UI, flows +100%
Replacement rate UI .1 .3 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Util. dif. in cons. units a −1.4 −0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.2 −0.5
UI rate (in %) 1.82 2.03 2.31 2.45 2.63 2.87 3.32
Tax rate (in %) .20 .66 1.23 1.56 1.94 2.41 3.12
a Utility difference relative to the second best UI system, expressed in consumption units in %.
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The first best leads to a rise in utility measured in consumption units by .3 percent when
compared to the second best UI with a replacement rate of .6 to .7. Hence, (expected)
utility in the second-best optimum is not that far from utility in the first best.
Table 3.4 considers the optimal replacement rate when we increase the coefficient of
relative risk aversion θ from 2 to 4. With more risk averse agents the optimal replacement
rate rises to the range .7 to .8, the range of current UI benefit levels, due to higher
insurance gains from UI.41
Table 3.5 shows the optimal replacement rate when we increase the elasticity of UI
use with respect to UI benefits from .6 to .9, a larger value seems outside the empirically
plausible range, by reducing γ from 30 to 20.42 With more moral hazard the optimal
replacement drops, to the range .5 to .6.
Table 3.6 gives the optimal replacement rate when there are no credit constraints for
unemployed youngsters. When there are no credit constraints, unemployed youngsters
can smooth the income shock from unemployment over the rest of their life, reducing
marginal utility from additional income in unemployment. As a result, the gains from
insurance fall. Indeed, the optimal replacement rate drops to the range .3 to .6.43
Finally, Table 3.7 considers whether a more dynamic labour market results in a dif-
ferent optimal replacement rate. Specifically, we assume that the probability to become
short-term unemployed or long-term unemployed doubles but that the duration of unem-
ployment in these states is cut in half.44 The optimal replacement rate is in the same
range as in the base simulation, though departures from the optimum seem to be a bit
less costly. Hence, we do not find that workers in more dynamic labour market need less
insurance. However, if the shortening of the unemployment durations would reduce the
importance of liquidity constraints, we probably would find a bigger effect of the dynamics
on the optimal replacement rate, so this result might be rather model specific.
Introducing individual accounts
In the base model above we then introduce individual accounts for unemployment. We
keep the replacement rate fixed and consider what happens when we introduce mandatory
savings into a UISA. The main goal here is to show what happens to the labour market and
try to understand the welfare effects under different assumptions. To determine whether
a UISA can actually improve welfare we have to go a step further by comparing a UISA
with the second best UI system, which we do below.
Table 3.8 gives the results for mandatory savings rates ranging from 0%, the initial UI
41In this simulation, we change γ (from 30 to 36) and the different αdy ,αdm and αdo for the different outcomes of the
search technology draw to keep ceteris at paribus. That is, we keep the elasticity of unemployment with respect to benefits
(evaluated at b/w = .7) and unemployment durations constant in the calibration.
42And again changing the αd’s to keep the elasticity of unemployment with respect to benefits and unemployment
durations unchanged.
43Again changing the αd’s and γ to keep the elasticity of unemployment with respect to benefits and unemployment
durations unchanged. Note that this simulation is not the same as when we abolish credit constraints, for we keep the
benefit elasticity and unemployment durations the same in the calibration.
44Due to e.g. a reduction in employment protection. That employment protection reduces labour market flows is a robust
finding whereas the net effect on the level of unemployment seems relatively minor, see e.g. Deelen et al. (2006).
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Table 3.8: Introduction of UISA, base simulation
Mandatory savings rate .00 .02 .04 .06 .08 .10
Util. dif. in cons. unitsa 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 −0.1
UI rate (in %) 2.63 2.47 2.26 2.23 2.16 2.15
Tax rate 1.94 1.20 .84 .58 .43 .32
Share never unemployed 58 58 58 58 58 58
Unemployed pos. terminal account . 14 27 30 35 35
Un. neg. term. account < 50% UI use . 13 8 6 5 6
Un. neg. term. account > 50% UI use . 15 7 6 2 1
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in %.
Table 3.9: Introduction of UISA, risk aversion +100%
Mandatory savings rate .00 .02 .04 .06 .08 .10
Util. dif. in cons. unitsa 0.0 0.0 −0.1 −0.2 −0.3 −0.4
UI rate (in %) 2.63 2.52 2.36 2.32 2.26 2.25
Tax rate (in %) 1.94 1.20 .84 .58 .43 .32
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in %.
Table 3.10: Introduction of UISA, moral hazard +50%
Mandatory savings rate .00 .02 .04 .06 .08 .10
Util. dif. in con. unitsa 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
UI rate (in %) 2.63 2.39 2.08 2.04 1.92 1.91
Tax rate (in %) 1.94 1.19 .83 .57 .42 .31
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in %.
Table 3.11: Introduction of UISA, no liquidity constraints
Mandatory savings rate .00 .02 .04 .06 .08 .10
Util. dif. in cons. unitsa 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
UI rate (in %) 2.63 2.41 2.18 2.14 2.04 2.04
Tax rate (in %) 1.94 1.19 .83 .57 .42 .31
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in %.
Table 3.12: Introduction of UISA, flows +100%
Mandatory savings rate .00 .02 .04 .06 .08 .10
Util. dif. in cons. unitsa 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
UI rate (in %) 2.63 2.32 2.20 2.18 2.11 2.09
Tax rate (in %) 1.94 .89 .45 .20 .05 .01
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in %.
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system, to 10% (for expositional purposes). Let us first consider the effect on unemploy-
ment and taxes. The higher the saving rate the more people will end up with a positive
terminal account. This implies that for more people the distortion from the benefits and
the mandatory savings disappears. In the model this dominates the worse incentives due
to a higher effective tax rate for individuals that end up with a negative terminal account.
Time in UI falls, for example by 14 percent for a mandatory savings rate of 4 percent.
With less individuals in unemployment and more contributions to the individual accounts
the negative account balances shrink, leading to a substantial drop in the tax rate, by
more than 50 percent in the case of a mandatory savings rate of 4%.
Turning to welfare, we see that for a mandatory savings rate of 4% welfare increases.
This is the gain in expected utility, ex post individuals that end up with a negative
terminal balance still lose relative to the UI system. However there are a number of
competing explanations for this welfare gain, the UISA may provide more efficient liquidity
insurance but may also simply reduce the level of insurance, and the optimal UI on a finer
grid is somewhat below .7. Below we disentangle these potential gains. Table 3.8 also
shows that for a sufficiently high mandatory savings rate welfare will start to fall, indeed
the result is an inefficiently large drop in risk pooling among individuals.
Finally, we also report the shares of individuals that end up with different balances.
Without behavioural changes, De Koning et al. (2006, Box 3.2, p. 37) compute that
57% never use UI over the lifecycle, 16 percent uses UI at some point but ends up with
a positive terminal balance, 10 percent ends up with a negative balance of less than 50
percent of benefits used and 17 percent ends up with a negative balance of more than 50
percent of benefits used. The simulation that comes closest to their mandatory savings
rate (1.4-1.9 percent) is 2.0%. We get numbers that are very close: 58, 14, 13 and 15
percent respectively. This does not come as a surprise since we calibrated our incidence
and durations on their data. However, to arrive at this distribution it was necessary to
distinguish between short- and long-term unemployed in our simulation model, and this
distribution seems adequate to capture a realistic distribution of terminal balances. Table
3.8 further shows that even for a mandatory savings rate of 10 percent, 7 percent of the
individuals still ends up with a negative terminal balance.
Table 3.9 shows what happens when we increase risk aversion. In this case a UISA
does not improve welfare. The optimal replacement rate in the UI system is above .7 in
this case (see above), and the UISA works in the wrong direction by effectively reducing
it. Indeed, beyond 2% welfare already begins to fall. This is another illustration of
the remark before that it is important to choose the optimal combination of mandatory
savings and benefit levels. The results on unemployment, tax rates and the distribution
of terminal balances (not in tables 3.9-3.12) are not qualitatively affected.
Table 3.10 shows how the results for the UISA change when we increase the moral
hazard in UI. The optimal UI replacement rate is then lower, and higher mandatory
savings achieve this, up to a mandatory savings rate of 8% welfare increases. Table 3.11
illustrates a similar effect, without credit constraints the optimal replacement rate is lower
and the UISA reduce the sub optimal high level of risk pooling. Finally, again the results
are basically the same for the more dynamic labour market, see Table 3.12, though the
range of mandatory savings rates that generate a welfare improvement is not somewhat
wider. Furthermore, unemployment drops more than in the more polarised labour market
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in the base simulation.
The optimal mix of mandatory savings and replacement rates
Above we already noted that comparing a UISA with a sub optimal UI system makes it
hard to determine where the gains from a UISA are coming from. Here we consider a
grid of combinations of mandatory savings rates and replacement rates to see whether a
UISA can improve welfare starting from an optimised UI system.
Table 3.13 gives the welfare effects of different combinations of mandatory savings rates
(columns) and replacement rates (rows), relative to the UI system with zero mandatory
savings and a replacement rate of .7, in terms of changes in consumption units. In the first
column we see that when we look at the second digit, an UI system with a replacement
rate of 60 percent is actually superior to the UI system with a replacement rate of 70
percent. Then we see that for all replacement rates below 60 percent in Table 6.13
welfare falls with the introduction of mandatory savings. The insurance is insufficient to
start with and this becomes worse with the introduction of individual accounts. However,
starting from the optimal UI system with a replacement rate of 60 percent we see that
mandatory savings up to 3% can (slightly) improve welfare. Giving some individuals
support only through liquidity reduces the distortionary effect of UI benefits leading to
an overall welfare gain. However, we can do even better, the biggest welfare gain, .07
percent in terms of consumption relative to the initial UI scheme (.05 percent relative
to the optimal UI scheme), comes from a combination of a replacement rate of .7 and a
mandatory savings rate of 4 percent. This is because the UISA scheme can target the
insurance to individuals that suffer long unemployment spells. Note that the gain is still
relatively small though, <.1% in consumption terms. Note also that for all replacement
rates there is a point where more mandatory savings are no longer optimal. This suggests
that liquidity alone is not optimal, some (targeted) insurance is always optimal.45 Finally,
note that as a policy maker you need quite precise knowledge on the extent of e.g. moral
hazard and risk aversion. For example, picking the right savings rate of 4% in Table 3.13
but picking the wrong replacement rate, say .6 or .8 instead of .7 already leads to an
inferior outcome compared to the second best UI system with a replacement rate of .6.
Given our limited knowledge of moral hazard and risk aversion, a mistake is easy to make,
making it less likely that welfare will rise.
The next question is whether some welfare gains remain when we assume that there
are no liquidity constraints? Table 3.14 gives the results when there are no liquidity
constraints. Perhaps the first thing to notice is that even for low replacement rates the
welfare effects are now relatively small. Indeed, without liquidity constraints even long
unemployment spells are not that big a deal as employment spells are much longer still.
Now that we have more precision we can see that 50 percent is actually the optimal
45Also note that for very high replacement rates and mandatory savings rates the model does not solve anymore. This
happens because some individuals would like to exert negative search effort. For a high mandatory savings rate still some
long-term unemployed end up with a negative terminal account, making income in employment lower than income in
unemployment, hence zero search effort is optimal. We do not fix the numerical problems in these simulations by setting
the search effort of these groups to zero because these mandatory savings rate and replacement rate combinations are not
that interesting anyway.
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Table 3.13: Welfare effects combinations mandatory savings and RR, base simulationa
SR/RR .00 .01 .02 .03 .04 .06 .08 .10
.10 −1.63 −1.68 −1.73 −1.73 −1.74 −1.74 −1.74 −1.74
.20 −.75 −.79 −.84 −.89 −.93 −.95 −.95 −.95
.30 −.39 −.42 −.46 −.50 −.54 −.64 −.65 −.66
.40 −.17 −.18 −.21 −.25 −.28 −.36 −.45 −.47
.50 −.04 −.04 −.04 −.07 −.11 −.16 −.24 −.34
.60 .02 .03 .04 .03 .01 −.03 −.10 −.17
.70 .00 −.02 .03 .06 .07 .02 .00 −.06
.80 −.12 −.14 −.03 .04 .01 .03 .04 −.01
.90 −.46 −.50 −.55 −.31 −.38 −.29 NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in %.
Table 3.14: Welfare effects combinations mandatory savings and RR, no liquidity constraintsa
SR/RR .00 .01 .02 .03 .04 .06 .08 .10
.10 −.10 −.15 −.20 −.20 −.20 −.20 −.20 −.20
.20 −.01 −.05 −.10 −.14 −.19 −.20 −.20 −.20
.30 .05 .03 −.01 −.05 −.09 −.19 −.20 −.20
.40 .09 .09 .06 .02 −.01 −.09 −.18 −.19
.50 .10 .11 .11 .08 .04 −.01 −.09 −.18
.60 .08 .11 .12 .12 .09 .05 −.01 −.09
.70 .00 −.02 .05 .11 .11 .06 .04 −.02
.80 −.16 −.18 −.05 −.08 .04 .03 −.02 .01
.90 −.56 −.60 −.66 −.38 −.45 −.34 NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in %.
Table 3.15: Welfare effects combinations mandatory savings and RR, risk aversion +100%a
SR/RR .00 .01 .02 .03 .04 .06 .08 .10
.10 −54.63 −54.71 −54.80 −54.81 −54.81 −54.81 −54.81 −54.81
.20 −16.78 −17.01 −17.26 −17.52 −17.81 −17.89 −17.90 −17.90
.30 −6.89 −7.13 −7.39 −7.66 −7.96 −8.63 −8.73 −8.80
.40 −3.39 −3.57 −3.79 −4.05 −4.30 −4.88 −5.59 −5.73
.50 −1.46 −1.60 −1.72 −1.94 −2.19 −2.66 −3.24 −3.97
.60 −.43 −.49 −.58 −.72 −.91 −1.31 −1.77 −2.37
.70 .00 −.10 −.10 −.12 −.20 −.56 −.87 −1.33
.80 −.07 −.15 .02 .14 .07 −.16 −.36 −.72
.90 −.85 −.95 −1.10 −.59 −.82 −.51 NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in %.
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Table 3.16: Welfare effects combinations mandatory savings and RR, moral hazard +50%a
SR/RR .00 .01 .02 .03 .04 .06 .08 .10
.10 −1.19 −1.24 −1.28 −1.29 −1.29 −1.29 −1.29 −1.29
.20 −.44 −.48 −.52 −.56 −.60 −.61 −.61 −.61
.30 −.14 −.16 −.20 −.24 −.28 −.36 −.37 −.37
.40 .01 .01 −.02 −.06 −.08 −.16 −.23 −.24
.50 .07 .08 .10 .06 .03 −.01 −.09 −.19
.60 .08 .11 .15 .14 .11 .09 .03 −.05
.70 .00 −.02 .05 .14 .15 .10 .10 .04
.80 −.21 −.23 −.26 −.10 .02 .07 .02 .07
.90 −.74 −.80 −.87 −.96 −.58 −.42 NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in %.
Table 3.17: Welfare effects combinations mandatory savings and RR, flows +100%a
SR/RR .00 .01 .02 .03 .04 .06 .08 .10
.10 −1.37 −1.41 −1.41 −1.41 −1.41 −1.41 −1.41 −1.41
.20 −.59 −.61 −.64 −.65 −.65 −.65 −.65 −.65
.30 −.27 −.29 −.32 −.34 −.35 −.35 −.35 −.35
.40 −.09 −.09 −.11 −.14 −.16 −.17 −.17 −.17
.50 .01 .03 .02 .00 −.03 −.06 −.06 −.06
.60 .04 .08 .09 .09 .07 .01 .01 .01
.70 .00 .04 .11 .10 .11 .06 .05 .04
.80 −.13 −.04 .01 .07 .10 .09 .02 .07
.90 −.49 −.51 −.31 −.09 −.09 .02 NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in %.
replacement rate without credit constraints. What is interesting is that starting from
this optimal replacement rate some mandatory savings of 1-2 percent can still improve
welfare, and a combination of 60 percent and 2-3 percent of mandatory savings does
even better. Since we assume there are no liquidity constraints, this can not come from
more efficient liquidity insurance. So, where does this welfare gain come from? The
answer is that a UISA implicitly differentiates in the replacement rate for individuals that
face short unemployment spells and those that face long unemployment spells over the
lifecycle, i.e. those that become unemployed when they are young and those that become
unemployed when they are old. The UI system is only optimised under the restriction
that the replacement rate is the same for all lifecycle phases (and the same for short-
and long-term unemployed). To study this issue we did a grid search to look for the
optimal combination of replacement rates for individuals in the young, middle age and
old age phase. The optimal replacement rates for these three groups when there are
no credit constraints turns out to be 10, 25 en 70 percent respectively.46 The trade-
off between insurance and moral hazard shifts in favour of insurance for older workers.
46In the case of credit constraints for young unemployed their optimal replacement rate rises to 65%.
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Most individuals that are only unemployed when they are young still end up with a
positive terminal balance, those that are unemployed when they are old typically end up
with a negative terminal balance. In this way the UISA gives more insurance to older
workers. When we start from the optimal replacement rates for the different lifecycle
phases, mandatory savings no longer raise welfare in the simulations. Hence, again this
welfare gain can be achieved by optimising the UI system.
Table 3.15 shows that when risk aversion is higher the optimal combination is less
mandatory saving, 3 percent relative to 4 percent in the base case, and more insurance,
a replacement rate of 80 percent compared to 70 percent in the base case.
Table 3.16 shows that with 50% more moral hazard the optimal combination does
not really change. But now there is another optimum which has a bit less insurance,
60 percent. Table 3.17 shows that higher flows basically result in the same optimal
combination for savings and insurance in our setup, again suggesting that making the
labour market more dynamic does not necessarily lead to a stronger case for UISA.
3.6.2 Ex ante heterogeneous agents
Next we consider optimal UI, the introduction of a UISA and the optimal combination of
mandatory savings and replacement rates in a setup where individuals are ex ante hetero-
geneous (next to having different lifecycle outcomes for employment and unemployment
ex post). Specifically, we divide the working population in three education groups: low,
medium and high educated.
Calibration
In each lifecycle phase, the education groups differ in their wages, and the incidence and
duration of UI use. The parameters and some values in the calibration are given in Table
3.18.
The groups are by construction of equal size, in line with the grouping of De Koning et
al. (2006) so as to fit the model to their incidence and duration data by education. The
incidence data per lifecycle phase and by education are taken directly from De Koning
et al. (2006), see Table 3.1. We use the same methodology as in the homogeneous case
to construct the UI durations of short- and long-term unemployed per lifecycle phase,
i.e. assume durations for short-term unemployed based on information of the Ministry
of Social Affairs and Employment and then calculate the average duration in long-term
unemployment so that the average UI duration per lifecycle phase and education matches
the data from De Koning et al. (2006). For simplicity we assume that the duration
of short-term unemployment is the same for the three education groups. The resulting
outcomes for incidence in Table 3.19 reflect the inputs from Table 3.1 discussed above.
The low educated are more likely to enter UI than the high educated, and also have a
longer average duration in UI.
We take the wage profiles from Ter Rele (2007), see Figure 3.6. Specifically, for the
low educated we use the average wage of those individuals with only elementary and those
with the lowest level of secondary education. For the high educated we take individuals
with higher vocational training or a university degree. The rest is medium educated. The
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Table 3.18: Parameter values and calibration outcomes, ex ante heterogeneity
Parameter values
UI incidence ρ Employed Short-term unemployed Long-term unemployed
Low educated
- Young .78 .18 .04
- Middle age .81 .10 .09
- Old age .90 .01 .09
Medium educated
- Young .76 .21 .03
- Middle age .80 .14 .06
- Old age .89 .05 .06
High educated
- Young .83 .15 .02
- Middle age .85 .12 .03
- Old age .92 .05 .03
Low educated Medium educated High educated
Wages
- Young 1.26 1.41 1.71
- Middle age 1.43 1.81 2.48
- Old age 1.56 2.02 3.11
Replacement rate b/w .7 Search elasticity γ 30.
Risk aversion θ 2. Time units per phase N 168.
Calibration outcomes
UI duration (in months) Employed Short-term unemployed Long-term unemployed
- Low educated
– Young 0. 12 71
– Middle age 0. 15 50
– Old age 0. 18 77
- Medium educated
– Young 0. 12 42
– Middle age 0. 15 37
– Old age 0. 18 74
- High educated
– Young 0. 12 22
– Middle age 0. 15 27
– Old age 0. 18 71
UI rate (in %) Low educated Medium educated High educated
All lifecycle phases 3.45 2.47 1.41
- Young 2.96 2.25 1.32
- Middle age 3.63 2.57 1.55
- Old age 4.28 3.19 1.82
Overall UI rate (in %) 2.62
Tax rate t2 1.78
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resulting average wages per education for the three different lifecycle phases are given in
Table 3.18. In particular in the later stage of life wages between low and high educated
start to diverge.47
Table 3.18 also gives some aggregate variables. The UI rate falls with education,
with the low educated being more than twice as often unemployed as the high educated.
Furthermore, the tax rate t2 that balances the budget of 1.78 in the heterogeneous agents
case is lower than the 1.94 in the homogeneous case. The reason for this is that low
educated are more likely to use UI than high educated and they get lower benefits48, as
a result total expenditures on UI and hence taxes required to finance these expenditures
are lower than in the homogeneous agents case.
Varying the replacement rate
As before, we first consider the optimal replacement rate in a tax financed UI system,
to check the elasticities and to see which optimal replacement rates come out. For the
heterogeneous case we only consider the base simulation and the case of no liquidity
constraints.
The results for the base simulation, with credit constraints for unemployed during the
young phase, are given in Table 3.19. For the low educated a replacement rate in the
order of .7 to .8 is optimal.49 For the medium educated the optimal replacement rate is in
the order of .6 to .7 and for the high educated it is in the order of .3 to .5. Hence, also the
high educated prefer a positive replacement rate, despite the redistribution in the system,
in part due to the credit constraint when they are young and unemployed and have no
way to access their future high wages.
In the second set of rows we consider the welfare effects relative to the starting point,
a replacement rate of .7. To compare the welfare results across agents and overall we
now present compensating variations in terms of euro per month.50 As an overall welfare
measure we look at the sum of compensating variations and see which replacement rate
generates the highest level of welfare.51 This turns out to be in the range of .5 to .7,
somewhat broader than the range of .6 to .7 in the homogeneous case (and the welfare
cost at .5 is also relatively minor). A somewhat higher replacement rate of .8 or .9
generates a welfare loss in terms of monthly consumption of about 2 respectively 6 euro.
For a much lower replacement rate like .1 there is a much larger welfare loss of 17 euro
per month. At this replacement rate the liquidity constraint really starts to bite.
Table 3.20 gives the results for the case without liquidity constraints. The first thing to
47This suggests that young high educated individuals want to bring more income from the future to the present than young
low educated, potentially making a credit constraint in unemployment more problematic for them (for a given incidence
and duration of unemployment).
48The replacement rate is the same, but the wages of the low educated are lower.
49Under the constraint that all education groups have a uniform replacement rate and tax rate.
50Specifically, we calculate the consumption equivalent of a given utility V 0 as V 0 =
∫ 4N
0 c0
1−θ/(1 − θ)ds ⇒ c0 =
((1− θ)V 0/(4N))1/(1−θ) and then report c1 − c0 where c1 = ((1− θ)V 1/(4N))1/(1−θ).
51As noted in e.g. Varian (1992) compensating variation is a limited welfare measure since we assign equal value to the
utility of all agents. Furthermore, the welfare gain is only in expectation, due to the ex post heterogeneity in labour market
outcomes this does not guarantee a Pareto improvement.
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Table 3.19: Varying the replacement rates of UI, ex ante heterogeneity, base simulation
Replacement rate UI .1 .3 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
CV relative to optimum per type (in % of consumption at the optimum)
Low educated −3.4 −1.1 −.3 −.1 .0 .0 −.2
Medium educated −1.4 −.4 −.1 .0 .0 −.1 −.4
High educated −.1 .0 .0 −.1 −.2 −.5 −.9
CV in consumption per month in euro relative to replacement rate of .7
Low educated −35 −11 −3 −1 0 0 −2
Medium educated −18 −5 −1 0 0 −1 −5
High educated 2 4 4 2 0 −4 −11
Total CV/3 −17 −4 0 0 0 −2 −6
UI use and tax rate (in %)
UI rate low educated 2.80 3.02 3.30 3.45 3.62 3.85 4.23
UI rate medium educated 1.74 1.97 2.30 2.47 2.67 2.94 3.43
UI rate high educated .88 1.05 1.29 1.41 1.57 1.77 2.13
UI rate overall 1.81 2.01 2.30 2.44 2.62 2.85 3.26
Tax rate .18 .59 1.12 1.43 1.78 2.22 2.85
Table 3.20: Varying the replacement rates of UI, ex ante heterogeneity, no liquidity constraints
Replacement rate UI .1 .3 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
CV relative to optimum per type (in % of consumption at the optimum)
Low educated −1.0 −.6 −.2 −.1 .0 .0 −.3
Medium educated −.2 −.1 .0 .0 −.1 −.2 −.5
High educated .0 −.1 −.3 −.4 −.6 −.9 −1.3
CV in consumption per month in euro relative to replacement rate of .7
Low educated −11 −6 −2 −1 0 0 −3
Medium educated −2 0 1 1 0 −2 −6
High educated 11 9 6 3 0 −5 −13
Total CV/3 −1 1 1 1 0 −2 −7
UI use and tax rate (in %)
UI rate low educated 2.99 3.14 3.35 3.48 3.65 3.89 4.35
UI rate medium educated 1.94 2.11 2.34 2.49 2.68 2.96 3.50
UI rate high educated 1.02 1.15 1.32 1.43 1.57 1.78 2.18
UI rate overall 1.98 2.14 2.33 2.46 2.63 2.88 3.34
Tax rate 0.19 0.62 1.13 1.43 1.79 2.24 2.93
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notice, again, is that the welfare effects are much smaller, unemployment benefits are not
the sole determinant of consumption for unemployed youngsters. The lower educated still
have an optimal replacement rate in the order of .7 to .8, though lower replacement rates
are now less costly. The medium educated now have a lower optimal replacement rate of
about .5 to .6, and the high educated prefer the low .1 in this case. Indeed, the liquidity
insurance disappears when there are no liquidity constraints and the high educated then
prefer only little lifetime income insurance, given the limited insurance gains for them
and the distribution to the lower educated in the system. Overall, .7 is no longer in the
optimal replacement rate range, which now drops to .3 to .6, the same range as for the
homogeneous agents case. The welfare loss from a replacement rate of .7 is still limited
though, on average 1 euro per month per person compared to the optimum of .3 to .6.
Introducing individual accounts
Next we consider the effects on introducing mandatory savings accounts for the heteroge-
neous agents case, keeping the replacement rate at .7. The results for the base simulation
are given in Table 3.21, and for the case without liquidity constraints in Table 3.22.
Table 3.21 shows that the low educated only lose from the mandatory savings, for them
this is simply less insurance. The medium educated also do not gain from mandatory
savings, and for savings rates beyond 2 percent actually lose. The higher educated prefer
more mandatory savings, which implies less redistribution to low and medium educated.
Overall, for the three groups in total there is a small welfare gain of 1 euro per month. Also
in the heterogeneous case the net incentives are positive for all education groups leading
to a fall in unemployment. Table 3.21 also gives the distribution of account balances
for the total and by education group. The pattern for the total is the same as for the
homogenous case, with more people having more positive balances the higher we set the
mandatory savings rate. Furthermore, unsurprisingly, the lower educated are more likely
to end up with a negative balance than the medium and in particular the high educated.
For a mandatory savings rate of 4% respectively 21, 15 and 7 percent of the low, medium
and high educated end up with a negative terminal balance.
Table 3.22 shows what changes when there are no liquidity constraints. The loss for the
low educated from mandatory savings is virtually the same, but the loss for the medium
educated is lower and the gain for the high educated is higher, they now prefer a lower
replacement rate. With the high educated being more over insured at a replacement rate
of .7 a mandatory savings rate of 4% now generates an overall welfare gain of 2 euro per
month.
The optimal mix of mandatory savings and replacement rates
Finally, also in the heterogeneous case we consider the optimal combination of mandatory
savings and replacement rates per education type and overall.52
Table 3.23 gives the base simulation with credit constraints for the low educated. Now
that we also can vary the replacement rate we find that at least some mandatory savings
52But still under the restriction that the replacement and tax rates are the same across education types.
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Table 3.21: Introduction of UISA, ex ante heterogeneity, base simulation
Mandatory savings rate .00 .02 .04 .06 .08 .10
CV in euro per month relative to an UI with rr=.7
Low educated 0 0 −1 −4 −7 −9
Medium educated 0 −1 −1 −2 −2 −2
High educated 0 2 5 8 9 10
Total CV/3 0 0 1 1 0 −1
UI use and tax rate (in %)
UI rate low educated 3.62 3.44 3.31 3.31 3.32 3.22
UI rate medium educated 2.67 2.48 2.24 2.15 2.12 2.11
UI rate high educated 1.57 1.45 1.23 1.15 1.15 1.15
UI rate overall 2.62 2.46 2.26 2.21 2.20 2.16
Tax rate 1.78 1.06 .74 .54 .39 .28
Terminal account balances
Total
Share never unemployed .59 .59 .59 .59 .59 .59
Un. with pos. terminal account . .13 .27 .30 .31 .34
Un. neg. term. account < 50% UI use . .14 .04 .04 .08 .07
Un. neg. term. account > 50% UI use . .14 .10 .07 .02 .00
Low educated
Share never unemployed .57 .57 .57 .57 .57 .57
Un. with pos. terminal account (in %) . .13 .22 .23 .23 .30
Un. neg. term. account < 50% UI use . .09 .00 .11 .18 .11
Un. neg. term. account > 50% UI use . .21 .21 .10 .03 .02
Medium educated
Share never unemployed .54 .54 .54 .54 .54 .54
Un. with pos. terminal account (in %) . .15 .31 .38 .40 .40
Un. neg. term. account < 50% UI use . .16 .08 .02 .05 .06
Un. neg. term. account > 50% UI use . .15 .07 .06 .01 .00
High educated
Share never unemployed .65 .65 .65 .65 .65 .65
Un. with pos. terminal account (in %) . .12 .28 .32 .32 .32
Un. neg. term. account < 50% UI use . .16 .04 .00 .02 .03
Un. neg. term. account > 50% UI use . .07 .03 .03 .01 .00
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Table 3.22: Introduction of UISA, ex ante heterogeneity, no liquidity constraints
Mandatory savings rate .00 .02 .04 .06 .08 .10
CV in euro per month relative to an UI with rr=.7
Low educated 0 0 −1 −4 −7 −9
Medium educated 0 −1 0 −1 −1 −2
High educated 0 3 6 9 10 10
Total CV/3 0 1 2 1 1 0
UI use and tax rate (in %)
UI rate low educated 3.65 3.43 3.27 3.27 3.28 3.16
UI rate medium educated 2.68 2.43 2.15 2.04 2.00 2.00
UI rate high educated 1.57 1.38 1.09 1.03 1.03 1.03
UI rate overall 2.63 2.41 2.17 2.12 2.10 2.06
Tax rate 1.79 1.06 .74 .54 .39 .28
can improve their welfare, when combined with a somewhat higher replacement rate of
.8 (at a mandatory savings rate of 3%), though the gain is only 70 euro cents per month.
Table 3.24 shows that medium educated actually prefer no mandatory savings. Table
3.25 shows that the high educated typically prefer mandatory savings, less redistribution.
What is interesting is that their optimal combination is a replacement rate of .7 and a
mandatory savings rate of 10 percent (or more). This illustrates they value liquidity when
they run the risk of liquidity constraints, but apart from that they would like to have as
little lifetime income insurance in the system as possible. Table 3.26 shows that across
education groups we find an optimal mandatory savings rate of 4% and a replacement
rate of .7, similar to the homogeneous agents case. The overall gain is 1 euro per worker
per month.
Tables 3.27-3.30 give the optimal combinations in the absence of liquidity constraints.
The optimal choice of low educated is hardly affected, they now prefer 4% mandatory
savings and a replacement rate of .8. The medium educated still prefer no mandatory
savings, but now prefer a lower replacement rate of .5. The high educated now no longer
require liquidity, and as a result they now only go for a low replacement rate and high
mandatory savings, to minimize the redistribution in the system. Overall welfare is now
maximized at a lower replacement rate of .6, and also a lower mandatory savings rate of
2%.53
53The welfare gain is higher than in the case with liquidity constraints, but this is because we compare welfare relative
to zero mandatory savings and a replacement rate of .7. The extent of over insurance is than higher to begin with than in
the case with liquidity constraints.
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Table 3.23: Welfare effects combinations SR and RR, low educated, base simulationa
SR/RR .00 .01 .02 .03 .04 .06 .08 .10
.10 −34.79 −36.19 −37.13 −37.32 −37.39 −37.41 −37.41 −37.41
.20 −18.23 −19.25 −2.96 −22.05 −22.88 −23.26 −23.41 −23.42
.30 −11.05 −11.78 −13.15 −14.85 −16.02 −17.76 −18.14 −18.51
.40 −6.45 −6.95 −7.99 −9.42 −11.13 −13.33 −15.02 −15.39
.50 −3.31 −3.75 −4.29 −5.48 −6.94 −9.84 −11.81 −13.43
.60 −1.20 −1.70 −1.72 −2.52 −3.73 −6.80 −9.16 −1.96
.70 .00 −.46 −.38 −.51 −1.33 −3.90 −7.20 −8.96
.80 .09 −.38 −.68 .68 .02 −1.86 −4.72 −7.19
.90 −2.02 −2.77 −3.70 −4.51 −2.32 NA NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in %.
Table 3.24: Welfare effects combinations SR and RR, medium educated, base simulationa
SR/RR .00 .01 .02 .03 .04 .06 .08 .10
.10 −17.71 −18.43 −19.00 −19.04 −19.04 −19.02 −19.02 −19.02
.20 −9.15 −9.98 −1.51 −11.05 −11.55 −11.65 −11.62 −11.62
.30 −5.26 −6.01 −6.77 −7.08 −7.53 −8.58 −8.72 −8.72
.40 −2.58 −3.25 −3.85 −4.52 −4.74 −5.65 −6.67 −6.77
.50 −.87 −1.52 −1.83 −2.50 −2.99 −3.44 −4.45 −5.41
.60 .00 −.53 −.77 −1.06 −1.74 −2.17 −2.72 −3.75
.70 .00 −.92 −.84 −.84 −.82 −1.57 −1.76 −2.43
.80 −1.11 −2.07 −1.66 −.84 −1.13 −1.76 −1.86 −1.98
.90 −4.76 −6.10 −7.65 −9.06 −6.20 NA NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in %.
Table 3.25: Welfare effects combinations SR and RR, high educated, base simulationa
SR/RR .00 .01 .02 .03 .04 .06 .08 .10
.10 2.17 2.64 2.50 2.55 2.55 2.55 2.55 2.55
.20 3.78 4.21 4.82 4.82 4.63 4.73 4.78 4.78
.30 4.25 4.82 5.58 6.15 6.29 6.06 6.10 6.20
.40 4.40 5.25 5.91 6.82 7.39 7.72 7.44 7.48
.50 3.83 4.68 5.63 6.67 7.58 8.58 8.72 8.48
.60 2.41 3.64 4.87 5.82 6.96 8.53 9.24 9.34
.70 .00 .61 2.31 4.21 5.35 7.72 9.01 9.53
.80 −3.81 −3.34 −.90 1.84 2.64 5.58 7.58 8.67
.90 −11.20 −11.20 −11.53 −8.68 −6.39 NA NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in%.
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Table 3.26: Welfare effects combinations SR and RR, total/3, base simulationa
SR/RR .00 .01 .02 .03 .04 .06 .08 .10
.10 −16.77 −17.33 −17.87 −17.94 −17.96 −17.96 −17.96 −17.96
.20 −7.87 −8.34 −8.88 −9.43 −9.93 −1.06 −1.08 −1.09
.30 −4.02 −4.32 −4.78 −5.26 −5.75 −6.76 −6.92 −7.01
.40 −1.54 −1.65 −1.98 −2.38 −2.83 −3.75 −4.75 −4.89
.50 −.12 −.19 −.17 −.44 −.78 −1.57 −2.51 −3.45
.60 .40 .47 .79 .75 .50 −.14 −.88 −1.79
.70 .00 −.25 .36 .95 1.07 .75 .02 −.62
.80 −1.61 −1.93 −1.08 .56 .51 .65 .33 −.16
.90 −5.99 −6.69 −7.63 −7.42 −4.97 NA NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in %.
Table 3.27: Welfare effects combinations SR and RR, low educated, no liquidity constraintsa
SR/RR .00 .01 .02 .03 .04 .06 .08 .10
.10 −1.69 −12.22 −13.27 −13.48 −13.57 −13.59 −13.59 −13.59
.20 −8.08 −9.16 −1.92 −12.10 −12.97 −13.39 −13.56 −13.57
.30 −5.76 −6.48 −7.90 −9.67 −1.91 −12.70 −13.10 −13.47
.40 −3.73 −4.17 −5.25 −6.73 −8.47 −1.74 −12.43 −12.82
.50 −2.05 −2.36 −2.94 −4.17 −5.64 −8.58 −1.58 −12.19
.60 −.76 −1.17 −1.06 −1.94 −3.18 −6.29 −8.61 −1.41
.70 −.00 −.44 −.21 −.16 −1.12 −3.71 −7.03 −8.72
.80 −.14 −.57 −.84 −.17 .09 −1.73 −4.54 −6.93
.90 −2.61 −3.26 −4.01 −4.65 −2.66 NA NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in %.
Table 3.28: Welfare effects combinations SR and RR, medium educated, no liq. constraintsa
SR/RR .00 .01 .02 .03 .04 .06 .08 .10
.10 −2.27 −3.03 −3.59 −3.63 −3.63 −3.63 −3.63 −3.63
.20 −1.11 −1.95 −2.51 −3.03 −3.54 −3.66 −3.63 −3.63
.30 −.22 −.89 −1.71 −2.02 −2.48 −3.51 −3.66 −3.63
.40 .41 −.12 −.72 −1.40 −1.64 −2.53 −3.51 −3.61
.50 .72 .22 .00 −.68 −1.16 −1.59 −2.60 −3.54
.60 .65 .29 .19 −.05 −.75 −1.11 −1.66 −2.70
.70 −.00 −.92 −.55 −.19 −.31 −1.01 −1.18 −1.83
.80 −1.64 −2.55 −1.78 −2.24 −1.16 −1.52 −1.37 −1.52
.90 −6.03 −7.25 −8.61 −9.82 −6.94 NA NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in %.
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Table 3.29: Welfare effects combinations SR and RR, high educated, no liquidity constraintsa
SR/RR .00 .01 .02 .03 .04 .06 .08 .10
.10 1.68 11.21 11.11 11.16 11.16 11.16 11.16 11.16
.20 9.92 1.54 11.16 11.21 11.07 11.11 11.16 11.16
.30 8.82 9.59 1.45 11.02 11.21 1.97 11.07 11.11
.40 7.44 8.54 9.25 1.25 1.83 11.16 1.88 1.97
.50 5.59 6.78 8.01 9.01 9.92 1.88 11.02 1.83
.60 3.22 4.73 6.35 7.25 8.49 1.02 1.73 1.83
.70 .00 .61 2.74 5.02 6.30 8.63 9.92 1.45
.80 −4.66 −4.10 −1.13 1.75 2.93 6.30 8.16 9.35
.90 −13.31 −13.17 −13.26 −9.53 −7.94 NA NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in %.
Table 3.30: Welfare effects combinations SR and RR, total/3, no liquidity constraintsa
SR/RR .00 .01 .02 .03 .04 .06 .08 .10
.10 −.76 −1.35 −1.91 −1.98 −2.02 −2.02 −2.02 −2.02
.20 .24 −.19 −.75 −1.31 −1.82 −1.98 −2.01 −2.02
.30 .95 .74 .28 −.22 −.73 −1.75 −1.90 −2.00
.40 1.37 1.42 1.09 .71 .24 −.70 −1.69 −1.82
.50 1.42 1.54 1.69 1.39 1.04 .23 −.72 −1.63
.60 1.04 1.29 1.83 1.75 1.52 .87 .15 −.76
.70 .00 −.25 .66 1.56 1.62 1.30 .57 −.04
.80 −2.15 −2.41 −1.25 −.22 .62 1.02 .75 .30
.90 −7.32 −7.89 −8.63 −8.00 −5.85 NA NA NA
a Utility difference relative to an UI system with rr=.7, in consumption units in %.
3.6.3 Summarizing the simulation results
The model suggests that in the presence of credit constraints for young unemployed the
optimal replacement rate is in the range of .6 to .7 in our preferred setup, .8 with more
risk aversion, and closer to .5 with more moral hazard or in the absence of liquidity con-
straints. Low educated prefer a higher replacement rate and high educated prefer a lower
replacement rate, much lower in the absence of liquidity constraints in unemployment.
Introducing some mandatory savings in the order of 4% into an UI system with a
replacement rate of .7 leads to a small gain in welfare of about 1 euro per month in
welfare in our preferred setup and with liquidity constraints. More risk aversion makes
mandatory savings no longer welfare improving, but more moral hazard strengthens the
case for mandatory savings, as does the absence of liquidity constraints. The latter may
seem counterintuitive, but that is because a replacement rate of .7 is too high in the case
without liquidity constraints, and mandatory savings effectively reduce the replacement
rate.
The question then is whether mandatory savings can still improve welfare when we
start from the second best UI system with the optimal replacement rate. When the
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unemployed are liquidity constrained, a small welfare gain is indeed possible, but the gain
is only .05% in consumption terms. Furthermore, to realize this welfare gain you have to
pick the right combination of the mandatory savings rate and the replacement rate, a sub
optimal choice quickly leads to no welfare gain at all or even a loss. Given our limited
knowledge of the extent of moral hazard and risk aversion it is easy to make a mistake.
Surprisingly, a UISA can also improve welfare slightly starting from the second best
UI system in the absence of liquidity constraints, by .02% in consumption terms. In this
case, clearly the benefit can not come from more efficient liquidity insurance. A system
with mandatory savings implicitly differentiates the replacement rate between individuals
that suffer few unemployment periods, they get little or nothing, and those that suffer
many periods of unemployment, they keep their current insurance. By doing so, a UISA
may still slightly improve welfare in the absence of liquidity constraints. However, when
we differentiate the replacement rate in the UI system between different groups of workers
the welfare gains from mandatory savings in the absence of liquidity constraints indeed
disappears.
As for the effects by education, the low educated prefer no mandatory savings (more
redistribution) and the high educated prefer more mandatory savings (less redistribution).
When there are liquidity constraints the high educated prefer a generous replacement
rate (high liquidity) with high mandatory savings (low redistribution). When there are
no liquidity constraints, the high educated prefer both a low replacement rate and high
mandatory savings (no need for liquidity and low redistribution). Also in the case of
heterogeneous agents, overall welfare may rise when we introduce mandatory savings,
due to the implicit differentiation in the replacement rate. But again, the same can be
achieved in the UI system.
3.7 Limitations of the analysis
Any model is an abstract representation of the real world where one tries to capture
the main mechanisms relevant for a certain research question. Below we consider some
limitations of the analysis above and consider how these might affect the outcomes.
For simplicity we have set the subjective discount rate, interest rate and productivity
growth rate to zero. With a subjective discount rate higher than the interest rate indi-
viduals would like to borrow more from the future, this would increase the demand for
liquidity, making liquidity constraints more problematic. Similarly, productivity growth
would increase wage profiles, part of which individuals want to consume earlier in working
life, again making liquidity constraints more problematic.
Another simplification is that we assume there is a liquidity constraint at zero assets
when unemployed. We could assume a constraint at some negative number or a higher
interest rate on borrowing than on saving as in e.g. Imrohoroglu (1989), both would result
in more borrowing by the young unemployed reducing the need for government provided
liquidity or insurance. We also assume the unemployed person has no access to other
income from e.g. a working spouse or relatives, again overstating the need for liquidity
or insurance. The liquidity constraint we consider above should therefore be viewed as
an extreme case for the young unemployed. On the other hand, we may understate the
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relevance of liquidity constraints for elderly unemployed, because we assume they have
full access to their accumulated (pension) assets. But on average, we seem to get the role
of liquidity constraints about right, as the average consumption response to a change in
benefits is in line with empirical studies.54 A drawback of the model is that the liquidity
constraint is exogenously imposed.55 Ideally we would derive the liquidity constraint from
some sort of optimising behaviour by creditors. Indeed, with an optimally set endogenous
liquidity constraint the government can perhaps not improve welfare by giving young
unemployed loans.
Yet another simplification is that we abstract from an endogenous retirement choice.
Some people fear that individual accounts will lead to more early retirement. However,
this is not clear from the outset. To the extent that individual accounts lead to higher
asset holdings close to retirement it is important to realize that this has only an income
effect, and income effects on the work-leisure choice are typically assumed to be small.
Well, at least for individuals that do not face credit constraints, which is more likely to be
the case for the individuals that end up with a positive terminal balance. In contrast, the
UI entitlement has a substitution effect, which directly affects the relative price of work
and leisure, making individuals more eager to retire early via UI and not look for a job
again. Hence, it seems dubious that a UISA will lead to more early retirement than UI.56
Perhaps a more severe limitation is that we do not consider the case of myopic indi-
viduals. When individuals are nearsighted (as in the case of hyperbolic time preferences,
see e.g. Laibson, 1997) they may perceive the mandatory savings (at least in part) as a
tax and the UI loan (at least in part) as a subsidy. When the mandatory savings and
the tax to bail out individuals with a negative terminal balance are higher than the UI
premium, which is the case when we maintain the same replacement rate, this will reduce
the incentives to find and keep a job. However, this potential problem actually becomes
less of a problem when we think that the individuals that are myopic are also the ones
that end up with a negative terminal balance. For them the mandatory savings are de
facto a tax.
We further assume that individuals are either working or in UI. In real life there are
many more states. This presumably leads to a tax rate for UI on employment that is
too low, but this can easily be fixed by adjusting the employment/unemployment ratio
in the lifecycle phases. More interesting seems to be the correlation between UI and
other types of labour market risks, like sickness and disability. Stiglitz and Yun (2005)
and Bovenberg and Sorensen (2004) suggest that individuals accounts can provide more
54We further do not consider liquidity constraints for employed workers. When e.g. young employed also face liquidity
constraints we face a trade-off between reducing a liquidity constraint for unemployed via a premium or a loan and increasing
a liquidity constraint for employed workers due to the premium or mandatory savings. One solution to this problem is
integrating the unemployment risk with the longevity risk, as suggested by e.g. Stiglitz and Yun (2005). Also, over saving
can be mitigated by setting a ceiling on the account beyond which the contributions are no longer mandatory.
55Actually, the liquidity constraint is not consistent with the rest of the model, as all individuals are working most of
the time in the remainder of their working life. The same holds for Bovenberg and Sorensen (2004) and Stiglitz and Yun
(2005).
56In any case, if one believes that individual accounts do lead to more early retirement we can mitigate this problem by
integrating the mandatory savings for unemployment with those for pensions (individuals can consume part of their pension
for certain contingencies, in this case unemployment), or by setting a ceiling on the maximum account balance and/or the
mandatory savings rate.
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efficient intra personal insurance when these risks are not perfectly correlated. Next to
more states it would also be interesting to study individual accounts with more periods.
In particular, the interaction of the optimal replacement rate profile and a UISA can not
be meaningfully studied in our setup where individuals know immediately how long they
will be unemployed once they draw the search technology.
Let us conclude by noting that we also use a simple UI setup in the model above.
In real life, after UI there is often welfare and an integrated analysis seems to be called
for. However, we doubt whether individual accounts for the basic tax financed income
level is a realistic scenario. Also, there are lower and upper limits on UI contributions
and benefits which affect the redistribution and insurance in the system. Indeed, our
analysis above suggests that high educated individuals might currently be over insured
which is mitigated by the upper limit on UI contributions and benefits. We further found
that the optimal replacement rate for older unemployed workers is higher than for younger
unemployed workers, and given the longer UI entitlement for individuals with more tenure
this also seems to be captured in the current system.
Clearly, this list of potentially relevant limitations is not exhausting, one can also think
of e.g. wage bargaining, endogenous education and transition issues for older workers etc.
3.8 Concluding remarks
The analysis above suggests that the welfare gains from individual accounts for the un-
employment risk in the Netherlands are small. Indeed, the welfare gain is only .05% in
consumption terms relative to the second best UI system. The main advantage UISA
have over premium financed UI is the ability to distinguish between the need for liquid-
ity and lifetime income insurance. However, liquidity constraints seem to play a minor
role in most unemployment spells, unemployment benefits mainly act as lifetime income
insurance.57 Furthermore, to reap a welfare gain the policy maker needs to have precise
knowledge on the extent of moral hazard and risk aversion of the workers. A sub optimal
choice easily results in a welfare loss, and a mistake is easy to make given our limited
knowledge of moral hazard and risk aversion. All in all, UISA then do not seem to offer
much over the current UI system in the Netherlands. However, this does not mean that
individual accounts are not interesting for other types of income shocks, like education
expenditures and subsidies for early retirement, which have a larger intra personal and a
smaller interpersonal component than unemployment benefits.58
The analysis above also gives insight in the optimal level of the replacement rate of UI.
The current level of UI (75% in the first two months of unemployment, and 70% thereafter)
comes close to the optimum in the calibrated model, provided that the unemployed in
the Netherlands are quite risk averse and sometimes run into liquidity constraints. When
risk aversion is smaller and liquidity constraints do not play a role in unemployment, the
57Also, for the individuals that are the most likely to run into liquidity constraints, the long-term unemployed, incentives
typically do not change under the UISA system, because they end up with a negative terminal account. Furthermore, even
for those unemployed for which liquidity constraints are relevant and that do not end up with a negative terminal balance,
converting benefits into a loan still has a smaller effect on job search behaviour than reducing benefits.
58See e.g. Orszag and Snower (1997) and Sorensen et al. (2006).
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optimal replacement rate is lower. But then again, close to the optimum the costs of a
deviation are typically small, in the order of .1% in consumption terms when we miss
the optimal replacement rate by 10 percentage points. The analysis further shows that
the optimal benefit level varies with age and education, in line with the current system
that links the maximum UI duration with the preceding employment duration and the
minimum and maximum income borders for UI premiums and benefits.
Appendix 3.A First, second and third best in a simpler
model
In this appendix we consider first best UI, second best UI and third best UISA in a
simplified setup of the model in Section 3.5, with only one lifecycle phase (instead of four)
and only two search technology outcomes (instead of three).
First best
With (exogenous) probability ρ individuals are employed and with probability 1− ρ they
are unemployed. That is, the unemployed are initially unemployed and then become
employed for the remainder of the lifecycle phase, where the duration of unemployment is
endogenous. The employed are employed for the whole lifecycle phase, and for simplicity
we assume they do not have to search (in the main text we assume they are at a corner).
Expected lifetime utility V 0 is
V 0 = ρV e + (1− ρ)V u (3.A.1)
where V e and V u are the lifetime utility of employed and unemployed respectively
Ve =
∫ N
0
u(ce(x))dx (3.A.2)
Vu =
∫ N
0
u(cu(x))dx− f(s) (3.A.3)
where ce(.) and cu(.) are the respective consumption streams and f(s) is a function that
converts search units into effective search effort (with f ′(s) > 0 and f ′′(s) > 0). The
lifecycle phase lasts N periods. We further have the resource constraint∫ N
0
u(ce(x)) + u(cu(x))dx ≤ (ρN + (1− ρ)g(s)N)w (3.A.4)
where g(s) is the duration of the lifecycle phase that the unemployed are employed (with
g′(s) > 0). During the initial unemployment periods, the unemployed produce nothing
(e.g. no household production or additional leisure).
Maximizing (3.A.1) with respect to ce(.), cu(.) and s, taking (3.A.4) into account gives
the first best solution for consumption and search effort
cu(x) = ce(x) = c (3.A.5)
f ′(s) = g′(s)Nwu′(c) (3.A.6)
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consumption is equalized across states and search effort is set so that the marginal cost
of search equals the marginal gain (the additional consumption units g′(s)Nw times the
marginal utility gain from higher consumption).
Second best
Next, we characterize the second best UI system, where the social planner can control
consumption via the benefit level, but does not control search effort, which is chosen by
the unemployed. We first consider the case without credit constraints, and subsequently
the case with credit constraints.
Without credit constraint
Individuals now choose their own consumption and search effort. When employed, indi-
viduals now pay a tax t to finance benefits b for the unemployment periods. The indirect
utility function of the employed is
V e = u(w − t)N. (3.A.7)
The indirect utility function of the unemployed is
V u = u((1− g(s))b+ g(s)(w − t))N − f(s), (3.A.8)
where
f ′(s) = g′(s)N(w − t− b)u′(cu), (3.A.9)
with cu the consumption chosen by the unemployed. Taxes and benefits drive a wedge
between the socially and privately optimal search effort. Even though consumption in
unemployment will be lower than in the first-best case, and hence the marginal utility of
additional consumption will be higher, the search effort will typically be inefficiently low
compared to the first best.
What is the best the social planner can do? Taking into account the budget constraint
(ρN + (1− ρ)g(s)N)t = (1− ρ)(1− g(s))Nb, (3.A.10)
and noting that by the envelope theorem the direct effect of b and t on V U is 0 (s is chosen
optimally by the unemployed), maximizing (3.A.1) with respect to b we arrive, after some
rearranging, at the Baily (1978) condition for the second-best level of b(
ρ
ρ+ (1− ρ)g(s)u
′(ce) + (1− ρ)g(s)
ρ+ (1− ρ)g(s)u
′(cu)
)
(1 + η(b)) = u′(cu) (3.A.11)
where η(b) is the elasticity of the ratio of unemployment to employment with respect to
the benefit level
η(b) ≡
∂
(
(1−ρ)(1−g(s))
ρ+(1−ρ)g(s)
)
∂b
b(
(1−ρ)(1−g(s))
ρ+(1−ρ)g(s)
) . (3.A.12)
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That is, at the optimal benefit level the marginal utility of consumption in employment,
the weighted average on the left hand side (of the employed periods of the employed and
the employed periods of the unemployed), times one plus the elasticity of the ratio of
unemployment to employment with respect to the benefit level has to equal the marginal
utility of consumption in unemployment. A special case arises when η is zero, no moral
hazard, in this case we have full insurance. But typically η > 0, so to maintain equality
in the condition above the marginal utility of consumption in unemployment has to be
higher than in employment, i.e. consumption in unemployment has to be lower than in
employment.
With credit constraint
Now suppose that the unemployed face a credit constraint, so that they can not borrow
from future wage income. How does this affect the optimal benefit level? The indirect
utility function of the unemployed is now given by
V u = (1− g(s))Nu(b) + g(s)Nu(w − t)− f(s), (3.A.13)
where optimal private search effort is now
f ′(s) = g′(s)N((w− t− b)u′(w− t) + u(w− t)− u(b) + u′(w− t)(w− t− b), (3.A.14)
the unemployed will search harder than in the absence of the credit constraint, as more
search now not only leads to more lifetime income, but also to a smoother consumption
pattern.
Again maximizing (3.A.1) taking into account the budget constraint and using the
envelope theorem we now arrive at the following simpler expression for optimal b
u′(w − t)(1 + η(b)) = u′(b), (3.A.15)
because consumption by the employed and by the unemployed once employed will be the
same. How does this compare to the case without credit constraint? Without the credit
constraint the unemployed will consume cu > b while unemployed. Now he or she can
only consume b. As a result the marginal utility on the right hand side will be higher,
the insurance gain of unemployment benefits rises. This means that η can be higher
as well, we will also have more moral hazard at the optimum. Typically this implies
that the optimal benefit level will be higher with than without credit constraints for the
unemployed.
Third best
Finally, we may consider how a simple UISA system gives the social planner an additional
tool to raise welfare. Specifically, suppose that the unemployed receive a loan p per period
next to their benefit b, which needs to be repaid during the subsequent employment period
(all redistribution runs via b). The indirect utility function of the unemployed is now given
by
V u = (1− g(s))Nu(b+ p) + g(s)Nu
(
w − t− 1− g(s)
g(s) p
)
− f(s). (3.A.16)
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Maximizing (3.A.1) with respect to p gives
u′(b+ p) = u′
(
w − t− 1− g(s)
g(s) p
)
, (3.A.17)
so the loan is used to equalize consumption over the unemployment and employment
periods of the unemployed. Maximizing (3.A.1) with respect to b then simply gives(
ρ
ρ+ (1− ρ)g(s)u
′(ce) + (1− ρ)g(s)
ρ+ (1− ρ)g(s)u
′(cu)
)
(1 + η(b, p)) = u′(cu) (3.A.18)
so the optimal benefit level is set as if there were no credit constraint.59
59Provided that p > 0 is optimal. Indeed, it may actually not be optimal to remove the liquidity constraint in the presence
of other distortions, as noted by e.g. Stiglitz and Yun (2005, p. 2042, footnote 14), because the welfare loss from reduced
search effort may dominate the gain in consumption smoothing.
Chapter 4
Employment protection
4.1 Introduction
Employment protection legislation (EPL) remains a hotly debated topic, both in academia
and in the political arena. Indeed, where the negative effect of EPL on labour market
dynamics is well established, there is no such certainty about the effect of EPL on em-
ployment and productivity, here ambiguous seems to be the robust finding.1 In light
of this ambiguity it is not surprising that there is much discussion amongst researchers
and policymakers regarding the impact of EPL, in which priors often seem to dominate
the evidence (Freeman, 2005). Another result of the ambiguity is that some researchers
conclude that time spent worrying about employment protection is probably time largely
wasted (Nickell and Layard, 1999). Although we are not the worrying type, we agree with
Addison and Teixeira (2001) that studying the impact of EPL is not just divertissement.
Indeed, inconclusiveness should not lead to indifference (Young, 2003). In this paper we
therefore further explore where the ambiguity might be coming from. Specifically, we
show that part of the ambiguity may be the result of lumping together different types
of EPL that differ in their impact, and give some empirical support for this. For the
different types of EPL we also show that the ambiguity can be real with respect to em-
ployment and productivity, when the returns to specific investments are not protected by
a contract but bargained over ex post. We further show that the tenure profile of EPL
matters. Indeed, the impact of constant EPL, popular in theoretical work, can be quite
different from rising EPL, popular in practice. We also consider the role of labour supply
in the overall effect of EPL, which empirical studies suggest might be a quantitatively
important decision variable for the impact of EPL. Next to employment and output, we
further consider the effect on welfare. EPL is often judged on its impact on GDP, but
this can be an imperfect indicator for welfare (even in the absence of insurance gains).
We illustrate these points in a calibration exercise for the Netherlands.
Deelen et al. (2006, Section 5) discuss the apparent ambiguities in empirical work
that we seek to explain. Specifically, reviewing a large number of empirical studies they
find that stricter EPL is associated with slightly lower employment and labour supply,
1See Deelen et al. (2006), they review the theoretical and empirical literature on EPL, and try to distill some fruitful
reform options from this literature for the Dutch case.
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and slightly higher unemployment. However, more important seems the variation in the
findings relative to the mean, the average effect across studies is not significantly different
from zero. Studies into the effect of EPL on productivity are more scarce, but again the
results seem mixed. Using cross-country data, Nickell and Layard (1999) find that EPL
is either not related to productivity or is positively related to productivity, depending on
the specification. Scarpetta et al. (2002) find a negative effect of EPL on productivity
growth, but only for countries with an intermediate degree of centralisation/coordination
in wage bargaining (as in the Netherlands). Using panel data for 60 countries by sector,
Caballero et al. (2004) find that EPL has a strong negative effect on productivity in
countries with strong rule of law, while the effect is negligible in countries with weak rule
of law. Autor et al. (2007) find (tentative) evidence that EPL reduces productivity. Belot
et al. (2007) find an inverted U-shape for the relation between EPL and GDP per capita,
with low levels of EPL raising GDP per capita and high levels of EPL reducing GDP
per capita. The question then is whether the ambiguity is perhaps more apparent than
real. Indeed, authors typically run cross-country panel regressions with limited variation
in EPL over time, and the quantification of EPL is rather subjective (OECD, 2004). So, if
we just had better data, perhaps we could find the real effect of EPL? Below we show that
part of the ambiguity indeed may be the result of a poor empirical strategy. However, we
also show that the effect on employment and productivity may indeed go either way.
This paper was partly inspired by the contribution of Ljunqvist (2002). To under-
stand the apparent ambiguity in the relation between layoff costs (actually layoff taxes)
and employment in earlier theoretical work he simulates variations in layoff costs in three
different model environments: a search model, a matching model and a model with em-
ployment lotteries. By tracing the results back to the underlying assumptions one can
understand why in e.g. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Saint-Paul (1995) employ-
ment falls when layoff costs rise, whereas the reverse is true in Alvarez and Veracierto
(1998) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). In particular, layoff costs are more likely to
reduce employment when they can push up wages and/or discourage labour participation.
Where Ljunqvist (2002) focused on different model environments, we focus on differences
resulting from different types of EPL and the tenure profile of EPL. How does the impact
of severance pay differ from the impact of firing costs? How does the impact of firing
taxes differ from the impact of firing costs? And what difference does it make when we
assume rising rather than flat EPL?
Next to the impact on employment we also study the impact on productivity and
consumption, where the effect on consumption can again be different from the effect
on output due to e.g. investment costs. To allow for a potential ambiguous effect on
productivity we have both potential sclerosis from reduced turnover in the economy due
to EPL and specific investments2 combined with ex post bargaining.
The model integrates the vintage model of Caballero and Hammour (1998a) with the
Mortensen and Pissarides model with specific investments by Belot et al. (2007). To
the analysis of Caballero and Hammour (1998a) we add the analysis of severance pay
and firing taxes, and the relevance of the tenure profile of EPL. We show that in this
2Apart from the search costs and the commitment to pay firing costs and/or taxes, which are also specific investments.
To this we add specific investments that increase the productivity of a match.
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setup, severance pay is neutral when it is zero for new matches. In general equilibrium
wages fall to leave job creation unaffected, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and in
the case with flexible wages in Garbaldi and Violante (2005). We further consider the
relevance of rising EPL rather than the flat EPL assumed in Caballero and Hammour
(1998a). Furthermore, we consider the productive role of firing taxes in preventing exces-
sive firings in the presence of unemployment insurance, following the lead of Blanchard
and Tirole (2007). We further show results similar to Belot et al. (2007) for the case of
specific investments in productivity and ex post bargaining, but then in a vintage setup.
Furthermore, we present a calibration exercise for the Netherlands in order to illustrate
the various points quantitatively and to gauge their empirical relevance.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2 we outline the model we use
to study the impact of the different types of EPL. In Section 4.3 we present a qualitative
study of the balanced growth path. We consider the differential impact of severance pay
and firing costs and taxes, the relevance of the tenure profile of EPL, and compare the
first best solution with the market outcome and the second best role EPL may play in our
setup. In Section 4.4 we calibrate the model to the Dutch labour market and simulate
the impact of EPL under different assumptions. Section 4.5 discusses some limitations of
the analysis and how these might affect the results. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 The model
4.2.1 Informal overview
Before we turn to the formal expressions we first give an informal overview of the model.
Workers flow between the states of employment and unemployment.3 A matching func-
tion determines the flow into employment, with unemployed workers and vacancies as
inputs. The flow from employment into unemployment consists of an exogenous and an
endogenous part. The exogenous flow captures separations to which no EPL applies (be-
cause e.g. the worker leaves or because the firm goes bankrupt due to a sudden shock).
Endogenous separations result from the scrapping of old vintages of production.4 Once a
match is created, the productivity is fixed for the duration of the match. However, the
productivity of new matches keeps growing. Hence, at some point the productivity of the
match is no longer sufficient to generate a surplus, and the worker and the firm separate.
Employment protection affects both the creation and destruction of matches. EPL
may deter match creation by increasing labour costs and may deter match destruction by
making separation more costly. As EPL can decrease both creation and destruction, the
impact on the stock of employment (and unemployment) is potentially ambiguous.
EPL affects productivity through its effect on match durations. When EPL increases
3In the base setup labour supply is fixed. In Section 4.4 we consider an extension where labour supply in persons is
endogenous.
4Hence, we do not allow firms and workers to re label a layoff a quit so as to avoid layoff costs or taxes. Since workers
lose their entitlement to UI when they quit their job in the Netherlands, this may not be so problematic. For an analysis
of the impact of EPL on quits, see Blanchard and Portugal (2001), and for an analysis of the impact of EPL on job-to-job
mobility see Pries and Rogerson (2005).
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match durations there are two opposing effects on productivity. On the one hand, longer
match durations imply that more workers will be working in older vintages, reducing
average productivity. On the other hand, longer match durations also make it more
profitable to invest in the match. Higher specific investments may overturn the sclerosis
effect of EPL on productivity.
Wages are determined by continuous time Nash bargaining, which splits the remaining
surplus of a match between the worker and the firm. Because we assume that the returns
from specific investments cannot be protected by a contract, Nash bargaining implies that
we have a hold up problem for specific investments on both the firm and worker side. In
this setting EPL can improve welfare by reducing the under investment problem.
Finally, the government sets the level and tenure profile of the different types of EPL,
the level of unemployment insurance benefits, and balances the budget via unemployment
insurance premiums. The presence of unemployment insurance benefits provides another
rationale for EPL in the model, next to under investment in specific investments.
Below we consider the setup in more detail. We start with the value functions for
firms and workers, and the resulting surplus of a match. We then consider the sharing of
this surplus, and the determination of specific investments by firms and workers. Finally,
we consider the flow equilibrium over the states of employment and unemployment, and
the budget constraint for the government.
4.2.2 Value functions
Firms
Let t denote time, and τ denote a specific vintage created at time t = τ . Furthermore,
let r denote the discount rate of firms and let q(θ) denote the rate at which a vacancy is
converted into a productive match. The rate at which vacancies are converted into matches
depends on θ, the ratio of vacancies to unemployed workers (‘labour market tightness’).
We will only consider steady states, and suppress a time subscript when possible, for
example for θ(t). A(t) is the leading technology at time t and grows exponentially at rate
γ, A(t) = A(0)eγt. The cost of holding a vacancy is vA(t) in period t. The firm further
sinks another specific investment ifA(t) into the match so as to raise its productivity, e.g.
through firm specific training.
The value of posting a vacancy at t, V (t), is implicitly given by the following asset
equation
rV (t) = −vA(t) + q(θ)(max
if
{J(if , iw, t, t)− ifA(t)} − V (t)) + ∂V (t)
∂t
, (4.1)
where J(if , iw, t, t) denotes the value of a newly created match given the specific invest-
ments by the firm and the worker (iwA(t), see below). The symbol t appears twice, once
for the vintage and once for time, which coincide at the time of creation. The return on a
vacancy is the sum of (minus) the per period vacancy cost, the rate at which a vacancy is
converted into a productive job times the associated capital gain, and the change in the
value of a vacancy with time.
Denote the value of a filled position created at τ at some future date t > τ for the
firm by J(if , iw, τ, t). At the moment of creation the productivity of the match is fixed.
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Furthermore, for simplicity we assume that workers and firms can only make specific
investments at the moment of creation. The productivity of a match created at τ is given
by (c0 + cf if ρf + cwiwρw)A(τ), where c0 is the part of output which is not due to specific
investments, cf if ρf is the part due to specific investments by the firm and cwiwρw is the
part due to specific investments by the worker. Denote wages for an individual worker in
a match created at τ at time t with specific investments if and iw by w(if , iw, τ, t)A(t),
and let pA(t) denote a premium levied on employers to finance unemployment insurance
benefits. Finally, let δ denote the exogenous separation rate. The value of a match from
vintage τ at time t, J(if , iw, τ, t), is implicitly given by
rJ(if , iw, τ, t) = (c0 + cf if ρf + cwiwρw)A(τ)− w(if , iw, τ, t)A(t)
−pA(t) + δ(V (t)− J(if , iw, τ, t)) + ∂J(if , iw, τ, t)
∂t
. (4.2)
The return on a filled position is the sum of the difference between the productivity of
the match and the wages and premiums the firm has to pay, a capital loss term when an
exogenous separation occurs, and the change in the value of the match with time.
Matches will continue production up to the point where it no longer pays to stay
together, when the discounted value of the match becomes lower than the outside option.
The outside option for the firm is to pay the EPL and post a vacancy. The firm may
face three types of EPL when a job is endogenously terminated: i) severance pay fsp,
ii) a firing cost fc, and iii) a firing tax ft. For an individual match the latter two are
the same, but in general equilibrium the effects may differ (see below). We assume that
EPL is indexed by the leading technology A(t). Furthermore, EPL may rise with tenure,
where α0 reflects the part at creation (which may be zero), and for every period of tenure
it increases by α1. For notational convenience we assume that the tenure profiles of all
types of EPL are the same. The date at which a unit created at τ is endogenously
destroyed is τ +T (τ), where T (τ) is the duration of a match conditional on survival until
τ + T (τ). The EPL the firm has to pay when a job is destroyed at τ + T (τ) is given by
(α0 +α1T (τ))(fsp + fc + ft)A(τ + T (τ)). So, the terminal condition for firms for a match
created at τ is
J(if , iw, τ, τ + T (τ)) = V (τ + T (τ))− (α0 +α1T (τ))(fsp + fc + ft)A(τ + T (τ)). (4.3)
Along the balanced growth path the value of a vacancy will be zero (see below), hence at
termination the discounted value of a firm excluding the EPL obligations will be negative.
Firms terminate when the discounted value of the losses exceeds the expenditures on EPL.
Workers
For workers we assume that the subjective discount rate is also r. iwA(t) is the specific
investment the worker sinks into the relation. The counterpart of the asset equation for
vacancies is the asset equation for the state of unemployment. Unemployed individu-
als receive unemployment insurance benefits buiA(t) and potentially a lump sum transfer
ylsA(t). Furthermore, we also introduce an (ad hoc) instantaneous utility term bldA(t) in
unemployment which may reflect the difference in leisure time in employment and unem-
ployment and/or a disutility in unemployment due to e.g. the loss of a social network.
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The variable bldA(t) gives us some additional freedom in the calibration later on. Finally,
θq(θ) is the job finding rate for an unemployed worker. The value of unemployment at
time t, U(t), then follows from
rU(t) = (bui + bld + yls)A(t) + θq(θ)(max
iw
{E(if , iw, t, t)− iwA(t)} − U(t))
+∂U(t)
∂t
= w˜A(t) + ylsA(t) +
∂U(t)
∂t
. (4.4)
once we introduce w˜A(t) ≡ (bui + bld)A(t) + θq(θ)(maxiw{E(if , iw, t, t)− iwA(t)} − U(t))
as the (private) shadow value of labour (excluding the lump sum transfer, for notational
convenience). The return in unemployment is the sum of the instantaneous income and
the utility component (bld), the rate at which unemployed individuals find a job times
the associated gain, and the change in the value of unemployment with time. Note that
instantaneous utility is linear in income. Hence, the marginal utility of income is constant,
so there will be no insurance gains from EPL in this setup.
The asset equation for holding a job created at τ at some date t > τ , E(if , iw, τ, t), is
rE(if , iw, τ, t) = (w(if , iw, τ, t) + yls)A(t) + δ(U(t)− E(if , iw, τ, t))
+∂E(if , iw, τ, t)
∂t
. (4.5)
Hence, the return on holding a job of vintage τ at t is the sum of the instantaneous wage
for that vintage at time t and the lump sum transfer, the drop in discounted lifetime
utility when the worker becomes unemployed (a ‘capital loss’), and the change in the
value with time.
The relation for E(if , iw, τ, t) above holds from the creation date τ until the terminal
date τ + T (τ). Also for workers we have a terminal condition, the point in time when
the value of continuing the match for the employee reaches the outside option. At the
terminal date we have
E(if , iw, τ, τ + T (τ)) = U(τ + T (τ)) + (α0 + α1T (τ + T (τ)))fspA(τ + T (τ)). (4.6)
The outside option is the value of unemployment at the terminal date plus severance
payments. Below we will see that the optimal terminal date will be the same for the firm
and the worker.
Surplus
We can use the value functions of firms and workers to derive an expression for the surplus
of a vintage from its creation till its end. The surplus of a match of vintage τ at time t,
S(if , iw, τ, t), is defined as the sum of the value of the match for the firm and the worker
minus their outside options
S(if , iw, τ, t) = J(if , iw, τ, t)− (V (t)− (α0 + α1(t− τ))(fsp + fc + ft)A(t))
+E(if , iw, τ, t)− (U(t) + (α0 + α1(t− τ))fspA(t)). (4.7)
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Before we proceed, we make two simplifying steps. First, note that the severance pay
cancels. Indeed, the severance pay is a transfer from one party of the match to the other;
hence, it can not be part of the surplus. Second, in the analysis below we only consider
balanced growth paths where job creation is positive. Combined with an assumption of
free entry of vacancies, this implies that the value of posting an additional vacancy will be
zero along the balanced growth path (and also ∂V (t)
∂t
= 0∀t ). Using these simplifications
and bringing the firing costs and taxes to the left we get
S(if , iw, τ, t) + (α0 + α1(t− τ))A(t)(fc + ft)) = J(if , iw, τ, t) + E(if , iw, τ, t)
−U(t). (4.8)
Rename the left hand side X(if , iw, τ, t). When we multiply both sides with r + δ, and
fill in the expressions for J(if , iw, τ, t), E(if , iw, τ, t) and U(t), we obtain5
(r + δ)X(if , iw, τ, t) = (c0 + cf if ρf + cwiwρw)A(τ)− (w˜ + p)A(t)
+∂X(if , iw, τ, t)
∂t
. (4.9)
This is a differential equation for the path of X(if , iw, τ, t) which we can solve for the ter-
minal conditions. Combining the terminal conditions for the employer and the employee
we find that the surplus at the terminal date is zero, S(if , iw, τ, τ + T (τ)) = 0. Solving
the differential for this terminal condition we obtain (see Appendix 4.A.1)
S(if , iw, τ, t) =
∫ τ+T (τ)
t
((c0 + cf if ρf + cwiwρw)A(τ)
−(w˜ + p)A(s))e−(r+δ)(s−t)ds
+(α0 + α1(t− τ))(fc + ft)A(t)
−(α0 + α1T (τ))(fc + ft)A(τ + T (τ))e−(r+δ)(τ+T (τ)−t). (4.10)
The remaining surplus of a vintage τ at some future date t is the discounted sum of the
difference between productivity and the (private shadow) value of unemployment plus
unemployment insurance premiums, plus the difference between firing costs and firing
taxes at t and at the terminal date, discounted to time t.
4.2.3 Surplus sharing and specific investments
The surplus is split assuming continuous time Nash bargaining. Workers get their outside
option and a share β of the remaining surplus and firms get their outside option and a
share (1− β) of the remaining surplus
E(if , iw, τ, t) = U(t) + (α0 + α1(t− τ))fspA(t) + βS(if , iw, τ, t), (4.11)
and
J(if , iw, τ, t) = −(α0 + α1(t− τ))(fsp + fc + ft)A(t) + (1− β)S(if , iw, τ, t), (4.12)
5Noting that ∂J(if ,iw,τ,t)
∂t
+ ∂E(if ,iw,τ,t)
∂t
− ∂U
∂t
= ∂X(if ,iw,τ,t)
∂t
.
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respectively.
Given this sharing rule we can determine the choice of specific investments by firms
and workers. For simplicity we assume that specific investments are made only at the
point of creation of the match. The profit maximizing specific investments by the firm
ifA(t) are given by
if = arg max
if
{J(if , iw, t, t)} − ifA(t)}
= arg max
if
{−(α0 + α1(t− τ))(fsp + fc + ft)A(t)
+(1− β)S(if , iw, τ, t)− ifA(t)}
=
(
cfρf
1− β
r + δ
(
1− e−(r+δ)T (t)
)) 11−ρf
, (4.13)
and for workers utility maximising specific investments iwA(t) are given by
iw = arg max
iw
{E(if , iw, t, t)} − iwA(t)}
= arg max
iw
{U(t) + α0fspA(t) + βS(if , iw, t, t)− iwA(t)}
=
(
cwρw
β
r + δ
(
1− e−(r+δ)T (t)
)) 11−ρw
. (4.14)
We see that specific investments depend positively on the expected match duration T (t),
which is how EPL will affect them. We also see that specific investments do not depend
on EPL variables directly. Indeed, EPL does not overcome the contracting problem for
specific investments. Workers get only a share β of the returns of their specific investments,
and firms only get a share 1−β of their specific investments. Hence, the social returns are
higher than the private returns. Any policy that shifts match durations T (t) up therefore
has the indirect benefit of raising specific investments (more on this below). Finally, note
that the effective discount rate for the specific investments is quite high. Apart from
the discount rate r, future returns are also discounted with the exogenous separation
rate δ, and the limited duration of the match. Hence, specific investments by either
party are quite ‘risky’, even from a social point of view. Furthermore, ex post bargaining
implies that the investor gets only part of the social return, further discouraging specific
investments.
4.2.4 Free entry and exit conditions
Next, we consider the free entry of vacancies and the free exit of matches. As noted above
we consider only balanced growth paths where V (t) = 0∀t. From (4.1) we then have one
expression for J(if , iw, t, t)
J(if , iw, t, t) =
vA(t)
q(θ) + ifA(t). (4.15)
The sharing rule (4.12) gives us another. Combining the two we get
(1− β)S(if , iw, t, t) = vA(t)
q(θ) + ifA(t) + α0(fsp + fc + ft)A(t). (4.16)
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This is the free entry condition which implicitly gives labour market tightness θ as a
function of the other endogenous variables and the parameters. Below we will assume
q′(θ) < 0, so to keep the free entry condition satisfied, a fall in the (initial) EPL variables
or a rise in the surplus increases θ (ceteris paribus).
Next, consider the exit decision. In our model there is no conflict between the firm
and the worker when it comes to separation, given that the firm and the worker can not
circumvent EPL. Indeed, from the sharing rules above we note that maximizing (4.10)
with respect to T (t) maximizes profits for firms and utility for workers. We find the
following condition for the optimal terminal date T(t)
(c0 + cf if ρf + cwiwρw)A(t− T (t)) = (w˜ + p)A(t)− ((r + δ − γ)
(α0 + α1T (t− T (t)))− α1)
A(t)(fc + ft), (4.17)
after we shift the time index. A match remains in production until the output just
covers the (private) shadow value of labour, the unemployment insurance premium and
the expected benefits of postponing separation till the next period. In our world with
constant productivity of old matches and ever rising productivity of new matches the
choice is not between separation or no separation, but between separating this period
or separating the next period. When I decide to separate the next period there is the
advantage that I discount the next period by r and δ. However, postponing separation
implies that firing costs and firing taxes will have grown at the rate γ. Furthermore, as
we assume a marginal increase of EPL with tenure, this too implies an additional cost
of postponing separation equal to α1A(t)(fc + ft). In the calibration exercise below, the
term in front of fc and ft will be positive, so that firing costs and firing taxes increase
match durations, in line with empirical studies. However, note that if the firing costs or
firing taxes rise steeply with tenure at some point, match durations might actually fall
due to EPL. Matches will then seek to avert this imminent danger. This is the mechanism
at work in models with two-tier EPL regimes, i.e. temporary and permanent contracts,
where some workers are fired just before they become eligible for a permanent contract.
4.2.5 Flow equilibrium and balanced budget
We close the model with the flow equilibrium condition for the stocks of employment and
unemployment and the balanced budget condition for the government. We normalize the
labour force L(t) to 1 at all dates. Denote the unemployment rate by u. Unemployment
is given
u(t) = 1−
∫ t
t−T (t)
θ(τ)q(θ(τ))u(τ)eδ(τ−t)dτ. (4.18)
Differentiating this expression with respect to time, and then assuming that unemploy-
ment is constant along the balanced growth path, we have
θq(θ)u = δ(1− u) + θq(θ)ue−δT . (4.19)
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Match destruction (the right hand side) consists of exogenous match destruction (the first
term) and endogenous match destruction (the second term). Rewriting for u we get
u = δ
δ + θq(θ)(1− e−δT ) . (4.20)
Assuming ∂θq(θ)
∂θ
> 0, this condition illustrates the diverse effects EPL may have on un-
employment and hence also employment. Suppose that e.g. firing costs reduce both
labour market tightness θ and increase match durations T , then the overall effect on
unemployment is typically ambiguous.
Finally, the government sets the parameters of EPL, the replacement rate for UI
benefits and the level of lump sum transfers (zero in the calibration) and then maintains
a balanced budget by varying UI premiums. Assuming the government starts without a
debt or surplus, the dynamic budget constraint for the government is∫ ∞
0
[∫ t
t−T (t)
θ(τ)q(θ(τ))u(τ)eδ(τ−t)dτp(t)A(t) + θ(t− T (t))
q(θ(t− T (t)))u(t− T (t))e−δT (t)(α0 + α1T (t))ft(t)A(t)
]
e−rtdt
=
∫ ∞
0
[(
1−
∫ t
t−T (t)
θ(τ)q(θ(τ))u(τ)eδ(τ−t)dτ
)
b(t)A(t)
+yls(t)A(t)] e−rtdt, (4.21)
unemployment benefits and lump sum transfers have to be financed by either UI premiums
or firing taxes. We multiply firing taxes with the number of endogenous match separations
in each period, θq(θ)u matches are formed each period of which e−δT survive until T .6
4.3 Qualitative analysis of the balanced growth path
In this section we study the balanced growth path more closely. In particular, we first
consider the relevance of distinguishing between flat and rising EPL. Flat EPL is often
assumed in theoretical work (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994, and Caballero and
Hammour, 1998a). However, most EPL regimes have little or no protection for newly
created matches followed by a gradual build up of EPL with tenure. Next, we consider a
second best role for firing taxes7, given the distortions in the private market outcome.
6Matches that are exogenously terminated do not pay EPL. Furthermore, in the absence of firing taxes, along the
balanced growth path we simply have the temporal budget constraint
p(1− u) = buiu+ yls.
7And potentially firing costs, although firing taxes would always be preferred in our setup.
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4.3.1 The relevance of the tenure profile of EPL
Severance pay
Lazear (1988, 1990) argues that severance pay does not affect job creation or destruction
because a worker and a firm can nullify the severance pay via a private arrangement in case
of a separation. Indeed, as shown by Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Garibaldo and
Violante (2005) an initial wage cut can nullify the effect of severance pay when severance
pay is zero for a new match. Below we show that the same is true in our vintage model.
However, of some interest is the effect on the wage profile. We derive an expression for
how severance pay affects the wage profile, and show that although overall wages will fall,
wages of workers with high tenure may rise.8
We already showed that severance pay does not affect the separation decision. Sever-
ance pay is a transfer from the firm to the worker, and hence does not affect the surplus
of the match (directly). However, it may still affect job creation. Consider the free entry
condition (4.16). We study two extreme cases, one where severance pay is flat and one
where it is initially zero, both cases resulting in the same severance pay being paid at
separation. First, consider the case that initial severance pay is zero, α0 = 0. The sur-
plus of the match, the right hand side of (4.16) is not directly affected by severance pay.
Specific investments are also not directly affected since match durations do not change.
In that case the shadow wage is also not affected and hence θ is independent of fsp as
well. Since unemployment and the budget constraint only depend on severance pay via
θ and T , they are also not affected. Hence, in this case severance pay drops out of the
equations determining the equilibrium.
Empirically, this seems the relevant case, and neither job creation and destruction are
affected by severance pay in our setup. However, what is then still of some interest is the
impact of severance pay on the wage profile. Set α0 to zero and suppose for notational
convenience that α1 = 1/T so that in period T the expression α1T simply becomes 1.
We can then derive a path of wages in the following way. First, subtract the expression
for U(t) from E(if , iw, τ, t) and solve the resulting differential equation with terminal
condition (4.6) to get9
E(if , iw, τ, t)− U(t) =
∫ τ+T (τ)
t
(w(if , iw, τ, s)− w˜)A(s)e−(r+δ)(s−t)ds
+fspA(τ + T (τ))e−(r+δ)(τ+T (τ)−t). (4.22)
The surplus of the match to a worker in vintage τ at some date t > τ is the discounted
sum of remaining wage payments over the discounted sum of shadow wages plus expected
severance payments discounted to t. Let us also briefly ignore specific investments and
set productivity of a vintage created at τ simply to A(τ), ignore unemployment insurance
benefits and their associated premiums, and suppose that fc = ft = 0. The expression
8This could motivate a push for higher severance pay by workers with higher tenure, via e.g. the political process or
trade unions.
9Along similar lines as Appendix 4.A.1.
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for the remaining surplus then becomes
S(τ, t) =
∫ τ+T (τ)
t
(A(τ)− w˜A(s))e−(r+δ)(s−t)ds. (4.23)
When we plug this expression into the sharing rule (4.11) we get another expression for
E(τ, t)− U(t), which combined with the expression above gives∫ τ+T (τ)
t
w(τ, s)A(s)e−(r+δ)(s−t)ds+ fsp(A(τ + T (τ))e−(r+δ)(τ+T (τ)−t)
−t− τ
T
A(t) =
∫ τ+T (τ)
t
(βA(τ) + (1− β)w˜(s))e−(r+δ)(s−t)ds. (4.24)
We can use (4.24) to show how severance pay affects wage payments during the match.
First, consider the date of creation∫ τ+T (τ)
τ
w(τ, s)A(s)e−(r+δ)(s−τ)ds+ fsp(A(τ + T (τ))e−(r+δ)T (τ)
=
∫ τ+T (τ)
τ
(βA(τ) + (1− β)w˜A(s))e−(r+δ)(s−τ)ds.
(4.25)
Total compensation for workers is a weighted average of the discounted sums of produc-
tivity and shadow wages. Furthermore, since the right hand side does not depend on
severance pay when α0 = 0, the discounted sum of wages will have to fall to compensate
for the discounted value of expected severance payments. Severance pay merely transfers
part of the compensation towards the end of the match.
Next, we can derive a path for wages by differentiating (4.24) with respect to t. This
gives10
w(τ, t) = βe−γ(t−τ) + (1− β)w˜ − (1− (r + δ − γ)(t− τ))
T
fsp. (4.26)
We know from above that the discounted sum of wages has to be lower. At creation we
have
w(τ, τ) = β + (1− β)w˜ − 1
T
fsp,
and severance pay leads to lower initial wages. However, in later periods during the match
wages may rise. Wages just before destruction are
w(τ, τ + T ) = βe−γT + (1− β)w˜ − 1
T
fsp + (r + δ − γ)fsp.
When r + δ − γ > 1
T
wages eventually rise above the level that would result without
severance pay. This is the same condition for firing costs and firing taxes to lengthen
match durations, the more relevant case empirically. Indeed, wages will be above the
level without severance pay after period t(τ)∗− τ = 1
r+δ−γ of the match, this is illustrated
in Figure 4.1. Severance pay shifts total wages down to keep total compensation constant,
4.3. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF BGP 91
t
t*(τ) – τ = (r+δ-γ) -1
∆w(τ,t)
τ
τ+T(τ)
Figure 4.1: The change in the wage profile due to severance pay
but over time severance pay improves the fallback position of workers. This leads to an
upward sloping wage profile.11
Finally, when α0 is not equal to zero, severance pay is no longer neutral. Though we
think this is empirically less relevant, let us briefly consider how it affects the equilibrium.
From (4.16) we can see that the term with severance pay on the left hand side will reduce
job creation, θ will have to fall to keep the equality. Furthermore, severance pay will also
reduce job creation via a reduction in the surplus resulting from a rise in the shadow wage
w˜ (conditional on θ). Substitute (4.15) into (4.12) and rewrite to S(if , iw, t, t), substitute
into (4.11) to arrive at an expression for E(if , iw, t, t)−U(t), and substitute this into the
expression for w˜ to obtain
w˜ = bui + bld + θq(θ)(α0fsp +
β
1− β (
v
q(θ) + α0(fsp + ft + fc) + if )− iw). (4.27)
Conditional on labour market tightness θ, severance pay increases the outside option
of workers. Firms have to sink more specific investments into the match, and over the
whole employment period workers will benefit from a stronger outside option. The higher
shadow wage will deter job creation, and θ will have to fall to restore equilibrium.
10Using (4.24) to get rid of the integrals with r + δ.
11Note that wages during the match will also rise due to the rise in shadow wages resulting from technological progress,
which also improves the fallback position of workers.
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Firing costs and firing taxes
Next we show that the tenure profile is also of some relevance for the effects of firing costs
and firing taxes, though the differences are less stark than with severance pay. Again,
for notational convenience we consider a setup without UI benefits and premiums, no
specific investments and in this case no severance pay. We will only study the impact of
changes in the tenure profile of firing costs, the impact of changes in the tenure profile
of firing taxes on job creation and destruction is similar as long as the receipts from the
firing taxes are used for lump sum transfers. Furthermore, for simplicity let us consider
the impact of two extreme cases: i) α0 = 1 and α1 = 0 (flat EPL) and ii) α0 = 0 and
α1 = 1/T0 (rising EPL).
First consider job destruction. With the simplifications above we have in the case of
flat EPL
e−γT = w˜ − (r + δ − γ)fc, (4.28)
and in case of rising EPL
e−γT = w˜ − (r + δ − γ − 1
T0
)fc. (4.29)
As the left hand side depends negatively on T , the effect working via the term 1
T0
fc
indicates that the rise in firing costs actually dampens the lengthening effect on match
durations. Indeed, postponing job destruction will increase firing costs more in the case
of rising firing costs. However, there is an effect working in the other direction, via w˜.
When firing costs are flat, and with the simplifications made above, w˜ is
w˜ = θq(θ) β1− β (
v
q(θ) + fc), (4.30)
but when firing costs are rising and initially zero the fc term drops out
w˜ = θq(θ) β1− β
v
q(θ) . (4.31)
So, whether or not rising firing costs lead to more or less job destruction than constant
firing costs depends on the increase in firing costs around the terminal date T and the
effect running via the outside option of workers w˜.
Next, consider job creation. With the simplifications made above we have the following
free entry condition for flat EPL
v
q(θ) = (1− β)
[∫ t+T
t
(
1− w˜eγ(s−t)
)
e−(r+δ)(s−t)ds− e−(r+δ−γ)Tfc
]
−βfc, (4.32)
and for rising EPL
v
q(θ) = (1− β)
[∫ t+T
t
(
1− w˜eγ(s−t)
)
e−(r+δ)(s−t)ds− e−(r+δ−γ)Tfc
]
. (4.33)
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In the case of flat EPL we have an additional term −βfc on the right hand side. Further-
more, as shown above, conditional on θ the shadow wage w˜ is also higher with flat EPL.
Both the higher initial investment cost and the higher shadow wage deter job creation,
and θ will have to fall more in the case of flat EPL than in the case of rising EPL. The flat
EPL typically assumed in theoretical work (e.g. Caballero and Hammour, 1998a) may
therefore overstate the adverse effects of firing costs on job creation.
Empirical support for the distinction between severance pay and firing costs
The model above suggests that severance pay does not affect job destruction and creation
when new jobs start without severance pay, the empirically relevant case, whereas firing
costs later in the match still affect job creation and destruction. Table 4.1 presents some
estimation results that support the hypothesis that severance pay is indeed more neutral
than firing costs.
We consider the relation between the overall OECD index for EPL and only for the
severance pay component (see OECD, 2004) for a number of variables. The overall EPL
index is a weighted average of sub indices for severance pay and notice periods, but also
for procedural inconveniences. A difference in the estimates for the overall index and the
severance pay variable is then supposed to come from the non severance pay part of the
index.12 We have a value for the OECD index for three periods: the late 1980s, the late
1990s and 2003. Accordingly, we use 5-year averages for the dependent and other control
variables to estimate a model with three observations per country.13 Although the size of
the estimated coefficients is not readily comparable, the significance of the estimates may
give us some clue as to the relative importance.
We estimate a random effects model and a fixed effects model on the cross-country
panel data. The former uses variation between countries and over time to study the
relation between the explanatory variables and the dependent variables, the latter only
uses the variation within countries over time. The first thing to note is that almost all
estimates for the fixed effects model are insignificant, except for the overall EPL index
in the equation for the labour force participation rate. Hence, the effects in the random
effects models stems from the variation between countries.14
For the random effects model we find a significant negative relation for the employment-
to-population ratio and the labour force participation rate when we use the overall OECD
index, but not when we only include the severance pay variable. The effect on unemploy-
ment is insignificant for both variables. This suggests that much of the negative effect of
EPL on employment runs via a discouraged worker effect, something we take up in an
extension of our model in Section 4.4. Since severance pay does not directly reduce the
returns from formal production, it is less distortionary than firing costs.
12The correlation between the overall EPL index and the severance pay variable is .53.
13As control variables we used most of the variables suggested by OECD (2004), like spending on active labour market
policies as a percentage of GDP, the output gap, the tax wedge, union density, the coverage of collective bargaining and
the level of coordination in wage bargaining. Details of the estimated equations are available on request.
14Hence, a potential risk in this case is that we are picking up the effect of other (missing) variables that are correlated
with both EPL or severance pay and the dependent variables across countries.
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Table 4.1: Estimated effect of overall EPL-index and severance pay on selected variablesa
Specificationb Random effects Fixed effects
Overall index SP Overall index SP
Employment-to-population ratio −1.81∗∗ −.35 −1.50 .92
(.84) (.42) (1.04) (.59)
Labour force participation rate −1.83∗∗ .29 −1.59∗ .92
(.65) (.32) (.80) (.46)
Unemployment rate .29 .19 −.36 .04
(.45) (.25) (.57) (.40)
Duration of unemployment 5.77∗∗∗ 3.40∗∗∗ 2.22 −2.39
(.55) (.32) (2.95) (4.89)
a We use version 1 of the summary indicator for EPL from the OECD, which is available for the late 1980s, late 1990s and
2003. Version 2 includes additional arrangements for collective dismissals, but version 2 is only available for the late 1990s
and 2003. For severance pay we use the average (legislated) severance pay for a worker fired after 9 months, 4 years and 20
years of tenure. These data are also from the OECD. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ are used to indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively. Standard errors are in brackets. All estimated equations contain a number of (significant) control
variables, where the controls are the same for the equations with the OECD indicator and the severance pay variable.
Details are available on request.
b In the random effects model we assume random country effects (and use feasible generalized least squares), in the fixed
effects model we assume fixed country effects.
Severance pay does not seem entirely neutral however, as both the overall index and
severance pay are positively correlated with unemployment durations. Indeed, in a setting
where we have endogenous search and selection by workers the neutrality of severance pay
may break down. Higher severance pay may lead to less search effort, in particular for
unemployed that would otherwise run into a liquidity constraint (see Chetty, 2008). The
finding may also be indicative of a reverse causation, where longer unemployment leads
workers to prefer higher severance pay (at the expense of lower wages).15
4.3.2 Social planner and EPL
Next, we study a potential second best role for firing taxes. We first study the social
planner outcome, and then consider the private market outcome and how firing taxes
may mitigate market failures.
15Fella (2007) studies the optimal severance pay level and finds that, conditional on the level and duration of unemploy-
ment benefits, longer unemployment durations imply a higher optimal severance pay level.
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First best
The social planner solves the following optimisation problem, given the initial distribution
of vintages for τ < 0,
max
{m(t),T (t),if (t),iw(t)}∞s=0
Ω =
∫ ∞
0
(
∫ t
t−T (t)
(c0 + cf if (τ)ρf
+cwiw(τ)ρw)A(τ)m(τ)eδ(τ−t)dτ
+bldA(t)u(t)− c(m(t), u(t))A(t)
−m(t)(if (t) + iw(t))A(t))e−rtdt,
s.t. u(t) = 1−
∫ t
t−T (t)
m(τ)eδ(τ−t)dτ, (4.34)
where m(t) ≡ θ(t)q(θ(t))u(t) is the number of matches in period t and c(m(t), u(t)) is the
creation cost. Following Caballero and Hammour (1996) this creation cost function can
be derived from a matching function in the following way. Let the matching function be
given by
m = σuφj1−φ, 0 < φ < 1, (4.35)
where j is the number of vacancies. When we rewrite this function to j we have the
number of vacancies as a function of the required matches. Given that posting a vacancy
costs νA(t) per unit of time we then have search costs for the social planner as
c(m(t), u(t))A(t) = σ−
1
1−φ (m(t)u(t)−φ)
1
1−φνA(t). (4.36)
Specific investments
Using calculus of variations we can determine the optimal specific investments (see Ap-
pendix 4.A.2)
if =
(
cfρf
r + δ
(
1− e−(r+δ)T
))− 11−ρf
, (4.37)
and
iw =
(
cwρw
r + δ
(
1− e−(r+δ)T
))− 11−ρw
. (4.38)
At the optimum, the marginal cost of an additional unit of specific investment equals the
discounted sum of the marginal increase in output. A comparison with the private market
outcomes (4.13) and (4.14) shows that the social return is higher than the private return.
Due to ex post bargaining over the returns of these specific investments, there will be
under investment in specific investment by both parties in the private market outcome.
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Creation and destruction
We can derive optimal job creation and destruction using the methods in Kamien and
Muller (1976) for an optimal control problem with integral state equations (see again
Appendix 4.A.2). When job creation is optimal we have
∫ τ+T (τ)
τ
(A(τ)− (bld − c′u(t))A(t))e−(r+δ)(t−τ)dt = A(τ)c′m(τ), (4.39)
so job creation occurs until the marginal creation cost (the right hand side) equals the
discounted stream of productivity minus the social shadow price of labour (the left hand
side). The shadow price of labour is the marginal reduction in search costs of having one
more unemployed plus the direct (potentially negative) value of unemployment bld.
Optimal job destruction occurs when
A(t− T (t)) = (bld − c′u(t))A(t), (4.40)
matches are destroyed when the value of production in vintage t− T (t) at time t equals
the value of moving an individual to unemployment, the direct value of unemployment
and the marginal reduction in search costs of having one additional unemployed.
For the search cost specification (4.36) we have
c′u(t) = −
φ
1− φθ(t)ν, (4.41)
and
c′m(t) =
1
1− φ
1
σ
θ(t)φν. (4.42)
When we compare these expressions with the private market outcomes of (4.16) and (4.17),
with q(θ) = σθ−φ from the matching function (4.35), and specific investments would be
optimal, we see that the private market outcome coincides with the social optimum when
β = φ (see Hosios, 1990, or Pissarides, 1990).
Second best
However, the private market outcome is not efficient in our setup, even when the Hosios
condition is met. First, we have under investment in specific investments due to ex
post bargaining over the rents from these investments. Second, unemployment insurance
benefits and premiums drive a wedge between the social and private value of creating and
continuing a match. Firing taxes may then play a second best role. Note that firing taxes
only attack the under investment problem indirectly, with potential adverse consequences
like sclerosis. A more efficient policy response would be to attack the under investment
directly, for example by making it possible for firms and workers to sign an ex ante contract
on the returns of the specific investments. But this is the equivalent to a tin can opener.
Indeed, the very nature of the specific investments and their returns make it hard to write
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a contract on the returns. Both the investment itself, and the returns are hard to observe
and hence to verify by a third party.16
To simplify matters we study the second best role of firing taxes for a number of
particular values for the parameters, in line with the calibration. Specifically, we set
α0 = 0, no initial EPL, and β = φ = .5, so that specific investments drop out of the
shadow wage of workers w˜ and the Hosios condition is met (absent other distortions), and
cw = cf = c and ρw = ρf = ρ so that specific investment choices are the same iw = if = i
for workers and firms.
Under investment in specific investments
First, consider the second best role of EPL when there is under investment in specific
investments (see also Belot et al., 2007), and suppose there are no unemployment insurance
benefits and premiums bui = p = 0. Since workers only get a share β of the returns to
their specific investments, and firms only get a share 1− β of the returns of their specific
investments, both will be too low in the private market outcome, compare (4.13) and
(4.14) with (4.37) and (4.38). This may also affect job creation and destruction. For the
parameter choices above the job creation condition becomes
ν
q(θ) = −i +
(
1− e−(r+δ)T
r + δ
)
ciρ
+12
(
1− e−(r+δ)T
r + δ
)
c0
−12
(
1− e−(r+δ−γ)T
r + δ − γ (w˜ + p)
)
−12
(
α1Te
−(r+δ−γ)Tft
)
, (4.43)
with
w˜ = bld + θν. (4.44)
This condition shows that under these assumptions, job creation would actually still be
at the optimum, provided T is at the optimum. In this situation, the firm only gets 50%
of the returns of his or her own specific investments, making job creation too low. This
is however compensated by the 50% of the returns the firm can claim from the specific
investments by the worker.
Unfortunately, T will typically not be at the optimum. Indeed, the condition for T
becomes
e−γT = w˜ + p− ((r + δ − γ)α1T − α1)ft
c0 + 2ciρ
. (4.45)
When i is too low, this will make T too low as well, jobs are destroyed too soon. With
the return period inefficiently low, this will cause job creation to be inefficiently low. The
16See also the discussion in Caballero and Hammour (1998b, pp. 730-732).
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combination of inefficiently high job destruction coupled with inefficiently low job creation
will result in an inefficiently high level of unemployment in the laissez-faire outcome.
Firing taxes can improve the private market outcome. When (r + δ − γ) > 1
T
, firing
taxes increase match durations. This is the case in the calibration. It is also in line
with the robust empirical finding that higher EPL increases match durations. Hence, by
introducing a firing tax we can increase inefficiently low match durations T . This will also
raise specific investments, further raising T . The downside of introducing firing taxes is
that they deter job creation, see above. However, this depends on what we do with the
receipts of the firing tax. If we use the receipts for lump sum transfers, this is indeed the
case. However, if we use the receipts to give a per period subsidy pA(s) to matches, we
can nullify this effect. Specifically, by choosing
∆p = − e
−(r+δ−γ)T
1− e−(r+δ−γ)T (r + δ − γ)∆ft, (4.46)
the introduction of the firing tax will be neutral with respect to job creation (ceteris
paribus).17
Distortions due to UI benefits and premiums
Unemployment insurance benefits and premiums may also provide a rationale for firing
taxes (see Blanchard and Tirole, 2008). We keep the simplifying assumptions above but
now assume positive bui and p initially. The shadow wage of workers becomes
w˜ = bui + bld + θν. (4.47)
Conditional on θ, w˜ will be higher. Combined with a positive p we can see from the
job creation condition (4.43) above, that job creation will be inefficiently low. Also, job
destruction will be inefficiently high, the higher shadow wage w˜ and premiums p lower
match durations T , see (4.44). Hence, again unemployment will be inefficiently high in
the absence of firing taxes.
As before, firing taxes may improve the private market outcome. The introduction
of firing taxes will lengthen match durations, reducing excessive job destruction. Fur-
thermore, this can be achieved without a cost on the creation side by using the receipts
from the firing tax for a budgetary neutral shift from firing taxes to lower unemployment
insurance premiums.18
4.4 Quantitative analysis of the balanced growth path
We continue with a quantitative analysis of the impact of EPL in general equilibrium. We
only consider the case where EPL of new matches is zero initially, and rises subsequently
17Note that whether or not firing taxes raise welfare also depends on whether firing costs are present. If so, match
durations may be inefficiently high to start with and a firing subsidy rather than a firing tax may be called for.
18The remaining distortion on the creation side could in principle be nullified by a hiring subsidy financed by a lump sum
tax.
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with tenure, which seems the empirically relevant case. In this case severance pay will not
affect the equilibrium and hence we do not consider it below. We do consider the impact
of firing costs and firing taxes, where the latter may be used for lump sum transfers or
to reduce UI premiums. To facilitate the discussion later on, we start with some partial
derivatives, then discuss the calibration, and then turn to the simulation outcomes.
4.4.1 Equilibrium conditions and partial derivatives
An equilibrium is a consistent set of values for
• specific investments by firms if ,
• specific investments by workers iw,
• shadow wage w˜,
• labour market tightness θ,
• match duration conditional on survival T ,
• unemployment u,
• UI premiums p, for given firing taxes ft.
The equilibrium values for these variables are
if =
(
cfρf
1− β
r + δ (1− e
−(r+δ)T )
) 1
1−ρf
,
iw =
(
cwρw
β
r + δ (1− e
−(r+δ)T )
) 1
1−ρw
,
w˜ = bld + bui + θ
β
1− βν + θq(θ)
(
β
1− β if − iw
)
,
ν
q(θ) = −if +(1− β)
(
1− e−(r+δ)T
r + δ (c0 + cf if
ρf + cwiwρw)
)
−(1− β)
(
1− e−(r+δ−γ)T
r + δ − γ (w˜ + p)
)
−(1− β)
(
α1Te
−(r+δ−γ)T (fc + ft)
)
,
e−γT = w˜ + p− ((r + δ − γ)α1T − α1)(fc + ft)
c0 + cf if ρf + cwiwρw
,
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u = δ
δ + θq(θ)(1− e−δT ) ,
p = buiu+ yls1− u −
e−(r+δ−γ)T
1− e−(r+δ−γ)T (r + δ − γ)ft.
Table 4.2 gives some partial derivatives. We briefly reiterate some interesting direct effects,
or the absence thereof.
Regarding specific investments, what is relevant to note is that both specific invest-
ments by the firm and the worker rise with T , whereas specific investments by workers
and firms rise respectively fall with the bargaining power of workers β. Furthermore,
EPL does not directly affect specific investments, it will only indirectly affect specific
investments via the match duration T .
The shadow wage of workers, reflecting the private value of unemployment, depends
positively/negatively on the specific investments that firms/workers sink into new matches.
However, in the base calibration below we assume that β = .5 and similar technologies
cf = cw and ρf = ρf in which case the specific investment terms cancel in w˜, and so there
will be no indirect effect of specific investments via the shadow wage on job creation and
destruction. The job finding rate θq(θ) rises in θ so the w˜ will rise with labour market
tightness as well.
The rate at which vacancies are filled q(θ) depends negatively on θ, so the left hand
side of the job creation condition rises with θ. Since if and T are chosen optimally by
the firm, the partial derivative of labour market tightness with respect to these variables
is zero. However, more specific investments by the worker will increase job creation. A
higher shadow wage has a negative effect on job creation, so a rise in benefits will reduce
job creation via the shadow wage, as will UI premiums, firing costs and firing taxes. What
is also of interest is that when the bargaining power of workers β increases, the negative
effect of firing costs and firing taxes on job creation is actually reduced. A higher β means
that you get a larger stake in the surplus, hence you also get a higher stake in factors that
reduce the surplus, like firing costs and firing taxes.19
The left hand side of the job destruction condition falls with T. Higher specific in-
vestments by firms or workers raise productivity, lengthening match durations. A rise in
the shadow wage or UI premiums will shorten match durations. Firing costs and taxes
will lengthen match durations when (r+ δ− γ) > 1
T
. Finally, note that using firing taxes
to pay for UI benefits instead of UI premiums (a move towards experience rating) will
lengthen matches both because it increases ft but also because it reduces p.
As noted above, unemployment depends negatively on θ and T . A rise in UI benefits
and premiums will lower both θ and T via its effect on w˜, and hence will unambiguously
raise unemployment. However, a rise in firing costs may reduce both job creation and
destruction, making the overall effect on unemployment ambiguous.
19In the case with initial EPL as in (4.27), there is a counteracting negative effect on job creation from a rise in β through
firing costs and firing taxes (as well as severance pay). So, again the tenure profile of EPL makes a difference.
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Table 4.2: Partial derivatives
Variables Parameters
if iw w˜ θ T β bui p fc ft
if . 0 0 0 + − 0 0 0 0
iw 0 . 0 0 + + 0 0 0 0
w˜ + − . + 0 + + 0 0 0
θ 0 + − . 0 − 0a − − −
T + + − 0 . 0 0a − ?b ?b
p 0 0 0 − − 0 + . 0 ?c
u 0 0 0 − − 0 0 0 0 0
a Higher benefits bui will decrease θ and T indirectly via their effect on w˜.
b ∂T
∂fc
, ∂T
∂ft
> 0 when r + δ − γ > 1
T
.
c 0 when firing taxes are used for lump sum transfers, −when firing taxes are used to reduce UI premiums.
4.4.2 Calibration
We calibrate the model on data and studies for the Dutch labour market, for different
levels of specific investments. The relevant data, assumptions and calibrated parameters
for the case where specific investments make up a large part (25%) of total productivity
are given in Table 4.3.
We use the (annual) stock and flow data from Kock (2002) for the period 1991-1997.
These data are somewhat dated, but consistent. The unemployment rate is .065, the
annual outflow rate (not probability) from unemployment to employment is .87, which
together in steady state imply a match destruction rate of .06. As an indicator of the
share of matches that is exogenous and to which EPL does not apply we take one minus
the share of job creation and destruction in gross worker flows, which is about .3 for the
period 1991-1997 according to Kock (2002). The motivation for this is that worker flows
in excess of job flows are worker initiated separations, to which employment protection
typically does not apply. We set δ = .018 for the exogenous match destruction rate. Then
we rewrite the flow equilibrium condition (4.20) to get T = −1
δ
ln
(
1− 1−u
u
δ
θq(θ)
)
which
implies a T = 19.6 will generate the required amount of endogenous match destruction.
We use bld to calibrate this value for T , which turns out to be .058.
We assume constant returns to scale in the matching technology and an elasticity
of matches with respect to unemployment φ = .5, which falls in the range of empirical
estimates reported by e.g. Broersma and Van Ours (1999). We calibrate the efficiency
parameter in the matching process σ so that the job finding rate corresponds with the
data on labour market tightness and our pick for φ. Labour market tightness is set in line
with the data rewriting the expression for labour market tightness to ν, and we find a per
period vacancy posting cost of .71 (normalising initial productivity to 1, see below).
We assume that the discount factor is .05. Furthermore, since we assume that workers
and firms have the same discount factor, β = .5 is a natural choice for the relative
bargaining power of workers (see e.g. Layard et al., 1991). This choice for β implies that
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Table 4.3: Calibration of the case with large specific investments
Data Assumptions
Unemployment rate u .065 Share prod. from firm spec. inv. .125
Outflow rate θq(θ) .057 Share prod. from worker spec. inv. .125
Match duration Ta 19.6 Ave. private return spec. inv. .125
Exogenous job destruction rate δ .018 Rel. bargaining power of workers β .500
Labour market tightness θ .268 Initial lump sum transfer yls .000
Discount rate firms/workers r .050
Benefits in unemployment bui .500
Matching weight unempl. φ .500
Rate of technological progress γ .013
Firing costs fc .100
Initial EPL α0 .000
Calibrated parameters
Decreasing returns parameter ρf .739 Deceasing returns parameter ρw .739
Share parameter spec. inv. firms cf .209 Share param. spec. inv. workers cw .209
Per period vacancy costs ν .710 Constant matching function σ 1.68
Unemployment benefits premium p .035 Disutility of unemployment bld .058
Slope of tenure profile of EPL α1 .051
a Conditional on survival until T .
in the absence of distortions in specific investments or distortions due to unemployment
benefits and its financing, the market solution will coincide with the social planner solution
(see above). The benefit level is set to .5, unemployment being made up of individuals
receiving more generous unemployment benefits and individuals receiving less generous
unemployment assistance, and the wage being below productivity with the productivity of
new matches normalized to 1. This is including the additional productivity resulting from
specific investments (so initial productivity of new matches is the same in all simulations
below).
Regarding productivity growth, average productivity growth has been around 1.5%
per annum since the mid 1970s (see CPB, 2008, Chapter 5) and also over the past decade.
In their analysis of France, Caballero and Hammour (1998a) assume that all technological
progress is embodied, and they ignore disembodied technological progress. This is poten-
tially not innocuous, as the extent to which EPL might lead to technological sclerosis
will depend on the extent to which technological progress is embodied or disembodied.
However, the assumption that most if not all technological progress is embodied seems a
reasonable approximation for the Dutch data as well, though our empirical knowledge on
this is rather dated.20 Kuipers et al. (1979) find for the period 1948-1976 that embodied
20From the previous time that vintage models were fashionable, before they were (at least temporarily) revived by
Caballero and Hammour starting with Caballero and Hammour (1994). However, again interest seem to have waned,
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technological progress makes up 78% of total productivity growth. Gelauff et al. (1985)
find for the period 1960-1982 that all technological progress is embodied in the long run.21
These empirical studies suggest that almost all technological progress is embodied, hence
we set the growth rate of (embodied) technological progress γ to .0125 in the calibration,
slightly below the per annum average growth of productivity since the mid 1970s.
Next, consider the calibration of the return to specific investments and the contribution
of specific investments to total productivity of a match. The average private return to
specific investment by firms and workers in the model is given by rsif = (1− β)cf iρf−1f =
1
ρf
1−e−(r+δ)T
r+δ and r
si
w = βcwiρw−1w = 1ρw
1−e−(r+δ)T
r+δ respectively. We use these expressions to
calibrate ρf and ρw, which captures the diminishing returns to productivity of a marginal
unit of specific investments. Rewriting to ρf and ρw gives ρf = 1rsi
f
1−e−(r+δ)T
r+δ and ρw =
1
rsiw
1−e−(r+δ)T
r+δ . The last term in these expressions shows that the private return has to
be quite high because there is an exogenous risk that matches end and matches that do
survive are still terminated after T periods. With the values of r, δ and T in the calibration
the last term becomes .092. For bounded specific investments we need ρf , ρw < 1, so the
private return has to be above this. We pick a value for ρw = ρf = .739, to keep
specific investments bounded and to generate an average private return rate of .125.22
Is this a reasonable number? Perhaps the returns on workplace training are informative
on this. Like the specific investments we consider these investments also face at least
the additional risk of limited return periods. Bassanini et al. (2005) estimate the private
returns to workplace training using data from the European Community Household Panel
for the period 1995-2001. The average over all countries is a return of 9.1% using OLS
and 2.5% assuming fixed effects (see Table 4.2 in Bassanini et al., 2005). This suggests
that our value may be a bit high, but then again workplace training may also result in
general skills which extend beyond the duration of the match.
We calibrate the contribution of specific investments to total productivity of a match
using cf and cw. Again, our knowledge on the potential size of this is limited. Topel (1990)
suggests that displaced workers earn on average some 10 to 20% lower wages in their new
job compared to their old job, which may be an indication of the quasi-rents earned by
workers due to match specific human capital. Our strategy is to try different values, and
see for which values the effect of EPL via specific investments on productivity dominates
the effect EPL has on productivity via reduced reallocation. In our first calibration we
assume that specific investments by firms and workers both contribute a share s = .125
to total productivity of the match. We then fill in the numbers in cf i
ρf
f = s ⇒ cf =
s1−ρf
(
(1− β)ρf 1−e−(r+δ)Tr+δ
)−ρf and cwiρww = s ⇒ cw = s1−ρw (βρw 1−e−(r+δ)Tr+δ )−ρw . Workers
perhaps again due to their complexity, consider e.g. the following quote from Blanchard (2000, p. 1403) on Caballero
and Hammour (1996) (and Phelps, 1994):"[T]hese are important contributions, but I see them more as the prototype cars
presented in car shows but never mass produced later: they show what can be done, but they are probably not exactly
what will be."
21Actually, they restrict the parameter of disembodied technological progress to 0 in the estimation, otherwise it would
presumably become negative, which seems implausible.
22Note that the social return is twice the private return, as firms and workers only get half of the return on their specific
investment due to ex post bargaining.
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can claim 50% of the specific investments by the worker and the firm. As a result, this
makes up some 12.5% of their wages.
Finally, for firing costs we use the data on EPL paid by firms collected by Knegt
and Tros (2007). One of the interesting aspects of their study is that they decompose
total firing expenditures into transfers to workers and costs of administrative and legal
procedures. The average firing expenditure was in the order of 17 thousand euro in 2007.
Of this, administrative and legal procedures only make up about 2.5 thousand euro. The
modal wage was in the order of 30 thousand euro in 2007 in The Netherlands, and so we
set firing costs fc to .1 in the base calibration. We further assume that initial EPL is zero,
α0 = 0, and there are no firing taxes or lump sum transfers in the base calibration.
4.4.3 Simulations
We consider the effect of three types of reforms: i) reducing or increasing firing costs,
ii) introducing firing taxes to pay for lump sum transfers, iii) introducing firing taxes
to reduce UI premiums. We first consider how these reforms work out when specific
investments are important. Next, we consider what happens when they are somewhat
less important, and finally when they play no role at all .23
Under investment in specific investments
We first consider the case that specific investments make up a large part of productivity,
25%, the calibration discussed above. Table 4.4 gives the percentage changes that result
from a change in firing costs. Note that firing costs are .1 initially, hence the zeros in the
second row. We discuss the effects on the variables from left to right.
Reducing firing costs to zero (the top row) leads to shorter match durations T . As
a result, the job destruction rate goes up, in line with empirical studies. Labour market
tightness θ drops, and hence the job finding rate goes down. On the one hand, lower
firing costs lead to a direct reduction in labour costs, making it more profitable to post
vacancies. On the other hand, shorter match durations discourage specific worker invest-
ments into the match, part of which is claimed by firms via ex post bargaining, reducing
the profitability of the match. The latter effect dominates in this calibration.24
With a higher firing rate and a lower job finding rate, unemployment goes up and em-
ployment (e) goes down. Output goes down even further since productivity declines along
with employment. On the one hand, productivity rises with shorter match durations, as
older vintages are scrapped sooner. On the other hand, firms and workers sink less specific
investments into these shorter matches, leading to an overall fall in productivity. Welfare
- measured as output minus search costs and specific investment costs plus the utility
component in unemployment bld times unemployment - falls with output. However, the
drop is less severe than the drop in output due to the drop in search and investment costs.
23The latter may also be used as an indication of the effects when there is no contracting problem for the returns on
specific investments.
24Again, note that since firms pick their own specific investments and set the match duration, there is no direct effect of
a change in these variables on job creation.
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Table 4.4: Firing cost, specific investments 25% of productivity, %-changesa
fc (level) T JD rate θ JF rate u e if&iw Q/E Q W
.0 −5.1 4.5 −3.5 −1.8 6.0 −.4 −9.4 −1.2 −1.6 −0.9
.1 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
.2 5.3 −4.2 3.5 1.7 −5.4 .4 9.7 1.2 1.6 0.8
.3 10.7 −8.1 6.9 3.4 −10.4 .7 19.5 2.4 3.1 1.6
.4 16.3 −11.7 10.2 5.0 −15.0 1.0 29.6 3.5 4.6 2.4
.5 22.0 −15.0 13.5 6.5 −19.2 1.3 39.7 4.6 6.0 3.1
.6 27.9 −18.2 16.7 8.0 −23.0 1.6 49.8 5.7 7.3 3.8
a The variables are from left to right: firing costs normalized by leading edge technology, maximum match durations
conditional on survival until T , the job destruction rate, labour market tightness, the job finding rate, unemployment,
employment, specific firm investments, specific worker investments, productivity, gross output and welfare.
Table 4.5: Firing taxes to pay for lump sum transfers, spec. inv. 25% of product., %-changesa
ft (level) T JD rate θ JF rate u e if&iw Q/E Q W
.1 5.3 −4.2 3.5 1.7 −5.5 .4 9.7 1.2 1.6 1.3
.2 10.7 −8.1 6.9 3.4 −10.4 .7 19.5 2.4 3.1 2.7
.3 16.3 −11.7 10.2 5.0 −15.0 1.0 29.6 3.5 4.6 3.9
.4 22.0 −15.0 13.5 6.5 −19.2 1.3 39.7 4.6 6.0 5.1
.5 28.0 −18.2 16.7 8.0 −23.0 1.6 49.9 5.7 7.3 6.3
a The variables are from left to right: firing taxes normalized by leading edge technology, maximum match durations
conditional on survival until T , the job destruction rate, labour market tightness, the job finding rate, unemployment,
employment, specific firm investments, specific worker investments, productivity, gross output and welfare.
Table 4.6: Firing taxes to reduce UI premiums, spec. inv. 25% of productivity, %-changesa
ft (l.) p T JD rate θ JF rate u e if&iw Q/E Q W
.1 .030 5.7 −4.5 5.3 2.6 −6.5 .5 10.4 1.3 1.8 1.5
.2 .025 11.4 −8.6 10.2 5.0 −12.2 .8 20.8 2.5 3.4 2.9
.3 .021 17.3 −12.3 14.9 7.2 −17.2 1.2 31.3 3.7 4.9 4.2
.4 .017 23.2 −15.6 19.4 9.3 −21.6 1.5 41.6 4.8 6.4 5.4
.5 .014 29.2 −18.8 23.6 11.2 −25.7 1.8 52.0 5.9 7.7 6.6
a The variables are from left to right: firing taxes normalized by leading edge technology, the UI premium rate maximum
match durations conditional on survival until T , the job destruction rate, labour market tightness, the job finding rate,
unemployment, employment, specific firm investments, specific worker investments, productivity, gross output and welfare.
106 CHAPTER 4. EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION
Table 4.7: Firing cost, specific investments 12.5% of productivity, %-changesa
fc (level) T JD rate θ JF rate u e if&iw Q/E Q W
.0 −2.4 2.1 .1 .0 1.9 −.1 −4.4 −.2 −.3 .2
.1 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
.2 2.6 −2.1 .0 .0 −2.0 .1 4.7 .2 .3 −.2
.3 5.3 −4.2 .0 .0 −4.0 .3 9.8 .3 .6 −.4
.4 8.3 −6.4 .0 .0 −6.0 .4 15.2 .5 .9 −.5
.5 11.5 −8.6 .1 .1 −8.2 .6 21.0 .7 1.3 −.7
.6 15.0 −10.8 .3 .1 −10.3 .7 27.2 .9 1.6 −.8
a The variables are from left to right: firing costs normalized by leading edge technology, maximum match durations
conditional on survival until T , the job destruction rate, labour market tightness, the job finding rate, unemployment,
employment, specific firm investments, specific worker investments, productivity, gross output and welfare.
Table 4.8: Firing taxes to pay for lump sum transfers, spec. inv. 12.5% of product., %-changesa
ft (level) T JD rate θ JF rate u e if&iw Q/E Q W
.1 2.6 −2.1 .0 .0 −2.0 .2 4.7 .2 .3 .3
.2 5.3 −4.2 .0 .0 −4.0 .3 9.8 .3 .6 .7
.3 8.3 −6.4 .0 .0 −6.0 .4 15.2 .5 .9 1.0
.4 11.5 −8.6 .1 .1 −8.2 .6 21.0 .7 1.3 1.4
.5 15.0 −10.8 .3 .1 −10.3 .7 27.2 .9 1.6 1.7
a The variables are from left to right: firing taxes normalized by leading edge technology, maximum match durations
conditional on survival until T , the job destruction rate, labour market tightness, the job finding rate, unemployment,
employment, specific firm investments, specific worker investments, productivity, gross output and welfare.
Table 4.9: Firing taxes to reduce UI premiums, spec. inv. 12.5% of productivity, %-changesa
ft (l.) p T JD rate θ JF rate u e if&iw Q/E Q W
.1 .031 2.8 −2.3 0.7 0.3 −2.4 .2 5.1 .2 .3 .4
.2 .028 5.8 −4.5 1.4 0.7 −4.9 .3 10.5 .4 .7 .7
.3 .024 9.0 −6.8 2.1 1.0 −7.3 .5 16.3 .6 1.1 1.1
.4 .021 12.4 −9.2 2.8 1.4 −9.8 .7 22.5 .7 1.4 1.5
.5 .018 16.0 −11.5 3.5 1.7 −12.3 .9 29.1 .9 1.8 1.9
a The variables are from left to right: firing taxes normalized by leading edge technology, the UI premium rate, maximum
match durations conditional on survival until T , the job destruction rate, labour market tightness, the job finding rate,
unemployment, employment, specific firm investments, specific worker investments, productivity, gross output and welfare.
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When we increase firing costs, and there is a big under investment problem in specific
investments, we get the reverse effects. Job durations increase and the job finding rate
goes up, reducing unemployment and increasing employment. Higher specific investments
further boost output, with welfare rising somewhat less due to the higher investments
costs.
Table 4.5 gives the impact of introducing firing taxes, the proceeds of which go to
lump sum transfers. We can compare the first row in Table 4.5 with the third row in
Table 4.4; both imply a rise in the firing cost to the individual firm of .1. The results
are (virtually) identical, except for welfare. Since the firing tax is paid out as lump sum
transfers they do not reduce welfare, hence the rise in welfare is larger in the case of firing
taxes than in the case of firing costs.
Things work out even better when we give back the firing taxes in the form of a
reduction in the UI premium, see Table 4.6. The firing tax reduces the distortion on
the destruction margin from UI premiums and benefits. With the UI premium falling,
match durations increase even further than in the case above, leading to even higher
specific investments. Using the receipts to reduce the UI premium further boosts job
creation. Job creation rises more, unemployment falls more, employment rises more, as
do productivity, output and welfare.
Tables 4.7-4.9 give the results for the case that specific investments make up 12.5%
of total productivity, half of the calibration discussed above. From Table 4.7 we see
that in this case we still have rising employment and productivity with higher firing costs.
However, job creation hardly changes, the rise in specific worker investments is just making
it more profitable to open up more vacancies despite the direct rise in labour costs due
to firing costs. Gross output still rises, but welfare now falls as an increasing part of it is
wasted on firing costs. Table 4.8 shows that firing taxes can still improve welfare, while
Table 4.9 shows that this is even more likely when the firing taxes are used to reduce UI
premiums.
No specific investments
Tables 4.10-4.12 give the effects when we abstract from specific investments to raise pro-
ductivity. Without specific investments we are essentially back in the world of Caballero
and Hammour (1998a). Table 4.10 shows that higher firing costs now lead to lower pro-
ductivity, more workers are in less productive vintages. Furthermore, without the counter
effect of higher specific worker investments, overall labour costs rise due to higher firing
costs, reducing labour market tightness and hence job creation. Unemployment still falls,
and employment still rises, when we increase firing costs (in an extension with endogenous
labour supply, we can also get a negative effect on employment, see below). The drop in
productivity dominates the rise in employment, leading to a fall in output. Welfare falls
even more, due to the loss of output to firing costs.
Table 4.11 shows that even in the absence of specific investments, firing taxes can
increase welfare, despite the fall in job creation. Indeed, UI benefits and premiums cause
firms and workers to separate while the social value of a job is still above the private value.
Firing taxes reduce this wedge, with some collateral damage on the creation margin.
Output still falls, but not welfare. In the calibration without specific investments the
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Table 4.10: Firing cost, no specific investments, %-changesa
fc (level) T JD rate θ JF rate u e Q/E Q W
.0 −1.6 1.4 .4 .2 1.1 −.1 .2 .1 .5
.1 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
.2 1.7 −1.4 −.3 −.2 −1.1 .1 −.2 −.1 −.5
.3 3.5 −2.8 −.7 −.3 −2.3 .2 −.4 −.2 −1.0
.4 5.4 −4.3 −1.0 −.5 −3.5 .2 −.6 −.3 −1.5
.5 7.4 −5.7 −1.4 −.7 −4.8 .3 −.8 −.4 −2.0
.6 9.6 −7.3 −1.7 −.8 −6.1 .4 −1.0 −.6 −2.6
a The variables are from left to right: firing costs normalized by leading edge technology, maximum match durations
conditional on survival until T , the job destruction rate, labour market tightness, the job finding rate, unemployment,
employment, productivity, gross output and welfare
Table 4.11: Firing taxes to pay for lump sum transfers, no specific investments, %-changesa
ft (level) T JD rate θ JF rate u e Q/E Q W
.1 1.7 −1.4 −.3 −.2 −1.1 .1 −.2 −.1 .01
.2 3.5 −2.8 −.7 −.3 −2.3 .2 −.4 −.2 .02
.3 5.4 −4.3 −1.0 −.5 −3.5 .2 −.6 −.3 .02
.4 7.4 −5.7 −1.4 −.7 −4.8 .3 −.8 −.4 .02
.5 9.6 −7.3 −1.7 −.8 −6.1 .4 −1.0 −.6 .01
a The variables are from left to right: firing taxes normalized by leading edge technology, maximum match durations
conditional on survival until T , the job destruction rate, labour market tightness, the job finding rate, unemployment,
employment, productivity, gross output and consumption.
Table 4.12: Firing taxes to reduce UI premiums, no specific investments, %-changesa
ft (level) p T JD rate θ JF rate u e Q/E Q W
.1 .031 1.8 −1.5 .1 .0 −1.4 .1 −.2 −.1 .02
.2 .028 3.8 −3.0 .2 .1 −2.9 .2 −.4 −.2 .04
.3 .025 5.8 −4.6 .2 .1 −4.4 .3 −.6 −.3 .05
.4 .022 8.0 −6.2 .3 .1 −5.9 .4 −.8 −.4 .05
.5 .019 10.3 −7.8 .3 .2 −7.5 .5 −1.1 −.5 .04
a The variables are from left to right: firing taxes normalized by leading edge technology, the UI premium rate, maximum
match durations conditional on survival until T , the job destruction rate, labour market tightness, the job finding rate,
unemployment, employment, productivity gross output and welfare.
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additional utility term in unemployment bld is negative, and hence there is an additional
benefit from keeping individuals in jobs, leading to a rise in welfare even though output
falls. Note that at a high enough value of the firing tax, the welfare effect starts to fall
again (indeed, at ft = .6 the welfare effect actually becomes negative, not shown in the
table), and lengthening job matches excessively makes firms and workers continue jobs
for which the social value is actually less than the private value.
As before, Table 4.12 shows that the welfare effects of firing taxes are more favourable
when the receipts are used to reduce UI premiums. But again, there is a limit to the extent
to which such a scheme can improve welfare. At some point before UI premiums become
zero (full experience rating), social welfare is maximized (conditional on the presence of
UI benefits). We should note that the welfare gains of a move towards such an experience
rating scheme is rather small, <.1%. Replacing firing costs with firing taxes leads to a
much bigger welfare gain in this calibration, in the order of .5% looking at Tables 4.10
and 4.12. This seems particularly relevant for the Netherlands, which scored number 1 in
terms of procedural inconveniences according to the OECD in 2003 (see Chapter 2).
Endogenous labour force participation
Finally, we consider the outcomes for the firing costs simulations when we endogenise
labour force participation. We do so mainly to show that the positive effect of a rise in
firing costs on employment in the analyses above is not robust, in line with empirical
studies.
We endogenise labour force participation along the lines suggested by Pissarides (1990).
We assume there is a uniform distribution of discounted lifetime utilities outside the for-
mal labour market running from U(t) to U(t). Labour force participation is then found
by summing all individuals that have a higher utility in the formal labour market than
outside the formal labour market. Note that the marginal individual will always be an
unemployed worker, as employed workers earn quasi-rents. Also note that all flow rates
are scale independent. Labour force participation will be given by U(t)−U(t)
U(t)−U(t) . Solving the
differential equation (4.4) for U(t) we have U(t) = (bui+bld+yls+
β
1−β θν)
r−γ A(t). By choosing
U(t) and U(t) appropriately relative to U(t), we can calibrate the initial gross partici-
pation rate to .7 as in 2007 in the Netherlands for individuals aged 15-64 (CPB, 2008).
Furthermore, by moving them closer or further from or to U(t) pro rata we can calibrate
the labour force participation elasticity with respect to a change in employment protec-
tion via its effect on the value of unemployment. This exercise is merely an illustration,
we choose a value of .01 for this elasticity. Estimates of the effect of EPL on labour
force participation suggest an elasticity of around .04 (see Deelen et al., 2006). Our fixed
effects estimate in Section 4.3 also comes close to this. However, this would result in an
unrealistic large drop in participation of 4 percent when we increase firing costs from .1
to .2. Hence, we take a much more modest value. We calibrate outside opportunities for
labour so that when firing costs rise from .1 to .2, labour supply drops by 1%.
Table 4.13 shows the results of this exercise. The effect on the flow rates is still the
same, and the unemployment rate still falls with higher firing costs. However, employment
now falls with higher firing costs. Higher firing costs reduce the value of participation in
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Table 4.13: Firing cost, no specific investments, endogenous labour force participation,
%-changesa
ft (level) T JD rate θ JF rate ur e part Q/E Q
.0 −1.6 1.4 .4 .2 1.1 1.0 1.0 .2 1.1
.1 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
.2 1.7 −1.4 −.3 −.2 −1.1 −.9 −1.0 −.2 −1.1
.3 3.5 −2.8 −.7 −.3 −2.3 −1.9 −2.0 −.4 −2.2
.4 5.4 −4.3 −1.0 −.5 −3.5 −2.8 −3.0 −.6 −3.3
.5 7.4 −5.7 −1.4 −.7 −4.8 −3.7 −4.0 −.8 −4.4
.6 9.6 −7.3 −1.7 −.8 −6.1 −4.5 −4.9 −1.0 −5.5
a The variables are from left to right: firing costs normalized by leading edge technology, maximum match durations
conditional on survival until T , the job destruction rate, labour market tightness, the job finding rate, unemployment rate,
employment, participation rate, productivity and gross output.
the formal labour market, reducing the value of an unemployed individual. Hence, some
individuals will switch to the informal labour market, leading to a drop in employment
and magnifying the drop in formal output. Welfare will fall less though (not in the table),
as individuals now have an escape route. Hence, with the proper modifications, the model
can also reproduce the finding in some empirical papers that firing costs reduce formal
employment because of a fall in labour force participation.
4.5 Limitations of the analysis
Severance pay is neutral in our vintage model setup when initial severance pay is zero. It
would be interesting to consider severance pay, and potentially notice periods, in a model
where they can play a productive role (and may no longer be neutral). Pissarides (2001,
2004) and Fella (2007) provide interesting examples. However, they do not consider
specific investments to raise productivity and assume that UI benefits are exogenous,
which still leaves the story incomplete.
Another limitation of our analysis is that we do not consider temporary shocks, either
idiosyncratic or business cycle shocks, in which EPL may have an important effect as well.
The Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model has idiosyncratic and business cycle shocks,
but they assume that productivity can jump to any value in a given distribution, which
seems at odds with productivity patterns. Perhaps a random walk model (see Bentolila
and Bertola, 1990, and Shimer, 1999) with growing initial productivity of new matches
and a business cycle could show all the different sides that EPL has on job destruction
and job creation, also over the business cycle. In general, it seems fruitful to work out
the different mechanisms at work in the different models of EPL: vintage models, random
draw models and random walk models.
Another interesting side of EPL that is not captured in our model is its effect on
job-to-job flows. We can study the potential golden chains from EPL rights that are not
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portable from one employer to the next. This may perhaps in part explain the rather low
dynamics in the market for older workers in the Netherlands (WRR, 2007).
We could also explore more flexible forms of EPL with tenure. Assuming that sever-
ance pay rises linearly with tenure seems close to the truth in the Netherlands. However,
the same is probably not true for firing costs (and we do not have firing taxes in the
Netherlands). However, this is not that important for the analysis above. What is impor-
tant is that firing costs are zero initially and then higher later on, but without a sudden
jump close to the terminal date.25 However, if we extend the model to include experimen-
tation initially (uncertainty about match specific productivity), the whole time profile of
EPL becomes important, and initial EPL may not only be damaging due to higher wages
but also because of the additional cost involved in experimentation.
What is still of some interest is the dual face of Dutch EPL, with strict EPL for fixed
contracts but a rather liberal stance towards temporary work and fixed term contracts (see
Chapter 2). It would be interesting to study the coexistence of temporary and permanent
contracts, as in e.g. Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), Alonso-Borrego et al. (2005) and
Osuna (2005). We do allow for a gradual build up of EPL, but the model does not feature
the discontinuous jump in EPL that occurs when a worker moves from a temporary to a
permanent contract, and the resulting churning of workers. For an empirical analysis of
temporary work and fixed term contracts in the Netherlands see Zijl (2006). She finds
that temporary contracts in the Netherlands act neither as stepping stone nor as dead-end
jobs, but do reduce unemployment durations.
For the Dutch case it also seems interesting to work out why certain firms choose to
take the administrative route via government agencies that can approve dismissal, and
other choose the route via the court (see again Deelen et al., 2006). We may then consider
what the effects are of partial reform, e.g. closing one route.
It would also be interesting to consider how the story changes when we assume dif-
ferent wage determination processes, like wage posting by firms and union bargaining.
Furthermore, it would be fruitful to consider political economy effects (Saint-Paul, 2002)
running via e.g. the government or trade unions.
Clearly, there are many more avenues we could explore. Allowing for labour and capital
substitution can mitigate the impact of firing costs on output, as shown by Caballero and
Hammour (1998a). We could also consider a setup where the specific investments by
firms and workers are complementary, and perhaps the under investment problem does
not appear. We might consider worker heterogeneity, e.g. younger and older workers, or
low and high skilled workers etc. Furthermore, an interesting topic is also the transition
path from one balanced growth path to the other, as in e.g. Caballero and Hammour
(1998a). Indeed, many topics for future research into EPL remain.
25Note that firing costs lengthen job matches in our model because it is actually cheaper to fire later rather than sooner.
Hence, assuming that firing costs do not rise with tenure at the separation date actually makes the effect of firing costs on
job durations bigger.
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4.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we consider a number of reasons why the impact of employment protection
on both employment and productivity is ambiguous in empirical work. First, lumping
together different types of EPL, as in the OECD indicator, may be a poor empirical
strategy. Different types of EPL have different effects, and we provide some empirical
support for this. Second, when there is under investment in firm specific human capital,
EPL may enhance productivity as sometimes found in empirical work, despite the sclerosis
it creates in the production structure.
We further show that severance pay is neutral in our vintage setup, when initial
severance pay is zero. However, an interesting implication of rising severance pay with
tenure is that it tilts the wage profile. Wages of new hires fall and wages of workers with
long tenures rise, potentially creating a political economy problem. Furthermore, we have
shown that firing costs rising with tenure, popular in practice, are less detrimental to job
creation than firing costs that are constant with tenure, popular in theoretical work. As
a result previous calibration exercises may have overstated the detrimental effect of firing
costs on job creation.
Our calibration exercise for the Netherlands suggests that when there is a large but
perhaps not unrealistic under investment problem in specific investments, firing costs
can raise productivity and employment, though a rise in productivity and employment
does not guarantee a rise in welfare. When there is no under investment problem in
specific investments, firing costs lower productivity and welfare though they may still
raise employment. Still, even in the absence of specific investments (or in the absence of
under investment in specific investments) firing taxes can improve welfare. This happens
when matches are terminated too soon due to the presence of UI benefits and premiums,
driving a wedge between the social and private continuation value of the match. Firing
taxes can mitigate this problem without collateral damage on the creation side if the
receipts are used to reduce UI premiums.
An extension of the model with endogenous labour force participation shows that the
model can also produce falling employment when we increase firing costs, as suggested by
our empirical findings in Section 4.3 and a number of other empirical studies.
Still, although we have made the analysis of EPL more realistic by introducing specific
investments and a tenure profile for EPL, many interesting aspects still need further study,
like the insurance role of severance pay and the role of firing procedures in distinguishing
between shirkers and non-shirkers.
4.A.1 Solving the differential equation (4.9)
We want to solve the differential equation
∂X(if , iw, τ, t)
∂t
− (r + δ)X(if , iw, τ, t) = −(c0 + cf if ρf + cwiwρw)A(τ)
+(w˜ + p)A(t), (4.A.1)
with terminal condition S(if , iw, τ, τ+T (τ)) = 0, noting that for notational convenience we
introducedX(if , iw, τ, t) ≡ S(if , iw, τ, t)+(α0+α1(t−τ))A(t)). This is a non homogeneous
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linear differential equation of the type dx(t)
dt
+ ax(t) = f(t) whose general solution is (see
e.g. Chiang, 1984)
x(t) = e−at
(∫
easf(s)ds+ c
)
, (4.A.2)
where c is a constant determined by a value for x at some (relevant) date. Filling in the
relevant expressions, and the relevant integration limits we obtain for some t
X(if , iw, τ, t) = e(r+δ)t(
∫ t
τ+T (τ)
e−(r+δ)s((w˜ + p)A(s)
−(c0 + cf if ρf + cwiwρw)A(τ))ds+ c). (4.A.3)
Next we fix the constant c. At t = τ + T (τ) we have S(if , iw, τ, τ + T (τ)) = 0, so
X(if , iw, τ, τ + T (τ)) = −(α0 + α1T (τ))(fc + ft)A(τ + T (τ)). Noting that the integral
above becomes zero when the lower and upper limit are the same, we get c = −(α0 +
α1T (τ))(fc + ft)A(τ + T (τ))e−(r+δ)(τ+T (τ). When we fill in this value for c, switching the
integration limits and to compensate for this putting a minus in front of the integral, and
substituting S(if , iw, τ, t) + (α0 + α1(t− τ))A(t)) back for X(if , iw, τ, t) we get
S(if , iw, τ, t) =
∫ τ+T (τ)
t
((c0 + cf if ρf + cwiwρw)A(τ)
−(w˜ + p)A(s))e−(r+δ)(s−t)ds
+(α0 + α1(t− τ))(fc + ft)A(t)
−(α0 + α1T (τ))(fc + ft)
A(τ + T (τ))e−(r+δ)(τ+T (τ)−t). (4.A.4)
which is equation (4.10) in the main text.
4.A.2 First best
We look for the optimal path of specific investments. Consider a path i′f (t) = if (t)+φx(t),
where if (t) is the optimal path. Denote the lagrangian of the optimisation problem in
(4.34) with the expression for if (t) above by V (φ). When the path for if (t) is optimal we
have ∂V (φ)
∂φ
= 0 at φ = 0. Taking the derivative with respect to φ and then setting φ = 0
we get the following optimality condition∫ ∞
0
∫ t
t−T (t)
cf if (τ)ρf−1x(τ)A(τ)m(τ)eδ(τ−t)dτe−rtdt
−
∫ ∞
0
x(t)A(t)m(t)e−rtdt = 0. (4.A.5)
By changing the order of integration, taking into account the change in the integration
limits, we can free the arbitrary expression x(τ) and derive an optimality condition per
vintage∫ ∞
0
x(τ)
(∫ τ+T (τ)
τ
cfρf i
ρf−1
f A(τ)m(τ)eδ(τ−t)e−rtdt−m(τ)e−rτ
)
dτ = 0
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Rewriting gives for each vintage the optimal firm specific investments
if =
(
cfρf
r + δ
(
1− e−(r+δ)T
))− 11−ρf
. (4.A.6)
In a similar way we can derive the first best choice for specific investments by workers
iw =
(
cwρw
r + δ
(
1− e−(r+δ)T
))− 11−ρw
. (4.A.7)
Optimal job creation is somewhat harder to derive because job creation also appears
in the integral constraint on unemployment. Kamien and Muller (1976) show how we can
derive the first order conditions for an optimal control problem with integral state equa-
tions. Suppressing the specific investment variables we can write the following lagrangian
V (m,u, λ) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ t
t−T (t)
A(τ)m(τ)eδ(τ−t)dτe−rtdt
+
∫ ∞
0
bldA(t)− c(m(t), u(t))A(t)e−rtdt
+
∫ ∞
0
λ(t)
(
1−
∫ t
t−T (t)
m(τ)eδ(τ−t)dτ − u(t)
)
dt. (4.A.8)
and then changing the order of integration
V (m,u, λ) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ τ+T (τ)
τ
A(τ)m(τ)e−δ(t−τ)e−rtdtdτ
+
∫ ∞
0
bldA(τ)− c(m(τ), u(τ))A(τ)e−rτdτ
+
∫ ∞
0
λ(τ)(u(τ)− 1)
−
∫ ∞
0
∫ τ+T (τ)
τ
λ(τ)m(τ)e−δ(t−τ)dtdτ, (4.A.9)
define H(m,u, λ)
H(m,u, λ) =
∫ τ+T (τ)
τ
A(τ)m(τ)e−δ(t−τ)e−rtdt
+bldA(τ)− c(m(τ), u(τ))A(τ)e−rτ
+
∫ τ+T (τ)
τ
λ(τ)m(τ)e−δ(t−τ)dt (4.A.10)
we may then write
V (m,u, λ) =
∫ ∞
0
H(m,u, λ)e−rtdt−
∫ ∞
0
λ(t)(u(t)− 1)dt. (4.A.11)
An optimal path for m(t) has ∂H(.)
∂m(t) = 0 and
∂H(.)
∂u(t) = λ(t). The latter gives
∂H(.)
∂u(t) = λ(t)⇒ λ(t) = (bld − c
′
u(t))A(t)e−rt, (4.A.12)
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and the former gives
∂H(.)
∂m(t) = 0⇒
∫ τ+T (τ)
τ
(
A(τ)− λ(t)ert
)
e−(r+δ)(t−τ)dt = A(τ)c′m(τ)⇒∫ τ+T (τ)
τ
(A(τ)− (bld − c′u(t))
A(t))e−(r+δ)(t−τ)dt = A(τ)c′m(τ), (4.A.13)
so job creation occurs until the marginal creation cost (the right hand side) equals the
discounted stream of productivity minus the social shadow price of labour (the left hand
side). The shadow price of labour is the marginal reduction in search costs of having one
more unemployed plus the direct value of unemployment bld.
Optimal job destruction follows simply from differentiating (4.A.5) with respect to
T (t)
A(t− T (t))e−rt = λ(t)⇒ A(t− T (t)) = (bld − c′u(t))A(t), (4.A.14)
matches are destroyed when the value of production in vintage t−T (t) at time t equals the
value of moving an individual to unemployment. The social value of an extra unemployed
individual is the utility term bld and the marginal reduction in search costs from having
one additional unemployed.
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Chapter 5
Active labour market policies
5.1 Introduction
To fight the rise and apparent persistence of unemployment in the Netherlands during
the 1980s and 1990s the Dutch government implemented and intensified various so-called
active labour market policies (ALMPs), see Chapter 2. Despite the steep rise in expen-
ditures on ALMPs in the Netherlands, little is known about the impact of these ALMPs
on both the individual and aggregate level.
ALMPs give rise to a host of effects, some promoting variables like employment and
output (e.g. promoting human capital formation, reducing labour costs of the target
group) and some discouraging employment and output (e.g. participants get locked in,
fiscal substitution from compensating taxation). The overall impact of ALMPs typically
seems ambiguous in theory, though there is not much work done in terms of theoretical
models. Holmlund and Linden (1993) consider an entitlement effect of relief jobs in a
three state flow model. Calmfors (1994) gives an excellent but informal overview of the
diverse effects on the micro and macro level, part of which are formalized in Calmfors and
Lang (1995). Boone and Van Ours (2004) derive some analytical results for a number of
ALMPs in a rather stylised model. A number of recent papers consider a threat effect of
workfare (relief jobs), e.g. Kreiner and Tranaes (2005) and Van Ours (2007).1 However,
we focus on the types of ALMPs implemented during the 1990s in the Netherlands. Since
participation was voluntary, they did not operate as sticks.
Three strands of literature try to determine the impact of ALMPs quantitatively. First,
micro-level studies use cross-section or panel data on individuals’ employment status and
wages to determine the so-called treatment effect on the probability of finding (regular)
employment and the impact on wages. See Heckman et al. (1999) and Martin and Grubb
(2001) for overviews of the findings of micro-econometric studies. In a recent study Kluve
(2006) presents a meta-analysis of 100 studies that gives a more systematic evaluation
of European ALMPs. Card et al. (2009) consider even more studies still, expanding the
analysis of Kluve (2006) to both European and non-European studies, and find roughly
similar conclusions as Kluve (2006). The findings of the micro-econometric literature on
the effects of ALMPs do not paint an optimistic picture, perhaps best summarized in the
1Geersden (2006) and Geersden and Holm (2007) provide some empirical support for a threat effect using Danish data.
118 CHAPTER 5. ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES
quote by James Heckman in The Economist (April 6, 1996, p. 23) that "zero is not a bad
number" when it comes to the effect of ALMPs on the probability of obtaining regular
employment and on wages of the target group (see also Heckman, 2001).
However, there does seem to be some heterogeneity when it comes to the impact of the
different programs, some performing better and others worse. In particular, counselling by
public employment services, targeted employment subsidies and start-up grants for small
businesses all seem to generate positive effects on the individual probability of finding
employment.2 The result of training programs on employment probabilities are mixed.
Relief jobs reduce the rate at which individuals find regular employment. Furthermore,
across policies, effects seem to be worse for the young. The meta-analysis of Kluve (2006)
further suggests that the effects seem to vary little across countries or time, though he only
scores programs with a +, 0 or -, and only for employment outcomes. Although there do
appear to be some clear patterns when it comes to individual outcomes, the question that
is left unanswered by the micro-econometric studies is whether the results carry over to the
aggregate level. That some of these policies speed up the rate at which targeted individuals
find employment is hardly surprising, but how does the total economy fare when we
consider e.g. compensating taxation and potential effects on wage formation? Indeed,
Heckman et al. (1999, p. 2043) note that "[A]ny policy with a large target population is
likely to have general equilibrium impacts. Reliance on microeconomic treatment effect
approaches to evaluate such policies produces potentially misleading estimates." We can
add to this that general equilibrium effects will also be important even when the target
population is small, in which case we just have to weigh smaller effects against each other.
Second, macro-econometric studies use aggregate panel data to determine the impact
of ALMPs on employment and wages. Calmfors et al. (2001) provide an overview of
macro-econometric studies. However, these studies suffer from a number of potential
drawbacks. In particular, identifying a causal effect is difficult with short time series and
potential reverse causality, see e.g. Forslund and Krueger (1997). Furthermore, although
most of the cross-country studies find that more spending on active labour market policies
reduces open unemployment, Calmfors (2004) shows that the impact on what he defines as
total unemployment, unemployment plus participants in ALMPs, is mixed. For example,
the negative effect of spending on ALMPs on open unemployment found in Nickell and
Jackman (1999) becomes positive when we look at the effect on total unemployment as
defined by Calmfors (2004).
Finally, a handful of papers studies the impact of ALMPs in the context of a com-
putable general equilibrium (CGE) model, see e.g. Davidson and Woodbury (1993) and
Heckman et al. (1998). General equilibrium models can complement the micro-level stud-
ies to determine the overall impact of the programs on the economy at large, and may help
in determining the causal structure underlying the effects in macro-econometric studies.
Heckman et al. (1999, p. 2043) therefore "... urge the use of general equilibrium methods
to produce more accurate assessments of the true impacts of the programs ... ." But at
2A recent study by Klaauw and Van Ours (2010) does not find a significant effect of reemployment bonuses for long-term
unemployed in Rotterdam. They note that most studies on employment subsidies find positive effects. They argue that
shortsightedness by long-term unemployed may perhaps explain the insignificant effect on employment probabilities, with
the subsidy spread out over a period of 2 years.
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the same time they note that "[T]he cost of this enhanced knowledge is the difficulty in
assembling all of the behavioural parameters required to conduct a general equilibrium
evaluation."
In this chapter we follow the call from Heckman et al. (1999) and explore the impact of
active labour market policies in a CGE model, calibrated on Dutch data. Specifically, we
consider the impact of subsidized employment in a stripped down version of MIMIC, the
CGE model of CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis to study policies
related to the labour market.3 We focus on relief jobs, public training programs and
targeted employment subsidies. These are the programs in which there have been massive
changes in expenditures over the last two decades in the Netherlands (see Chapter 2). Due
to a lack of data we lack a rigorous underpinning of the treatment effect of relief jobs and
public training programs in the Netherlands. The goal of this exercise then is not too
draw any definitive conclusions on actual programs but rather to consider the role of
general equilibrium effects in the overall impact of our stylised subsidized employment
programs. Still, a sensitivity analysis considers how general the overall results to changes
in key parameters. Furthermore, we also compare our simulation results with the findings
of related studies abroad.
The chapter has the following outline. In Section 5.2 we first have a closer look at
the types of ALMPs we plan to study. Section 5.3 then outlines the model we use for
our analysis, and the calibration of the different model blocks. In Section 5.4 we present
the simulation outcomes and compare the outcomes with the findings of related studies.
Furthermore, we also consider how sensitive the results are to some key parameters and
assumptions. Section 5.5 summarizes our main findings and concludes.4′5
5.2 A closer look at some Dutch ALMPs
The focus of this paper is on relief jobs and training programs in the public sector, and
targeted employment subsidies in the private sector. Table 5.1 gives some characteristics of
ALMPs running in The Netherlands in 1998. Table 5.2 gives some data on participation,
annual outflow rates to various destinations, and two efficiency measures taken from
Gravestein-Ligthelm et al. (1998) and Welters (1998). ‘Deadweight’denotes the share of
participants that would have found employment anyway, whereas ‘substitution’denotes
the share of vacancies filled by subsidised workers that would otherwise have gone to
other job seekers. At the time of writing we had no information on participation in and
the outflow from the WIW program of Table 5.1, therefore we consider some data on
participation etc. of related programs that preceded the WIW in Table 5.2. Below we
consider the different programs, organised by type of ALMP.
3See Graafland et al. (2001) for an overview of the full MIMIC model.
4An appendix gives stock-flow relations that follow from the flow model that is at the core of our analysis.
5This chapter is based on Jongen (1999) and Jongen et al. (2003). An effort has been made to include recent theoretical
and empirical studies, Furthermore, as Kluve (2006) has shown, the impact per type of ALMP does not seem to vary much
with time. So the results per type of ALMP in this study should still be informative on more recent programs.
120 CHAPTER 5. ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES
Ta
bl
e
5.
1:
A
ct
iv
e
la
bo
ur
m
ar
ke
t
po
lic
ie
s
in
th
e
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
in
19
98
Pr
og
ra
m
En
tr
y
re
qu
ire
m
en
t
C
om
pe
ns
at
io
n
Ty
pe
of
jo
b
W
IW
-D
ie
ns
tb
et
re
kk
in
g
>
1
ye
ar
un
em
pl
oy
ed
,
M
ax
.
12
0%
m
in
.
wa
ge
Pu
bl
ic
an
d
pr
iv
at
e
se
ct
or
,
(U
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
Ac
tiv
at
io
n
or
un
em
pl
oy
ed
an
d
32
ho
ur
s
pe
r
we
ek
,m
ax
.
2
ye
ar
s
Ac
t-
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t)
m
ax
.
23
ye
ar
s
ol
d.
W
IW
-W
er
ke
rv
ar
in
gs
pl
aa
ts
>
1
ye
ar
un
em
pl
oy
ed
,
M
in
.
10
0%
m
in
.
wa
ge
,
Pu
bl
ic
an
d
pr
iv
at
e
se
ct
or
,
(U
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
Ac
tiv
at
io
n
or
un
em
pl
oy
ed
an
d
m
ax
.
co
lle
ct
iv
el
y
ag
re
ed
32
ho
ur
s
pe
r
we
ek
,6
-1
2
m
on
th
s
Ac
t-
Ex
pe
ri
en
ce
Jo
b)
m
ax
.
23
ye
ar
s
ol
d
wa
ge
In
-
en
D
oo
rs
tro
om
ba
ne
n
>
1
ye
ar
un
em
pl
oy
ed
an
d
M
ax
.
13
0%
m
in
.
wa
ge
Pu
bl
ic
se
ct
or
,a
dd
iti
on
al
wo
rk
,
(I
nfl
ow
an
d
Fl
ow
-T
hr
ou
gh
Jo
bs
)
on
be
ne
fit
s/
so
ci
al
se
cu
rit
y
(a
fte
r
4
ye
ar
s:
15
0%
)
32
ho
ur
s
pe
r
we
ek
,
no
lim
it
on
du
ra
tio
n
M
el
ke
rt
-2
>
1
ye
ar
un
em
pl
oy
ed
an
d
10
0-
12
0%
m
in
.
wa
ge
,
R
eg
ul
ar
jo
b
in
pr
iv
at
e
se
ct
or
,
on
be
ne
fit
s/
so
ci
al
se
cu
rit
y
em
pl
oy
er
re
ce
iv
es
8,
16
8.
-
at
le
as
t
32
ho
ur
s
pe
r
we
ek
,
eu
ro
pe
r
ye
ar
6
m
on
th
s
-2
ye
ar
s
M
el
ke
rt
-3
W
el
fa
re
re
ci
pi
en
t
Em
pl
oy
ee
re
m
ai
ns
on
R
eg
ul
ar
jo
b
be
ne
fit
s
V
LW
(R
ed
uc
tio
n
>
1
ye
ar
un
em
pl
oy
ed
M
ax
.
13
0%
m
in
.
wa
ge
,
R
eg
ul
ar
jo
b
in
pr
iv
at
e/
pu
bl
ic
Lo
ng
-T
er
m
U
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
)
em
pl
oy
er
re
ce
iv
es
2,
04
2.
-e
ur
o
se
ct
or
,m
ax
.
4
ye
ar
s
pe
r
ne
w
hi
re
So
ur
ce
s:
G
ra
ve
st
ei
n-
Li
gt
he
lm
et
al
.
(1
99
8)
an
d
M
in
ist
ry
of
So
ci
al
A
ffa
irs
(1
99
7a
,b
).
5.2. A CLOSER LOOK AT SOME DUTCH ALMPS 121
Ta
bl
e
5.
2:
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n,
ou
tfl
ow
,a
nd
effi
ci
en
cy
in
di
ca
to
rs
in
19
96
Pr
og
ra
m
Pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
O
ut
flo
w
to
re
gu
la
r
O
ut
flo
w
to
ot
he
r
‘D
ea
dw
ei
gh
t’b
‘S
ub
st
itu
tio
n’
c
wo
rk
de
st
in
at
io
ns
a
JW
G
(Y
ou
th
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t
24
,8
10
19
%
17
%
27
%
14
%
G
ua
ra
nt
ee
Sc
he
m
e)
Ba
ne
np
oo
l(
La
bo
ur
po
ol
)
22
,9
32
3%
11
%
3%
10
%
M
el
ke
rt
-1
18
,0
00
5%
8%
?
?
M
el
ke
rt
-2
6,
00
0
-
-
?
?
M
el
ke
rt
-3
(5
0
pr
oj
ec
ts
)
?
?
?
?
V
LW
(R
ed
uc
tio
n
Lo
ng
-
11
0,
00
0
-
-
48
%
32
%
Te
rm
U
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
)
So
ur
ce
s:
G
ra
ve
st
ei
jn
-L
ig
th
el
m
et
al
.
(1
99
8)
,W
el
te
rs
(1
99
8)
an
d
M
in
ist
ry
of
So
ci
al
A
ffa
irs
(1
99
7a
,b
).
a
O
th
er
de
st
in
at
io
ns
in
cl
ud
es
ou
tfl
ow
to
an
ot
he
r
pr
og
ra
m
,t
o
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
as
sis
ta
nc
e
or
di
sa
bi
lit
y
be
ne
fit
s,
an
d
wo
m
en
w
ho
ga
ve
bi
rt
h.
b
‘D
ea
dw
ei
gh
t’d
en
ot
es
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
th
e
flo
w
of
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
ou
t
of
th
e
pr
og
ra
m
th
at
wo
ul
d
ha
ve
fo
un
d
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
an
yw
ay
.
c
‘S
ub
st
itu
tio
n’
de
no
te
s
th
e
sh
ar
e
of
th
e
flo
w
of
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
ou
t
of
th
e
pr
og
ra
m
th
at
su
bs
tit
ut
es
ot
he
r
jo
b
se
ek
er
s.
122 CHAPTER 5. ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES
5.2.1 Relief Jobs
First, we consider the relief programs: the Banenpool (Labourpool), the Melkert-1 pro-
gram6 and the Melkert-3 program. The outflow from the Banenpool to regular jobs is
rather low, a mere 3% per year. Most individuals that do leave the program flow to
‘other destinations’. The flow to other destinations includes the flow to the Melkert-1
program, to unemployment assistance or disability benefits, and women who gave birth.
The deadweight in the Banenpool seemed to be quite low, given the low job prospects of
participants before they entered the program. Substitution of other job seekers appears
to be somewhat higher.
Outflow from the Melkert-1 program to regular employment is somewhat higher than
from the Banenpool, but still quite low. Towards the end of the program, the duration
of contracts became more limited. The Melkert-3 program also creates jobs in the public
sector, but targets individuals who remain on welfare benefits. We have no information
on the outflow from this program. Furthermore, we have no information on the extent of
deadweight and substitution from the Melkert-programs.
5.2.2 Training programs
Turning to the training program, the Jeugdwerkgarantieplan (JWG, Youth Work Guar-
antee Plan,), the outflow to regular employment from the JWG is much higher than the
outflow from relief jobs to regular employment. This is likely to be due to differences
in the targeted group, unemployed youngsters versus long-term unemployed, and due to
differences in the extent to which participants receive training. The outflow to other
destinations is also much higher. This might be due to the limited duration of contracts
in the JWG. Deadweight seems to be much higher for the training program, given the
more favourable job prospects of unemployed youngsters, whereas participants also seem
to substitute more other job seekers.
5.2.3 Employment subsidies
Finally, some programs provided subsidies for firms that hire previously long-term un-
employed job seekers (sometimes referred to as ‘vouchers’): the Melkert-2 program and
the Vermindering Langdurig Werklozen (VLW, Reduction Long-term Unemployed). Data
on the outflow is less informative, as outflow may occur because the match dissolves or
because the subsidy period ended. Unfortunately we have no information on the extent
of deadweight and substitution of the Melkert-2 program. Deadweight and substitution
under the VLW program is much higher than for the relief and training programs. All
long-term unemployed are targeted, and many of them would have found employment in
the absence of the subsidy. Furthermore, the subsidised long-term unemployed seem to
substitute a substantial part of competing job seekers.
6Named after the minister under whose responsibility the program was enacted.
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5.3 Modelling ALMPs
We consider the impact of these ALMPs in a stripped-down version of the MIMIC model.
We use a stripped-down version to keep the results tractable and to limit the compu-
tational burden. The main simplifications are an exogenous labour force, no physical
capital, no schooling decision, and no division by sector. What remains is an aggregate
CES production structure with intermediate goods and services produced by unskilled,
low-skilled and high-skilled labour, the flow models per skill type with the search and
selection strategies of firms and workers as inputs, the wage bargain, and a government
that sets tax and premium rates. These sub models are supposed to capture the main
channels through which ALMPs affect the labour market.
5.3.1 The flow model
Model
The core of the model is the flow model, depicted in Figure 5.1. We distinguish between
the following states on the labour market: low- and high-productive employment, El
and Eh, low- and high-productive unemployment, Ul and Uh, relief jobs, R, and training
programs, T .
First, consider the states of employment and unemployment. Individuals in low- and
high-productive unemployment move into (regular) employment at rates piul,el and piuh,eh,
respectively. Individuals in low- and high-productive employment become unemployed
at rates σel,ul and σeh,uh, respectively. Furthermore, we assume that high-productive
individuals run a risk τuh,ul of becoming low-productive unemployed as long as they are
unemployed, i.e. they run the risk of losing part of their skills. On the other hand, we
assume that low-productive individuals that have entered into low-productive employment
become high-productive again at rate τel,eh, i.e. they may regain their lost skills.
Next, consider the states of relief jobs and training programs. Only low-productive
unemployed individuals are eligible for these programs. In the calibration we associate
low-productive unemployed individuals with individuals on welfare benefits. The low-
productive unemployed flow to relief jobs and training programs at rates piul,r and piul,t,
respectively. Our stylised relief jobs and training programs are meant to capture two polar
cases of subsidized employment for low-productive unemployed in the public sector, where
actual programs may contain elements of both. Individuals in relief jobs do not regain
lost skills but produce some output. As relief job workers do not regain lost skills, exit is
either back to low-productive unemployment, at rate σr,ul, or to a regular low-productive
job, at rate pir,el. At the other extreme we assume that individuals that have completed
the training program have fully regained their lost skills, but they do not produce output
whilst in the program. Individuals that have completed the training program move into
high-productive employment at rate pit,eh. Individuals that return to unemployment before
the training was finished move back to low-productive unemployment, this occurs at
rate σt,ul. Individuals that have completed the training program but have not found
employment move into high-productive unemployment, this occurs at rate σt,uh.
The rates at which workers flow back to either low- or high-productive unemployment
are exogenous in the model. Hence, job destruction is exogenous. The assumption here
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Figure 5.1: Stocks and flows in the model
is that the ALMPs do not make the targeted group so attractive for employers that they
consider firing incumbent workers.7 The rates at which individuals lose and regain their
skills are also exogenous. However, the rates at which individuals move into employment,
relief jobs and the training program are endogenous. The endogenous flow rates result
from optimising behaviour on the part of firms and workers, given technology and policy.
The analysis is restricted to steady states, in which case the stocks follow directly from
the flow rates, see Appendix 5.A, and initial conditions do not matter. Hence, we do not
consider the transition from the initial steady state to the new steady state in response to
a change in policy parameters. The results should therefore be interpreted as ‘long-run’.
Calibration
Table 5.3 below gives the data we use to calibrate the flow model, and the calibrated
parameters. The model is calibrated on data for the Dutch labour market in 1993, in line
with the original MIMIC model. We calibrate the flow model for three different levels of
education: high-skilled, low-skilled and unskilled.
The stocks of employment, unemployment and vacancies per skill type are Central
Bureau of Statistics (CBS) data. We associate high-productive unemployment with the
stock of individuals on unemployment benefits, and low-productive unemployment with
the stock of individuals on welfare benefits, again from the CBS. We use data from Kock
(2002) for the flow rate from unemployment insurance into welfare benefits, and data from
7However, the model does capture that following a training program may also lead to finding a more stable job, as the
rate at which high-productive matches dissolve is lower than the rate at which low-productive matches dissolve.
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Table 5.3: Calibration of the flow modela
Data
piuh,eh piul,el τuh,ul Uh/L Ul/L R/L T/L
High-skilled .80 .40 .21 .04 .03 .00 .00
Low-skilled .76 .38 .21 .05 .04 .00 .00
Unskilled .56 .28 .21 .05 .09 .01 .01
Calibration
σeh,uh σel,ul σr,ul σt,ul σt,uh pir,el pit,eh
High-skilled .03 .05 .08 .13 .03 .24 .58
Low-skilled .04 .18 .09 .18 .04 .23 .57
Unskilled .04 .28 .08 .18 .04 .11 .36
piul,r piul,t τel,eh Eh/L El/L
High-skilled .02 .01 .16 .91 .04
Low-skilled .04 .11 .11 .87 .05
Unskilled .03 .05 .11 .82 .06
a The stocks are normalised by the labour force L.
Kock (2002) and CBS for the flow rates from low- and high-productive unemployment into
employment, per skill type. The rate at which individuals rebuild skills in low-productive
employment (τel,eh in Figure 5.1) is set lower than the rate at which individuals lose skills
in high-productive unemployment (τuh,ul in Figure 5.1) to obtain a higher job destruction
rate in low-productive employment than in high-productive employment (e.g. De Beer,
1996, finds that welfare recipients have a higher flow rate back to unemployment once
employed than unemployment benefits recipients).8
We associate the stock of relief job workers with the number of participants in the
Banenpool program, and the stock of training job workers with the number of participants
in the JWG, to get some realistic starting values for the number of participants in our
stylised programs. We take these data from Gravesteijn-Ligthelm et al. (1998). From the
same source we also have data on the flow rates from relief jobs and training programs to
low- and high-productive unemployment.
We further have data on the average flow rates from relief jobs and training jobs
into regular employment. The Ministry of Social Affairs (1997a,b) reports an annual
outflow rate to regular employment of only 3 percent for the Banenpool and 21 percent
for the JWG. But the annual outflow rate for welfare recipients to regular employment is
over 30 percent a year. As noted above, there is no study for the Dutch labour market
8See Jongen et al. (2000) for the calibration strategy of the quit rates given the other flow rates.
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that separates the treatment effect from the selection effect. Hence, whether the low
outflow rates from the Banenpool and JWG are the result of the treatment or because
the least able individuals join the program remains unclear. Rather than forcing these
low outflow rates on our stylised programs we let the model determine the outflow rates
and compare the resulting outcome in terms of flow rates to regular employment and
wages with studies that do separate the treatment effect from the selection effect. Our
reading of the literature is that relief jobs do not increase the transition rate into regular
employment, and are more likely to reduce it, see also Section 5.2. This is what comes out
of the model, participation in our stylised relief jobs reduces an individuals job finding
rate by 48 percent on average.
The findings on the effect of public training programs in empirical work are less robust.
The effect on the subsequent employment probabilities and wages can be either signifi-
cantly positive, insignificant, or significantly negative. Findings are often also not robust
even across different specifications used in the same paper. So, we have little guidance
from the literature on public training programs, but it seems fair to conclude that our
assumptions concerning the stylised training program are rather favourable. Our model
produces an upward jump in the individual job finding rate and wages of respectively 40
and 28 percent. But remember that our stylised programs are supposed to capture polar
cases, with actual programs presumably containing both relief jobs and training program
elements.
5.3.2 Matching technology
Model
The technology underlying the endogenous flow rates are given by matching functions,
with constant returns to scale in vacancies and effective job seekers.9 The rate at which
a job seeker of type i moves into regular employment type j is given by
pii,j = µsi,jf(αwi,j, α
f
j )θprγ, (i, j)  {(ul, el), (uh, eh), (r, el), (t, eh)},
where µ is a constant that captures e.g. the degree of mismatch. The flow rate for individ-
ual i depends positively on his or her search effort si,j for state j and the probability that
a contact with a vacancy results in a match f(αwi,j, α
f
j ). When a worker and a vacancy
meet they draw a match-specific productivity from a potential productivity distribution.
αwi,j and α
f
j denote the minimum productivity required by the worker and the firm, respec-
tively. Vacancies and competing job seekers enter via θpr ≡ Vpr/(sul,elUul + suh,ehUuh +
sr,elR+ st,ehT ), where Vpr denotes private sector vacancies. More vacancies raise the rate
at which individual i finds employment, but more competing job-seekers reduce the rate
at which individual i finds employment (ceteris paribus). The aggregate matching func-
tion for regular employment follows from the sum of the individual transition rates for
job-seekers multiplied by the respective stocks.
9Constant returns to scale is typically not rejected in empirical work, see e.g. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
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Vacancies for relief jobs and training programs are posted in another segment of the labour
market but the flow rates into these states are specified in a similar way10
piul,j = µsul,jθjγ, j  {r, t},
with θj = Vj/(sul,jUul). The probability that a contact results in a match is missing from
the transition rates into relief jobs and training programs. Indeed, policy dictates that
all low-productive job seekers are accepted in these states, whereas compensation is set
sufficiently high to make low-productive job-seekers willing to enter these programs. The
aggregate matching functions for relief jobs and the training program can be found by
multiplying the flow rates with the stocks of low-productive unemployed.
From the expressions above we also have the rate at which private sector vacancies
are filled
mvpr = (piuh,ehUh + piul,elUul + pir,elR + pit,ehT )/Vpr, (5.1)
and the rate at which relief and training vacancies are filled
mvj = piul,jUul/Vj. (5.2)
Calibration
Table 5.4 gives the calibration of the matching functions. The relative weight of vacancies
in the matching function, γ, is similar to the value in the original MIMIC model. We
assume that the relative weight of vacancies in the matching function is the same for relief
and training jobs.
Given the other inputs and the flow rates we can rewrite the matching functions for
the technology parameter µ. The search effort of each group of job seekers contains a
parameter (normalised to 1 for high-productive job seekers) that is set so as to let µ be
the same across all job seekers. The matching technology parameter for relief jobs and
training programs, µr and µt, are set equal to µ for matching for regular jobs. Hence, we
assume that the government has no technological advantage or disadvantage over private
firms in acquiring new workers for relief and training jobs. The stocks of vacancies for
relief and training jobs follow from the steady state assumption and the other inputs in
the respective matching functions.
5.3.3 Firms
Model
Firms determine employment given labour costs, which in turn determines the number of
vacancies they want to post in the market. Furthermore, firms set a minimum productivity
10The assumption of segmented markets for regular employment, relief jobs and training programs is more innocuous
than it may appear at first sight. Suppose that we create two segments in a market that is initially not segmented. Both
markets contain 50 percent of vacancies, and workers divide their search effort equally over both segments. With constant
returns to scale in the matching function the total number of matches will be the same.
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Table 5.4: Calibration of the matching processa
Data and input from other sub models
Uh Ul R T Vpr suh,eh sul,el sr,el
High-skilled 148. 95.0 3.18 .61 25.0 1.03 .63 .38
Low-skilled 60.1 54.9 4.83 5.43 12.5 .99 .68 .42
Unskilled 37.6 68.6 7.57 4.21 7.0 .89 .81 .31
st,eh sul,r sul,t f(h, h)b f(l, l)b f(r, l)b f(t, h)b
High-skilled .63 .07 .08 .69 .57 .57 .82
Low-skilled .68 .12 .41 .76 .56 .56 .84
Unskilled .57 .20 .39 .16 .09 .09 .16
Calibration
γ µ µr µt mvpr mvr mvt Vr Vt
High-skilled .65 3.88 3.88 3.88 4.98 17.5 31.7 .07 .01
Low-skilled .65 3.33 3.33 3.33 4.37 11.9 13.3 .13 .33
Unskilled .65 17.0 17.0 17.0 4.48 217. 235. .01 .01
a Stocks are in thousands of persons.
b The share of contacts that result in match are abbreviated, i.e. f(h, h) ≡ f(αwuh,eh, αfeh) etc.
required from a potential match. The presence of minimum wage legislation implies that
not all matches are profitable for firms.
The demand for output follows the structure of MINI-MIMIC in Bovenberg et al.
(2000). Here we only sketch the general setup, and focus on the changes we made to
account for low- and high-productive workers and ALMPs.
Domestic consumers can spend their income on domestic and foreign goods. A CES
sub utility function over these two goods gives the demands of domestic and foreign goods
as a function of the prices, and the corresponding ideal price index used by domestic
consumers pc. Domestic output in turn is a CES aggregate of the output of workers of
the three skill levels. Cost minimization gives employment for the different skill types Ek.
Higher labour costs per skill type reduce the demand for that skill type and further cause
an overall decline in the demand for domestic output as the domestic composite good
becomes more expensive. Private sector vacancies for labour type k necessary to sustain
Ek are
Vpr,k =
σkEk
mvpr,k
, (5.3)
where σk is the average outflow rate from employment for labour type k.
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Next to bringing the profit maximizing number of vacancies into the market, firms also
have to determine which applicants to accept and which to reject. Minimum wages imply
a threshold productivity level for potential matches, below this threshold level it is not
profitable to form a match. After they meet, the vacancy and the worker take a random
draw from a lognormal potential productivity distribution, where we suppress an index
for skill type,
g(αj) ∼ N(log(αuj )− .5sdj2, sdj2), E[αj] = αuj , j  {el, eh}, (5.4)
where αuj denotes the unconditional expectation of the match specific productivity in-
dex (αj denotes expected productivity conditional upon acceptance). The unconditional
expectation of productivity for a high-productive job seeker is normalized to 1. The un-
conditional expectation of productivity for a low-productive job seeker is αuel = ωαueh,
where ω < 1 captures the loss of skills.
Following the MIMIC model, we assume that labour costs are proportional to pro-
ductivity. The presence of minimum wages wm then implies the following minimum
productivity standard for a high-productive unemployed or a training program partici-
pant
αfeh =
wm
wc
α, (5.5)
where wc denotes average labour costs and α average productivity. The minimum pro-
ductivity required from low-productive unemployed and relief job participants is different
because they might regain their lost skills and because the employer might receive a
subsidy for a low-productive worker
αfel =
(σeh,uh + r)
(σeh,uh + r) + τel,eh
(
1
ω
(α−wc)
α
) (wm− v)
wc
α, (5.6)
where v denotes a subsidy to the employer for hiring a low-productive worker. Both the
possibility that the low-productive job seeker may regain his or her lost skills and the
employer subsidy for low-productive workers reduce the minimum productivity standard
that the low-productive job seeker has to meet.
We obtain the share of job applicants accepted by the firm by confronting the reser-
vation productivity with the relevant productivity distributions. The share of applicants
accepted from the pool of low-productive unemployed individuals and relief job workers
is given by
frel = 1−Gl(αfel), (5.7)
and the share of applicants accepted from the pool of high-productive unemployed and
participants in the training program is given by
freh = 1−Gh(αfeh). (5.8)
130 CHAPTER 5. ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES
Calibration
Most parameters of the production and demand structure are taken from the MIMIC
model. The substitution elasticity of skill types is set to 1.5. The price elasticity of
export demand is 2.7 (the Netherlands being a small open economy). The loss of skills
parameter is set to obtain the lower outflow rates from unemployment assistance than
from unemployment insurance per skill type. We come up with the following numbers for
ω: .5 for the high-skilled, .6 for the low-skilled and .93 for the unskilled. The loss of skills
in combination with the minimum productivity standard implied by the minimum wage
makes firms reject more low-productive applicants than high-productive applicants (see
Table 5.5 below).
5.3.4 Workers
Model
Workers determine how much time to spend on job search, and hold a reservation wage
which determines the share of job offers acceptable to them. Let us first introduce some
notation. bul and buh denote the gross benefit level in low- and high-productive unemploy-
ment. Individuals in relief jobs receive wr and individuals in the training program receive
wt. w(αj) denotes gross wages corresponding to productivity αj, and t denotes the linear
tax rate. δ, η, T and l0 are the subjective discount rate of workers, the relative weight of
consumption in the utility function, total time available to an individual and (exogenously
given) working hours, respectively. The parameters κul and κr capture a utility gain or
loss in low-productive unemployment and relief jobs, respectively, not accounted for by
the difference in income or leisure. Time spent on job search by a high-productive unem-
ployed, a relief job worker and a training program participant is denoted by tsuh,eh, tsr,el
and tst,eh, respectively. Finally, time spent on job search by a low-productive unemployed
job seeker for a job in low-productive employment, a relief job and placement in a training
program is denoted by tsul,el, tsul,r and tsul,t, respectively.
Now that we have the elements of utility we consider the Bellman equations of individu-
als in the various states. Denote the asset value of being in the state of high-productive em-
ployment, low-productive employment, high-productive unemployment, low-productive
unemployment, a relief job and the public training program by Veh(αj), Vel(αj), Vuh, Vul,
Vr and Vt, respectively. The per period return in the various states is
δVeh(αeh) = ηln((1− t)w(αeh)/pc) + ln(T − l0) + σeh,uh(Vuh − Veh(αeh)), (5.9)
δVel(αel) = ηln((1− t)w(αel)/pc) + ln(T − l0) + σel,ul(Vul − Vel(αel))
+τel,eh(Veh(αel/ω)− Vel(αm)), (5.10)
δVuh = ηln((1− t)buh/pc) + ln(T − tsuh,eh) + piuh,eh
(E[Veh,uh]− Vuh) + τuh,ul(Vul − Vuh), (5.11)
δVul = ηln((1− t)bul/pc) + ln(T − tsul,el − tsr − tst) + κul
+piul,el(E[Vel,ul]− Vul) + piul,r(Vr − Vul)
+piul,t(Vt − Vul), (5.12)
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δVr = ηln((1− t)wr/pc) + ln(T − l0 − tsr,el) + κr + pir,el
(E[Vel,r]− Vr) + σr,ul(Vuh − Vr), (5.13)
δVt = ηln((1− t)wt/pc) + ln(T − l0 − tst,eh) + pit,eh
(E[Veh,t]− Vt) + σt,ul(Vul − Vt) + σt,uh(Vuh − Vt). (5.14)
The asset equations show that the return on being in a particular state equals the im-
mediate utility derived from the current state and the utility gains or losses when the
individual changes state times the rate at which these changes occur.11
The search effort of an individual n is related to the time spent on job search via
si,j,n = νitsi,j,n1/ζ , (i, j)  {(ul, el), (uh, eh), (r, el), (t, eh), (ul, r), (ul, t)}, (5.15)
where νi measures search efficiency per group of job seekers, and ζ > 1 implies diminishing
returns to search. The individual transition rate corresponding to this search intensity is
pii,j,n = (si,j,n/si,j)pii,j, (5.16)
where si,j and pii,j denote the average search intensity and flow rate of the respective
group, respectively. Maximizing utility with respect to search effort gives the optimal
search intensities
suh,eh = νuh
[
Tpiuh,eh(E[Veh,uh]− Vuh)
ζ + piuh,eh(E[Veh,uh]− Vuh)
] 1
ζ
, (5.17)
sul,el = νul
[
(T − (sul,r/νul)ζ − (sul,t/νul)ζ)piul,el(E[Vel,ul]− Vul)
ζ + piul,el(E[Vel,ul]− Vul)
] 1
ζ
, (5.18)
sul,r = νul
[
(T − (sul,el/νul)ζ − (sul,t/νul)ζ)piul,r(Vr − Vul)
ζ + piul,r(Vr − Vul)
] 1
ζ
, (5.19)
sul,t = νul
[
(T − (sul,el/νul)ζ − (sul,r/νul)ζ)piul,t(Vt − Vul)
ζ + piul,t(Vt − Vul)
] 1
ζ
, (5.20)
sr,el = νr
[
(T − l0)pir,el(E[Vel,r]− Vr)
ζ + pir,el(E[Vel,r]− Vr)
] 1
ζ
, (5.21)
st,eh = νt
[
(T − l0)pit,eh(E[Veh,t]− Vt)
ζ + pit,eh(E[Veh,t]− Vt)
] 1
ζ
, (5.22)
once we set si,j = si,j = si,j,n. What is important to note in these expressions is that
search effort in relief jobs and training programs depends negatively on the time spent
working respectively training in these states and also on the compensation in these states
(via Vr and Vt). We also see that job search by the long-term unemployed for relief jobs
11Note that we assume that working time in relief jobs and training time in the training program equals working time in
regular employment.
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and training programs comes at the expense of time available for job search for regular
employment. Furthermore, if the states of relief jobs and training programs are more
attractive than Vul, and they will be since participation is voluntary and positive, this
will also push Vul up, leading to a further reduction in search effort for regular employment
by low-productive unemployed.
Workers also have to decide which job offers to accept and which to reject. They do
this following a reservation wage strategy, where they accept all potential matches offering
wages in excess of the reservation wage. Let αi,j denote the productivity associated
with the reservation wage of an individual from state i for employment state j. The
reservation wages of workers for private sector employment can be found by looking for
the productivity α for which Veh(αwuh,eh)=Vuh, Vel(αwul,el)=Vul etc. This gives
w(αwuh,eh) =
1
η
(T − l0)e
1
η
δVuh , (5.23)
w(αul,elw) =
1
η
(T − l0)e
1
η
(δVul−τel,eh(Veh(αwul,el/ω)−Vul)), (5.24)
w(αwt,eh) =
1
η
(T − l0)e
1
η
(δVt−σeh,uh(Vuh−Vt)), (5.25)
and
w(αwr,el) =
1
η
(T − l0)e
1
η
(δVr−σel,ul(Vul−Vr)−τel,eh(Veh(αwr,el/ω)−Vr)), (5.26)
what is noteworthy about these expressions is that the probability to regain lost skills
(associated with a ‘capital gain’) pushes reservation wages for low-productive unemployed
and relief job workers down. Also note that the risk of becoming low-productive unem-
ployed again once a relief job worker accepts a regular low-productive job makes them
more choosy regarding regular job offers.
We can then use the assumption that wages are proportional to productivity to get the
minimum productivity levels corresponding to these reservation wages. The corresponding
shares of job offers accepted by workers are
fuuh,eh(αwuh,eh) = 1−Gh(αwuh,eh), (5.27)
fut,eh(αwt,eh) = 1−Gh(αwt,eh), (5.28)
fuul,el(αwul,el) = 1−Gl(αwul,el), (5.29)
fur,eh(αwr,eh) = 1−Gl(αwr,eh). (5.30)
We also have expressions for the reservation wage when it comes to accepting or rejecting
participation in relief jobs and training programs. However, since we assume that com-
pensation is not match specific in these states, low-productive unemployed either accept
or reject all offers. The compensation in these programs is sufficiently high in all simula-
tions to ensure that all low-productive unemployed accept an offer to enter one of these
programs.
To arrive at the share of contacts resulting in a match we need to combine the share
of contacts acceptable to the firm and to the worker. As in MIMIC, rather than taking
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the most restrictive of the two, we assume that the overall share of contacts resulting
in a match is a CES function of the acceptance rate of the worker and the firm. This
captures the idea that minimum productivity standards and reservation wages may still
differ across firms and workers of the same group. The overall share of contacts resulting
in a match when a worker of state i and a private sector vacancy meet is given by
f(αwi,j, α
f
j ) = (fui,j(αwi,j))λ + frj(α
f
j )λ)
1
λ . (5.31)
Corresponding with this share of contacts is an overall minimum productivity level
αoi,j = esdjG
−1(1−f(αwi,j ,αfj ))−.5sd2j , (5.32)
and an average productivity of contacts resulting in a match
αi,j = (1−G(log(αoi,j)/sdj − .5sdj))/f(αwi,j, αfj ). (5.33)
The average productivity in low-productive employment then equals
αel =
piul,elUulαul,el + pir,elRαr,el
piul,elUul + pir,elR
. (5.34)
and the average productivity in high-productive employment is
αeh =
τel,eh
σel,ul+τel,eh (piul,elUul
αul,el
ω
+ pir,elRαr,elω )) + piuh,ehUuhαuh,eh + pit,ehTαt,eh
τel,eh
σel,ul+τel,eh (piul,elUul + pir,elR) + piuh,ehUuh + pit,ehT
, (5.35)
and the average productivity of all employed workers (per skill type) is
a = (Eelαel + Eehαeh)/E. (5.36)
Calibration
Table 5.5 gives the calibration of the search and selection strategy of workers. Most
of the scale and elasticity parameters are taken from the original MIMIC model. The
relative weight of consumption in utility η is set to 2. Total time available per period
is 2.4, of which 1.0 is spend on working when working. The parameter that determines
the diminishing returns to search ζ is set to 2.0. Benefits in high- and low-productive
unemployment per skill level are set in line with average unemployment insurance benefits
and welfare benefits. The compensation in relief jobs and training programs, wr and wt,
are set equal to the minimum wage.12 The discount rate is set at .25. The model requires
a rather high discount rate to keep the unemployed from rejecting most job offers. For
the same reason we also introduced disutility parameters κul and κr for low-productive
individuals outside regular employment.13
12In the sensitivity analysis we consider how compensation affects the impact of relief jobs and training programs.
13Introducing on-the-job search could make the model more realistic and mitigate the problem of reservation wages
becoming ‘too high’with a low discount rate.
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Table 5.5: Calibration of the search strategy of workersa
Calibrated parameters and corresponding endogenous variables
η T l0 ζ bh bl wr wt
High-skilled 2.00 2.40 1.00 2.00 14.1 6.7 10.2 10.2
Low-skilled 2.00 2.40 1.00 2.00 11.4 6.7 10.2 10.2
Unskilled 2.00 2.40 1.00 2.00 7.5 6.7 10.2 10.2
δ κul κr κt νuh νul νr νt
High-skilled .25 −2.00 −1.00 0. 1.00 .57 .57 .78
Low-skilled .25 −2.00 −1.00 0. 1.00 .74 .74 .87
Unskilled .25 −2.00 −1.00 0. 1.00 .96 .96 .98
suh,eh sul,el sr,el st,eh sul,r sul,t
High-skilled 1.03 .63 .38 .63 .07 .08
Low-skilled .99 .68 .42 .68 .12 .41
Unskilled .89 .81 .31 .57 .20 .39
fuuh,eh fuul,el fur,el fut,eh freh frel
High-skilled .72 .98 .93 .90 .99 .58
Low-skilled .81 .99 .95 .94 .99 .56
Unskilled .59 1.00 .78 .60 .16 .09
a Wages and benefits are in thousands of euro.
We set the efficiency parameter for low-productive job seekers νl (the skill loss in job
search) together with the skill loss parameter ω in production above to obtain the outflow
rate from welfare benefits in the data. The extent of skill loss in search and production
is about the same. We set νr equal to νl as they have the same productivity profile.
Furthermore, we set νt=0.5νl + 0.5νh to capture that at any point in time only part of
the individuals in the training program has regained their lost skills.
Turning to the outcomes for the resulting search intensities, we find that high-productive
unemployed have a higher search intensity for regular employment than their low-productive
counterparts. Indeed, high-productive unemployed individuals are more successful in con-
verting search time into effective search units, νuh > νul, and high-productive unemployed
do not spend time on locating vacancies for relief jobs and training programs. We fur-
ther find that the search effort of low-productive unemployed for relief jobs and training
programs is lower than their search effort for regular employment. They have less to
gain from moving into these programs and the marginal returns of additional search for
5.3. MODELLING ALMPS 135
these ALMPs is low given that the probability to locate a vacancy for these programs
is relatively low to start with. We also see that the search effort of training program
participants for regular employment is lower than the search effort of high-productive
unemployed. Training program participants have to devote a substantial part of their
valuable time on training. Individuals with a relief job have the lowest search intensity.
They have the least to gain from moving into regular employment, given the relatively
high compensation in these programs, and have to devote a substantial part of their time
to working.
Turning to the resulting outcomes for the share of potential matches acceptable to
job seekers (fui.j) we see that the high-productive unemployed accept less matches than
the low-productive unemployed. Low-productive unemployed accept more offers because
employment gives them the opportunity to regain their lost skills and to escape from the
disutility term for low-productive individuals outside regular employment. However, this
does not mean that a contact for a low-productive job seeker is more likely to result in a
match. Table 5.5 also gives the share of matches acceptable for employers. Here we see
that employers accept most potential matches with high-productive applicants, and reject
a large share of potential matches with low-productive applicants. Table 5.4 above shows
that the end result is that a contact between a vacancy and a high-productive job seeker
is more likely to result in a match than a contact between a vacancy and a low-productive
job seeker. From Table 5.5 we further see that relief job workers are more selective than
low-productive unemployed, due to the higher compensation and the lower disutility in
relief jobs.
5.3.5 Wage determination
Model
Wage costs per skill type are the result of bargaining between a representative worker and
firm. The representative worker is a worker with the average productivity per skill type.
The representative firm is the firm that employs this worker. In the expressions below we
suppress and index for skill type.
Wage costs for the representative worker follow from maximizing the Nash product
max
wc
Ω = (a− wc)1−β(wc(1− t)− wo)β, (5.37)
where a denotes average labour productivity and wo denotes the outside option of the
worker. The outside option of the firm is zero. The solution to the (generalized) Nash
bargain above is
wc = β wo1− t + (1− β)a. (5.38)
Wage costs are a weighted average of the outside option and productivity.
The outside option is a weighted sum of formal, wfo , and informal, wio, outside op-
portunities: wo = χwwfo + (1 − χw)wio. The informal outside opportunity is wio = ρwα.
Informal (i.e. non-taxable) employment is essential in the wage bargain as it implies that
taxes and premiums are not fully born by labour, in line with empirical findings for the
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Netherlands (see e.g. Graafland and Huizinga, 1999). As in MIMIC, the formal outside
opportunity is a weighted average of the opportunities outside the current match
wfo = (wc(1− t)E + buh(1− t)Uuh + (δwbul + (1− δw)wc)(1− t)Uul +
(δwbr + (1− δw)wc)(1− t)R + (δwbt + (1− δw)wc)(1− t)T )/L. (5.39)
We introduce a parameter δw to discount the difference between income in low-productive
unemployment, relief and training jobs and private sector employment. Empirical stud-
ies for the Netherlands suggest that low-productive unemployment generates the same
downward pressure on wages as high-productive unemployment.14 To achieve this result
we discount the difference between income in low-productive unemployment and formal
employment by a factor δw.
Active labour market policies affect the wage bargain via taxes and the outside option.
Specifically, active labour market policies may drive up public expenditures, causing taxes
to rise to keep the government budget balanced. As taxes are not fully born by labour,
this drives up wage costs, discouraging labour demand. But whether public expenditures
actually do go up also depends on the production by relief job participants and the extent
to which relief jobs and training programs affect the flow rate into regular employment. We
will study the overall effect below. With compensation in relief jobs and training programs
higher than compensation in low-productive unemployment, higher participation in these
programs will increase the outside option of workers, ceteris paribus. This again may push
up wage costs, discouraging labour demand.
Finally, for labour demand total labour costs, that is the sum of wage and search costs,
is the relevant variable. Per time unit, effective labour costs per employee per skill type
are wage costs plus the effective depreciation on search costs
pek = wck + (r + σk)χwck/mvk, (5.40)
where χwck denotes the per time unit vacancy cost. Unit labour costs for labour type k
that enter labour demand are
pk = pek/αk. (5.41)
Calibration
The parameter values for the wage bargaining model are taken from the original MIMIC
model, see Graafland et al. (2001), except for δw which we use to keep the elasticity of
wages with respect to benefits in line with Graafland et al. (2001) (the change in the
specification of the fallback position of workers led to a different elasticity for benefits).
A value of .45 for δw gives the desired elasticity. In a sensitivity analysis we consider how
sensitive the results are to this parameter, see below.
14Actually, these studies use long-term unemployment, a proxy for our pool of low-productive unemployed. For an
empirical study see e.g. Jongen and Graafland (1998).
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5.3.6 Government policy
Model
The government sets the benefit levels in low- and high-productive unemployment, and
compensation in relief jobs and the training program. Furthermore, the government
sets tax and premium rates for workers and employers, and determines the level of the
subsidy for employers that hire a low-productive worker. Finally, the government sets the
number of vacancies for relief jobs and the training program to reach a target number of
participants in these programs.
The receipts for the government are given by
GR =
∑
k
tk(Ekwck + buh,kUuh,k + bul,kUul,k + wrRk + wtTk) + αrRk, (5.42)
where the last term captures the production by relief job workers, where the productivity
of all relief job workers is assumed to be the same (not match or skill specific). Receipts
come from taxes and production of relief job workers.
Expenditures by the government are
GE = GEa +
∑
k
buh,kUuh,k + bul,kUul,k + ρplpekEpl,k
+wrRk + wtTk + ctTk + χwckVr,k + χwckVt,k + vEel,k, (5.43)
where GEa = GR0 − GE0 denotes initial autonomous government expenditures to get
realistic tax rates. ρplpekEpl,k denote public sector wage costs, which are a constant
fraction of private sector wage costs and public sector employment Epl,k is fixed. ct
denotes the per time unit training costs. v denotes the employment subsidy per low-
productive worker per time unit. Expenditures by the government are on autonomous
government spending, benefits for the unemployed, compensation in relief jobs and the
training program, labour costs for public sector employment, vacancy costs for vacancies
for relief jobs and the training program, and subsidies for low-productive workers in regular
employment. The reason we include a fixed number of public sector workers is to allow
higher wage costs in the private sector to push up public expenditures via higher wage
costs for public sector employees.
Calibration
Relief job workers and training program participants receive the minimum wage, a con-
servative assumption. In the sensitivity analysis we consider the impact of higher com-
pensation. We assume that the productivity of relief job workers equals 25% of minimum
wages. Hence, they produce one quarter of their compensation. Some empirical support
for this perhaps seemingly low productivity assumption comes from the behaviour of local
communities after the government transferred the funds for relief jobs to the local com-
munities in the beginning of the century. After the transfer to the local communities the
funds were no longer required to flow into relief jobs. The local communities were quick
to dismantle the relief job programs, see Chapter 2. Hence, at least in the perception of
the local communities, the productivity of relief jobs was not enough to make it profitable
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for them to move individuals from unemployment to relief jobs. This lends some support
for our assumption. In the sensitivity analysis we also consider the impact of different
values for the productivity of relief job workers.
We have some information on training costs. De Koning et al. (1995) find that the
average training cost for training programs was 22 percent of the gross minimum wage in
1993. We set the training cost including overhead costs conservatively at 25 percent of
minimum wage costs. However, Forslund and Krueger (1997) report an average training
cost of around 60 percent of benefits for Sweden and 96 percent of benefits for Germany.
We therefore also consider higher training costs in the sensitivity analysis.
Regarding taxes and premiums, in the calibration we take actual tax and premium
rates in the calibration year in the Netherlands and then set autonomous government
spending to balance the budget.
5.4 Simulations
We are interested in the impact of increasing the number of relief jobs, places in the
training program and/or the employer subsidy for hiring a low-productive worker. Fur-
thermore, we are also interested in how the programs affect key variables relative to each
other. To make the results comparable we present simulation results for an equal ex ante
impulse of 115 million euro into each type of subsidized employment. By ex ante we mean
for relief jobs and the training program that we increase vacancies for these programs to
obtain an increase in the stocks of these programs which accords with an additional 115
million euro spent on compensation, for given outflow rates and the initial number of
searching units for these programs. For the employer subsidy we set the subsidy at the
level for which the initial stock of low-productive employed multiplied by the subsidy
equals the ex ante impulse.
The discussion of the simulation outcomes is structured as follows: first we consider
the induced changes in behaviour, then we consider how these behavioural changes are
reflected in some macro-economic variables, and finally we consider the impact on gov-
ernment expenditures and receipts. For the macro-economic variables we give the results
both with and without changes in income tax rates to balance the budget. Comparing
the outcomes with and without changes in tax rates gives an indication of the extent of
‘fiscal substitution’.
5.4.1 Relief jobs
First consider the impact of increasing the number of relief jobs. To increase the number
of relief jobs the government posts more vacancies for relief jobs. Table 5.6 below gives
the induced changes in the behaviour of workers and firms.
As more vacancies for relief jobs come into the market, individuals in low- productive
unemployment devote more time to locating these vacancies. This goes at the expense of
time devoted to locating private sector vacancies and vacancies for the training program.
The flow rate into relief jobs rises. We observe a mild drop in private sector vacancies.
Relief job workers devote less time to job search than low-productive unemployed and are
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more reluctant to accept job offers than low-productive unemployed. Hence, search costs
for firms rise. As we will see below, wage costs rise as well. The rise in search and wage
costs implies a rise in labour costs. Higher labour costs lead to crowding out of private
sector employment. The drop in the entry of private sector vacancies is somewhat masked
by the increase in the vacancy duration.15
Next, consider how the changes in these inputs of the matching process affect the
output, the endogenous flow rates. Obviously, the flow rate from low-productive unem-
ployment into relief jobs increases. Individuals in low-productive unemployment spend
less time on locating vacancies in the private sector, their flow rate into regular employ-
ment falls.
Turning to the stocks, we see that participation in relief jobs rises more than the
fall in low-productive unemployment. Indeed, this reflects the effect that individuals get
‘locked-in’in the relief program, with a reduced outflow into regular employment. The
drop in the effective supply of labour combined with higher wage costs lowers private
sector employment. The number of relief job workers rises by almost 14 thousand persons,
whereas regular employment falls by 7 thousand persons, i.e. 50 percent crowding out
of regular employment. These numbers are generated assuming that the budget is not
balanced yet via additional taxation. We consider how fiscal substitution affects crowding
out below.
Table 5.7 gives the impact of an increase in relief jobs on some key macro-economic
variables, both with and without compensating taxation to balance the government bud-
get. Wages rise as higher compensation in relief jobs than in low-productive unemploy-
ment improves the outside option of workers. Productivity in the private sector rises as
less individuals in the low-productive segment are in regular employment. The drop in
output reflects the drop in private sector employment.
Turning to the receipts and expenditures of the government, the wage bill of the
government rises. This is mostly due to the rise in relief job expenditures, but also due to
the rise in regular labour costs for the government. Labour costs for the government are
linked to private sector labour costs. Overall, expenditures do rise but less than the ex ante
impulse of 115 million euro. There are savings on welfare benefits (and unemployment
insurance) whereas relief job workers produce some output.
Table 5.7 also gives the corresponding effects on the macro level and government
expenditures when the government finances the rise in expenditures by a rise in income tax
rates. This further raises labour costs, which adversely affects private sector employment
and output. With compensating taxation, crowding out of private sector employment
rises from 50 percent without additional taxation to 69 percent with additional taxation.
5.4.2 Training program
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 also give the changes induced by an ex ante impulse of 115 million euro
into the training program. With more vacancies for the training program in the market,
low-productive unemployed devote more search effort to locating these vacancies. This
15The changes in the acceptance rates, i.e. the share of contacts accepted, mainly reflect changes in the composition of
unskilled, low-skilled and high-skilled workers.
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goes at the expense of search effort devoted to locating vacancies in the private sector.
However, whereas the relief program slows down the process by which an individual
moves into regular employment, the training program has the opposite effect. Increased
participation in the training program results in an increase in the effective supply of
labour. Trained individuals search more intensely for a job than low-productive unem-
ployed, and a contact between a worker and a vacancy is more likely to result in a match
for a trained individual than for a low-productive unemployed. The private sector vacancy
duration and stock fall. Search costs for firms fall.
Turning to the flow rates and stocks, the flow rate into the training program rises. For
the additional individuals in the training program the flow rate into regular employment
rises, the stock of low-productive unemployed falls more than the rise in the training
program. But for all other individuals the flow rate into regular employment falls. Indeed,
as we will see below, higher compensation in the training program than in low-productive
unemployment pushes wages up. The rise in wage costs dominates the fall in search
costs and the rise in the average productivity of applicants. As a result, the positive
treatment effect of the training program on the individual level is reversed on the aggregate
level. Regular employment falls. Without additional taxation crowding out of regular
employment is 26 percent of the rise in training program participation.
Table 5.7 gives the resulting changes in macro-economic variables. Labour costs rise
when we increase participation in the training program. The rise in labour costs is partly
due to a composition effect, i.e. the increase in average productivity, and partly due to
the more favourable outside option of workers.
Private sector employment falls as labour costs rise. However, production is unaffected
due to the increase in human capital of trained individuals. Unemployment falls more than
under relief jobs, but the inactivity ratio, defined as the sum of unemployment, relief jobs
and the training program over the labour force, increases. Government expenditures rise
due to the higher expenditures on the training program. Expenditures on unemployment
insurance benefits also rise, due to the rise in high-productive unemployment. However,
the government saves on welfare benefits, relief jobs expenditures and receives more taxes
due to the rise in wages. Overall, the additional expenditures fall short of additional
receipts though. Expenditures are higher ex post due also to the training cost.
Table 5.7 also gives the corresponding changes in macro-economic variables and gov-
ernment expenditures and receipts when we finance the rise in the deficit with higher
income tax rates. With compensating taxation labour costs rise further. Now production
falls, and private sector employment falls further. With additional taxation, crowding
out rises from 26 percent to 52 percent. Despite the higher ex post cost for the training
program before compensating taxation, after compensating taxation the training program
still significantly outperforms the relief jobs in terms of employment and production.
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5.4.3 Employment subsidies for low-productive workers
Finally, we consider the impact of a temporary subsidy for an employer that employs
a low-productive worker.16 The budget of 115 million euro ex ante implies a subsidy
of 7 percent of unemployment assistance benefits for the initial stock of low-productive
workers per period.
The impact on the individual level is once again given in Table 5.6. The subsidy
for low-productive workers lowers labour costs, which stimulates labour demand. Fur-
thermore, the subsidy for low-productive workers effectively lowers the minimum wage
for low-productive workers. The minimum productivity required from the low-productive
applicant is reduced. Higher labour demand leads to more vacancies entering the market,
but the lower minimum productivity required lowers the vacancy duration in the private
sector. Overall vacancies fall.
Turning to the workers side, low-productive job-seekers are more likely to be accepted
in a job and therefore spend more time on job search. Less time is devoted to locating relief
jobs or placement in the training program. High-productive unemployed and training
program participants now face tougher competition and reduce their search effort.
Turning to the stocks and the flow rates, more individuals flow from low-productive
unemployment and the relief program into regular employment. The flow rates for high-
productive unemployment and the training program fall due to the increase in competi-
tion. The fall in the stocks of low-productive unemployment and relief jobs dominates the
rise in high-productive unemployment and participation in the training program. Both
total and regular employment rise, where relief jobs and training programs led to a drop
in regular employment.
Whereas the net effect of relief jobs and (public) training programs on employment is
typically analysed in terms of crowding out, the net effect of private sector vacancies is
typically analysed in terms of deadweight, substitution and displacement. Deadweight is
defined as the share of subsidized individuals that would have found employment in the
absence of the subsidy. Substitution is defined as the number of job-seekers outside the
target group that would have been hired instead of a subsidized individual over the number
of subsidized individuals. Displacement is defined as the number of incumbent workers
that is displaced by a subsidized individual over the number of subsidized individuals. The
model does not allow for displacement, which is typically limited relative to deadweight
and substitution.17 Without additional taxation we find that deadweight and substitution
come to 95% and 2% of subsidized individuals, respectively.
Table 5.7 once again gives the changes in macro-economic variables. Labour costs
fall due to the subsidy. Labour productivity falls as low-productive employment rises
more than overall employment. Production rises less than employment, due to the fall in
average productivity. The fall in the inactivity rate is more pronounced than the fall in
unemployment as regular employment attracts more former relief job workers.
Turning to the effects on government expenditures, the wage bill of the government
16For simplicity we model the temporary character of the subsidy by letting the employer receive the subsidy as long
as the worker is in low-productive employment. As the transition rate into high-productive employment is exogenous this
simplification is innocuous.
17See Jongen and Graafland (1998) for some explorations of employment subsidies with displacement.
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falls. Furthermore, the government saves on welfare benefits. However, the latter effect
is nullified by an equivalent rise in unemployment insurance benefits. Aggregate subsidy
expenditures rise somewhat above the level expected ex ante as more individuals are
drawn into low-productive employment. Tax receipts rise with the rise in production.
Savings on wages by the government and additional tax receipts lead to an ex post deficit
that is only approximately one third of the ex ante expenditures.
Table 5.7 also gives the corresponding changes with compensating taxation. After
compensating taxation the rise in employment and production is less pronounced. How-
ever, whereas the training program and in particular relief jobs lead to a fall in private
sector employment and output after compensating taxation, employment subsidies in the
private sector still increase private sector employment and output after compensating tax-
ation. After compensating taxation the net employment effect drops from 3 to 2 percent
of subsidized matches.
5.4.4 A comparison of the policies
We briefly review how the different types of ALMPs affect our model economy relative to
each other. Both before and after compensating taxation, employment rises more when we
increase spending on relief jobs and the training program than when we increase spending
on the employment subsidy for low-productive workers in the private sector. However,
relief jobs crowd out private sector employment because individuals are discouraged to
continue searching for regular employment and because higher compensation outside reg-
ular employment pushes up wage costs. Although the training program speeds up the rate
at which the individual finds employment, higher compensation in the training program
relative to low-productive unemployment generates a negative effect on private sector
employment due to additional wage pressure. After compensating taxation, both relief
jobs and the training program reduce overall output, most notably relief jobs. The em-
ployment subsidies targeted at low-productive workers in the private sector increase both
private sector employment and output. Although the training program is more effective
for the individual for regaining skills than being in low-productive employment, the fact
that individuals in low-productive employment produce output right away, and spending
is on subsidies that lower labour costs rather than (partly) on improving workers’ out-
side option, make the employment subsidies more effective in promoting output than the
training program.
5.4.5 Comparison with findings of other studies
Table 5.8 below gives the findings of some other studies on ALMPs. These studies typ-
ically focus only on the net employment effect. As mentioned above we analyse two
stylised subsidized employment programs in the public sector: relief jobs and training
programs. Actual programs are likely to contain elements of both, for example the sub-
sidized employment program analysed by Dalhberg and Forslund (1999) in Table 5.8 and
the studies on youth programs which combine work experience with formal training. Swe-
den has been very active in subsidized employment in the public sector. Indeed, most
studies on crowding out of subsidized employment in the public sector are on Swedish
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data. The studies on subsidized employment in the public sector in Table 5.8 use time
series or panel data on aggregate (regional) employment and participation in the public
employment schemes in Sweden. The net employment effect ranges from 35 percent of the
subsidized employment program analysed by Dahlberg and Forslund (1999) to 0 percent
in the early study by Gramlich and Ysander (1981) on relief jobs. Our stylised relief jobs
have a net employment effect of 31 percent, close to the upper bound of the findings of
the studies reported in Table 3. Our stylised training program has a net employment
effect of 48 percent, above the upper bound of the reported studies. Indeed, our stylised
training program makes the favourable assumption that all trained individuals become as
productive as high-productive workers. As noted in the calibration of the treatment effect
of the training program, this seems rather optimistic. In the sensitivity analysis below we
consider the impact of a less favourable treatment effect. Furthermore, we conservatively
assume that the compensation in relief jobs and the training program equals the minimum
wage. Many programs actually pay wages in excess of this level, which generates more
wage pressure when we increase subsidized employment in the public sector, crowding out
more private sector employment, which we also consider below. Overall, in terms of the
net employment effect, the programs analysed by the studies in Table 5.8 seem to come
closer to our stylised relief jobs than our stylised training programs.
The studies on employment subsidies for low-productive workers in the private sector
typically do not employ aggregate time series or panel data on employment but use survey
methods to determine the net employment effect. Employers are asked to indicate whether
a subsidized individual would have been hired in the absence of the subsidy (deadweight),
whether an unsubsidised individual would have been hired instead (substitution) and the
extent to which they were able to gain a larger market share (indicator of displacement of
other incumbent workers). The net employment effect so obtained of the studies reported
in Table 5.8 range from 21-33 percent for the Australian Jobstart program to 4 percent
for the Irish Employment Incentive program. Presuming that the survey results reflect
the actual level of the net employment effect on the individual firm level, the 2 percent
net employment effect we find for our stylised employment subsidies for low-productive
workers does not strike us as particularly low. Indeed, additional wage pressure and fiscal
substitution are likely to lower the overall employment effect relative to the effect on the
individual firm level.
5.4.6 Sensitivity analysis
Table 5.9 below gives some sensitivity analyses on assumptions for relief jobs and the
training program. We present results after compensating taxation to balance the budget.
First consider the effect of changing some key assumptions on our stylised relief jobs.
In our base simulations we assume that production by relief job workers net of overhead
costs equals 25 percent of minimum wage costs. The second column in Table 5.9 gives
the results when we add overhead costs equal to compensation (the minimum wage) per
participant. With higher overhead costs taxes have to rise more to balance the budget
when we increase the number of relief jobs. Higher taxes raise labour costs and lower
net wages, as a result regular employment and production fall more than in the base
simulation. The net total employment effect drops from 31 percent to 10 percent.
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On the other hand, one might also argue that production net of overhead costs for relief
job workers is more than 25 percent of minimum wage costs. Column 3 reports the results
when production net of overhead costs equals the compensation for relief job workers, i.e.
the program is run at no immediate cost to the government. Even with this rather
favourable assumption, more relief jobs lead to a fall in overall production. More relief
jobs still raise wage and search costs for firms. Furthermore, even though participants
produce output equal to the minimum wage they would still be more productive in the
private sector. The net employment effect rises from 31 percent to 44 percent.
The next columns give some sensitivity analyses of the assumptions for the training
program. Introducing overhead costs equal to the minimum wage implies that after
compensating taxation crowding out of regular employment rises and overall output drops
more, see column 5. The net employment effect falls from 48 to 27 percent.
In our base simulation we make the rather favourable assumption that training pro-
gram participants become as productive as high-productive workers. When individuals
(re)gain no skills in the training program the results are comparable with those of re-
lief jobs, which generates a net employment effect of 31 percent versus the 48 percent
in our base simulation of the training program. Another way to consider the impact
of a different treatment effect is to change the outflow rate from the training program
to high productive employment directly via the matching efficiency parameter µ in the
flow rate from the training program into regular employment. Columns 6 and 7 give the
results when the mismatch indicator drops and rises by 50 percent, respectively. When
the mismatch indicator drops by 50 percent, and hence the flow rate from the training
program into regular employment drops as well, the net employment effect drops from 48
to 24 percent (more in line with the findings of the studies reported in Table 5.8). For
completeness we also report the impact of increasing the matching efficiency parameter
for training program participants by 50 percent. Now the net employment effect rises
from 48 percent to a dramatic 95 percent. However, as noted above, our stylised training
program already appears rather optimistic on the effect of training on the flow rate into
regular employment in the base simulation.
The final column in Table 5.9 considers the effect of increasing the compensation in
relief jobs and the training program from 100 percent in the base simulation to 115 percent
of the minimum wage, without increasing the number of vacancies for relief jobs and the
training program. Indeed, most programs actually pay wages in excess of the minimum
wage, see Section 5.2. Increasing compensation in relief jobs and the training program
leads to a rise in the participants but crowds out regular employment. Indeed, overall
employment falls, the net employment effect of the rise in relief jobs and training program
participation is actually negative, -33 percent.
Finally, in Jongen et al. (2000) we also consider how sensitive the results are with
respect to changes in the parameter δw. A higher value implies that higher compensation
in relief jobs and public training programs than in low-productive unemployment leads to
more wage push. The numerical outcomes are affected, but most qualitative results remain
the same. In particular, subsidies for low-productive unemployed in the private sector still
outperform training programs when it comes to regular employment and overall output,
and training programs still outperform relief jobs when it comes to regular employment
and output. However, when the wage push effect is low, low δw, the overall effect of
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training programs on production turns slightly positive even after compensating taxation.
5.5 Concluding remarks
Subsidized employment programs in both the public and private sector took a high flight
in the Netherlands at the end of the 20th century. Although spending on ALMPs has come
down over the past decade, the share in GDP remains sizeable. We consider the impact
of ALMPs targeted at low-productive workers in a stripped down version of the MIMIC
model. The focus of the stripped down model is on the wage bargain and the matching
process which capture the main channels through which ALMPs affects the workings of
the economy. In the stripped down model we introduce: a) relief jobs in the public sector,
where participants produce some output but do not regain skills, b) training programs,
where low-productive individuals become as productive as high-productive individuals
but produce no output while on training, and c) temporary employment subsidies in
the private sector. The relief jobs and the training program are supposed to capture
the two polar cases of subsidized employment in the public sector, with actual programs
containing elements of both. Indeed, comparing the individual wage and employment
effect of our stylised programs we find that our stylised relief jobs are rather pessimistic
and our stylised training program are rather optimistic when compared to the findings of
micro-level studies on the impact of actual programs abroad.
In the simulations we consider the effect of increasing the budget for relief jobs, the
training program and the employment subsidy by 115 million euros, respectively. When
individuals move into a relief job they reduce their search effort for regular employment,
this increases search costs for regular firms. Furthermore, higher compensation in relief
jobs than in low-productive unemployment and the financing of this higher compensation
raises wage costs as well. As a result the net employment effect of relief jobs is only 31
percent of placements. Although relief job workers produce some output, the crowding
out of regular employment leads to an overall fall in output. The training program
speeds up the process by which participants find employment. This lowers search costs
for firms. However, higher compensation in the training program than in low-productive
unemployment, and the financing of this higher compensation plus training costs push
up wage costs. Overall, higher participation in the training program crowds out regular
employment. Hence, the favourable effect of training on the individual level is reversed
on the aggregate level for the average job seeker. The net employment effect is somewhat
below 50 percent of placements. Output falls. Finally, employment subsidies in the private
sector encourage rather than discourage private sector employment. The net employment
effect is only 2 percent of placements though, leading to a small rise in output. Although
the training program enhances human capital formation, the fact that expenditures are
used to reduce labour costs rather than (partly) improving labour’s fall back option,
combined with the fact that individuals produce output right away still makes targeted
employment subsidies in the private sector more effective in enhancing output and regular
employment than the training program.
Compared to macro-econometric studies on subsidized employment programs in the
public sector abroad (more specifically Sweden) the net employment effect of relief jobs
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seems on the upper bound of the reported findings, whereas the net employment effect
of the training program is above the upper bound of the reported findings. In our base
simulations we set the compensation in relief jobs and the training program conservatively
at the minimum wage, whereas actual programs typically pay wages above the minimum
wage. When we increase the compensation to 115 percent of minimum wages, subsidized
employment in the public sector crowds out more regular employment. Furthermore,
when we make less favourable assumptions on the effect of the training program on human
capital formation or the employment probability we also find more crowding out of regular
employment. The results then move closer to the overall findings of the macro-econometric
studies on the net employment effect of subsidized employment in the public sector.
Studies on the overall impact of employment subsidies in the private sector typically
do not employ aggregate data but rely on survey studies instead. Employers are asked to
indicate to what extent subsidized individuals constitute net employment gains. Presum-
ing that the reported net employment effects accord with the actual employment effects
on the individual firm level, our net employment effect of employment subsidies is below
the lower bound of the reported findings. However, as the survey studies do not consider
the effect on wage formation via the outside option of workers and via taxes, they are
likely to overstate the overall net employment effect.
Finally, the main lessons we draw from this analysis are the following. First, the lack
of knowledge on the individual effect of ALMPs in the Netherlands on variables like wages
and employment probabilities is disturbing given the dramatic changes in expenditures
on these programs. Second, the impact of ALMPs may be quite different on the aggregate
level than on the individual level, see e.g. the impact of the training program on the tran-
sition rate into regular employment for participants and the average job seeker. Third,
ALMPs for low-productive workers are perhaps best viewed as a redistribution of income
and employment opportunities towards low-productive workers rather than enhancing reg-
ular employment and output. Indeed, employment subsidies for low-productive workers
in the private sector have only a marginal effect on employment and output, whereas sub-
sidized employment programs in the public sector actually crowd out regular employment
and output.
5.A. Stocks and flows
Figure 5.1 in the main text gives an overview of the stocks and flows of the model. In a
steady state we can express the stocks in terms of the flow rates18
Uh =
σeh,uh(τel,ehρtρlr + ρrρelpiul,t(pit,eh + σt,uh))
D
L, (5.A.1)
Ul =
σeh,uhτuh,ulρtρrρel
D
L, (5.A.2)
R = σeh,uhτuh,ulpiul,rρtρel
D
L, (5.A.3)
18The model features three skill types: unskilled, low-skilled and high-skilled. For each skill type we construct a flow
model. To limit the number of subscripts we suppress an index for skill type in the stock and flow expressions.
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T = σeh,uhτuh,ulpiul,tρrρel
D
L, (5.A.4)
El =
σeh,uhτuh,ulρtρlr
D
L, (5.A.5)
Eh = L− Uh − Ul −R− T − El, (5.A.6)
whereD = ρt[σeh,uhτuh,ulρel(ρr+piul,r)+ρlr(σeh,uh(τuh,ul+τel,eh)+ρuhτel,eh)]+piul,tρrρel[σeh,uh(pit,eh+
σt,uh + τuh,ul) + (piuh,eh + τuh,ul)pit,eh + piuh,ehσt,eh], ρr = pir,el + σr,ul, ρt = pit,eh + σt,ul + σt,uh,
ρlr = piul,el(pir,el + σr,el) + piul,rpir,el, ρel = τel,eh + σel,ul, and ρuh = τuh,ul + piuh,eh.
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Chapter 6
Summary, policy implications and
topics for future research
6.1 Summary
6.1.1 The labour market and policy in the Netherlands
When it comes to the level of unemployment, the Dutch labour market has been doing
rather well since the mid 1990s, at least until recently, though part of the unemployed
may have been hiding in e.g. disability and early retirement schemes. However, the flows
seem to tell a different story. Indeed, the average flow rate from employment to unemploy-
ment and from unemployment to employment are among the lowest in the OECD. The
usual suspects for these low flow rates are generous unemployment insurance and strict
employment protection. Indeed, unemployment insurance benefits seem rather generous
compared to other OECD countries. Furthermore, the protection of regular employment
contracts seems rather strict. Finally, the steep rise in public expenditures on active
labour market policies appears to have had limited success in raising the outflow rate
from unemployment. In the subsequent chapters we consider whether unemployment in-
surance benefits are indeed too high, employment protection is too strict and active labour
market policies are actually active.
6.1.2 Unemployment insurance
We study optimal unemployment insurance in a lifecycle model with unemployment risk.
The incidence and duration of the risk may vary over the lifecycle. Workers decide on
search effort when unemployed, consumption and savings. The ability to save and borrow
gives workers the opportunity to self insure against the unemployment risk. However, the
extent to which they can do so may be limited by liquidity constraints.
We calibrate the model to the panel data of De Koning et al. (2006) on the incidence
and duration of unemployment over the lifecycle, and the empirical literature on the
elasticity of unemployment and consumption with respect to the benefit level.
We find that in the base calibration, the optimal benefit level is quite close to the
actual benefit level of around 70% of the wage. However, given our limited knowledge of
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moral hazard, risk aversion and the role of liquidity constraints, the optimal level could
be somewhat lower or higher. But the welfare cost of a sub optimal replacement rate by
say 10 percentage points is small (.1% in consumption terms).
We further find that the replacement rate should be higher for older workers and for
lower educated workers. This is in line with the current system that links the maximum
UI duration with the preceding employment duration and the maximum income borders
for UI premiums and benefits.
Hence, although the relatively generous unemployment insurance is one of the reasons
for the low outflow rate from unemployment to employment in the Netherlands, it may
be second best.
6.1.3 Individual accounts
Next, we study the introduction of unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISA).
Under the current system employees pay a premium to finance unemployment insurance
benefits for the unemployed. Under a UISA system the premium is replaced by mandatory
savings into an individual account out of which benefits are paid during unemployment.
Because individuals can have a negative balance they still have access to income during
unemployment. Furthermore, in a popular proposal by Feldstein and Altman (1998),
negative terminal balances at the end of working life are nullified, which is financed by a
tax, and positive terminal balances go to the individual pension account.
Under the UISA system, individuals that expect to end up with a positive terminal
balance will have a stronger incentive to keep their job and to find a new one in case of
job loss. Individuals that expect to end up with a negative terminal balance will have
weaker incentives though. But as most individuals will end up with a positive terminal
balance, on net incentives are improved and unemployment will fall.
However, the pooling of the unemployment risk will fall as well. Individuals that are
unemployed often or for a long duration will have a lower lifetime income, though some
risk pooling remains when negative terminal balances are nullified. Hence, also UISA do
not escape the trade off between incentives and insurance.
But still, individual accounts may improve this trade off. When unemployed have no
assets and can not borrow, their consumption is determined solely by their unemployment
benefits. UISA force individuals to build up some precautionary savings for job loss and
allow the unemployed to borrow in the case of job loss. In this way, individuals can
self insure against the risk of unemployment, and the need for public insurance against
unemployment is reduced.
However, for reasonable levels of unemployment insurance benefits, most unemployed
individuals do not run into liquidity constraints. Most unemployment spells do not last
that long, and most unemployed have sufficient assets or access to funds to cover the
larger part of the income shock due to unemployment. Indeed, studies that look into the
effect of a change in the unemployment benefit on the consumption of the unemployed
find that consumption falls only slightly even when benefits are reduced significantly.
Simulation results indicate that the welfare gains of introducing UISA in the Nether-
lands are indeed small. The introduction of an UISA leads to a substantial drop in
unemployment, but also to a substantial loss in risk pooling. Starting from an optimal
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unemployment benefit level the overall welfare gains are less than .1% in consumption
terms. In line with empirical studies, most unemployed in the model do not run into
borrowing constraints.
Starting from a higher benefit level, the welfare gains from introducing UISA are
larger, but then simply reducing benefit levels seems preferable. Furthermore, to reap
a welfare gain the policy maker needs to have precise knowledge on the extent of moral
hazard and risk aversion of the workers. A sub optimal choice for the replacement rate
and the mandatory savings rate under a UISA system easily results in a welfare loss, and
a mistake is easy to make given our limited knowledge of moral hazard and risk aversion.
All in all, UISA then do not seem to offer much over the current UI system in the
Netherlands. However, this does not mean that individual accounts are not interesting
for other types of income shocks, like education and health care, which have a larger intra
personal and a smaller interpersonal component than unemployment benefits.
6.1.4 Employment protection
Next, we consider employment protection. We consider the impact of severance pay, firing
costs and firing taxes in a general equilibrium vintage model with specific worker and firm
investments to raise the productivity of a match.
A qualitative analysis of the balanced growth path shows that lumping together differ-
ent types of employment protection, as in the OECD indicator, may be a poor empirical
strategy. Different types of employment protection have different effects. Furthermore,
we also provide some empirical support for this. Specifically, we show that when sev-
erance pay is initially zero, severance pay is neutral when it comes to job creation and
destruction. However, an interesting implication of rising severance pay with tenure is
that it tilts the wage profile. Wages of new hires fall and wages of workers with long
tenures rise, potentially creating a political economy problem.
Furthermore, we show that rising firing costs with tenure, popular in practice, are
less detrimental to job creation than flat firing costs, popular in theoretical work. Hence,
previous simulation studies may have overstated the negative effect of firing costs on
employment.
In the qualitative analysis we also consider the first best solution, and consider how
contracting problems in specific investments and the presence of unemployment insurance
benefits may provide a second best role for firing taxes. In particular, in both cases match
destruction will be too high and match creation will be too low. Firing taxes lengthen
match durations and thereby mitigate the distortion on the destruction side. When we
use the receipts to reduce unemployment insurance premiums, this can be done without
collateral damage on the creation side.
We illustrate a number of points quantitatively in a calibration exercise for the Nether-
lands. When there is a large under investment problem in match specific human capital,
firing costs raise productivity and employment (though a rise in productivity and employ-
ment does not guarantee a rise in welfare, due to the higher investment costs).
When there is no under investment problem in match specific human capital, firing
costs reduce productivity and welfare though they may still raise employment. When
there is no under investment, firing taxes can still improve welfare, matches are terminated
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too soon due to the presence of unemployment insurance benefits and premiums. When
we return the receipts of the firing taxes in the form of lower unemployment insurance
premiums the policy reform actually boosts job creation.
In an extension with an endogenous labour force we further shows that the model can
also produce falling employment as a result of higher firing costs. This is in line with our
empirical findings earlier in the chapter, and a number of other empirical studies.
Again, returning to the flow data from Chapter 2, our analysis of employment protec-
tion suggests that firing costs are a likely candidate for the low flow rate from employment
into unemployment, and perhaps the low flow rate from unemployment to employment,
in the Netherlands. Is this also collateral damage for the greater good? It depends, it is
when we believe that there is a sizeable under investment problem in specific investments
in the Netherlands. However, then attacking the contracting problem directly seems a less
costly approach than imposing firing costs in terms of job creation and welfare in general.
When there is no under investment problem in specific investments the strict employment
protection of permanent contracts in the Netherlands likely reduces welfare. The analysis
also shows that another form of protection, firing taxes, may play a similar productive
role as firing costs, but without the collateral damage to welfare. Our theoretical and
empirical analysis suggests that severance pay is not behind the low flow rates between
employment and unemployment.
6.1.5 Active labour market policies
Finally, we consider the effectiveness of active labour market policies in raising the job
finding rate of job seekers and their subsequent productivity, in general equilibrium.
We consider the impact of a number of popular active labour market policies in a
stripped down version of the so-called MIMIC model. The focus of the stripped down
model is on the matching process and the wage bargain, which are supposed to capture
the main channels through which these policies affect the workings of the economy.
In the stripped down model we introduce: a) relief jobs in the public sector, where par-
ticipants produce some output but do not regain skills, b) training programs, where low-
productive individuals become as productive as high-productive individuals but produce
no output while on training, and c) temporary employment subsidies in the private sector.
The relief jobs and the training program are supposed to capture the two polar cases of
subsidized employment in the public sector, with actual programs containing elements
of both. Indeed, comparing the individual wage and employment effect of our stylised
programs we find that our stylised relief jobs are rather pessimistic and our stylised train-
ing programs are rather optimistic when compared to the findings of micro-econometric
studies on the impact of actual programs abroad.
We consider the effect of increasing the budget for each of the ALMPs by 115 million
euros. When individuals move into a relief job they reduce their search effort for regular
employment, this increases search costs for firms. Furthermore, the higher compensation
in relief jobs than in low-productive unemployment and the financing of this higher com-
pensation raises labour costs as well. As a result the net employment effect of relief jobs
is only 31 percent of placements. Although relief job workers produce some output, the
crowding out of regular employment leads to an overall fall in output.
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The public training program speeds up the process by which participants find employ-
ment. However, higher compensation in the training program than in low-productive
unemployment, and the financing of this higher compensation plus training costs push up
labour costs in the private sector. Higher participation in the training program crowds out
regular employment as well. Overall, the favourable effect of training on the individual
level is reversed on the aggregate level. The net employment effect is somewhat below 50
percent of placements. Output again falls.
Finally, employment subsidies in the private sector encourage rather than discourage
private sector employment. But the net employment effect is only 2 percent of placements.
There is a small increase in output. Although the training program enhances human
capital formation, the fact that expenditures are used to reduce labour costs rather than
(partly) improving labour’s fall back option, combined with the fact that individuals
produce output right away still makes targeted employment subsidies in the private sector
more effective in enhancing output and regular employment than the training program.
Compared to macro-econometric studies on subsidized employment programs in the
public sector abroad (more specifically Sweden) the net employment effect of relief jobs
seems on the upper bound of the reported findings, whereas the net employment effect of
the training program is above the upper bound of the reported findings.
In our base simulations we set the compensation in relief jobs and the training program
conservatively at the minimum wage, whereas actual programs typically pay wages above
the minimum wage. When we increase the compensation to 115 percent of minimum
wages, subsidized employment in the public sector crowds out more regular employment.
Furthermore, when we make less favourable assumptions on the effect of the training
program on human capital formation or the employment probability we also find more
crowding out of regular employment. The results then move closer to the overall findings
of the macro-econometric studies on the net employment effect of subsidized employment
in the public sector.
Studies on the overall impact of employment subsidies in the private sector typically
do not employ aggregate data but rely on survey studies instead. Employers are asked to
indicate to what extent subsidized individuals constitute net employment gains. Presum-
ing that the reported net employment effects accord with the actual employment effects
on the individual firm level, our net employment effect of employment subsidies is below
the lower bound of the reported findings. However, as the survey studies do not con-
sider the effect on wage formation via taxes, they are likely to overstate the overall net
employment effect.
To conclude, for all active labour market policies we find that the aggregate effect
is less favourable than the individual effect, due to additional wage pressure and higher
taxes to finance the programs. Hence, the result that targeted wage cost subsidies raise
the rate at which targeted individuals find employment (as suggested by e.g. the meta
analysis of Kluve, 2006), does not mean that they raise the average job finding rate of
all job seekers. Furthermore, training programs that seem to promote the employment
rate of participants on net (despite lock-in effects) may not do so for the average job
seeker. Finally, relief jobs seem even more detrimental for the transition into regular
employment once we account for the negative side effects of additional wage pressure and
higher taxes. Hence, the fact that the Netherlands has had one of the lowest outflow rates
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from unemployment to employment, despite the steep rise in spending on active labour
market policies, does not come as a surprise.
6.2 Policy implications
Clearly, this whole thesis is about policy. But there is no harm in reiterating some key
policy implications and consider how they relate to the current policy debate. We do this
with the help of bullets.
Unemployment insurance
• Are unemployment benefits too high? Not necessarily, simulation results suggest
that the optimal replacement rate is in the order of 60-70%. Furthermore, the
welfare cost of setting the replacement 10 percentage points too high or too low is
also small, around .1% (the objective function is fairly flat close to the optimum).
• Are unemployment insurance savings accounts an interesting policy option for the
Netherlands? No, most unemployed do not run into liquidity constraints, and a large
part of the redistribution by the unemployment insurance system is interpersonal
not intra personal. Simulations results suggest that the welfare gain is less than .1%
in consumption terms.
Employment protection
• Is employment protection too strict? Not necessarily, firing costs can play a pro-
ductive role when there is under investment in match specific human capital and
in the presence of unemployment insurance. For a realistic parameter range the
effect on both employment and productivity can go either way when we increase (or
decrease) firing costs.
• Is severance pay in the Netherlands too high? The average severance pay in the
Netherlands is average in the OECD, though above average for high tenures. But
even if severance pay is considered too high for high tenures, theory indicates that
severance pay is typically neutral when it comes to job creation and destruction,
which also gets empirical support.
• So the current system might be optimal? No, there is no need to treat every layoff
as a potential crime. Firing taxes can perform the same role as costly or lengthy
procedures in preventing an excessive inflow into unemployment insurance. When
the receipts are used to lower unemployment insurance premiums labour costs can
actually fall.
Active labour market policies
• Are active labour market policies active? Typically not, in particular relief jobs
seem to keep people out of regular jobs rather than guide them towards them, and
training programs give mixed results, with typically negative effects for youths.
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• So should we abandon active labour market policies all together? No, some ALMPs
seem to work, at least on the individual level. Job search assistance, targeted
employment subsidies in the private sector and start-up grants seem to improve the
employment prospects of participants.
• However, that job search assistance and subsidies for workers or entrepreneurs help
to get individuals back to employment on the partial level is hardly surprising.
Our analysis shows that wage pressure and higher taxes can take a substantial bite
out of the effect on the aggregate level, and even reverse the effect. So, a cost-
benefit analysis of ALMPs based on individual outcomes can lead one to the wrong
conclusion.
6.3 Topics for future research
We conclude this thesis with a number of promising topics for future research, again
organised by topic.
The empirical knowledge on the costs and benefits of unemployment insurance in the
Netherlands is limited. The policy changes over the past decade, in particular the short-
ening of the maximum insurance duration and the increase in the initial benefit, provide
an interesting natural experiment. When we study the impact of these experiments we
should not only study unemployment durations (and subsequent wages), but also the
impact on consumption. In this way we can determine both the costs and the benefits
of the changes in the program. In doing so, it seems also fruitful to distinguish between
individuals with and without assets, and with and without a partner, as shown by Chetty
(2008).
As for individual accounts, our analyses suggests that this is a dead end for the unem-
ployment risk. Because most unemployed do not seem to run into liquidity constraints,
and a large part of the redistribution is interpersonal not intra personal. But perhaps
liquidity constraints are more important than the scarce evidence suggests. Again, the
analysis of the recent changes in the UI program may be helpful in determining the rele-
vance of liquidity constraints for unemployment. Also, we may study individual accounts
for tax financed programs that have more intra personal redistribution, like education and
health care.
There also remain some theoretical challenges. What if these liquidity constraints
are there for a good reason? Stiglitz and Yun (2005) suggest that integrating unemploy-
ment insurance with social insurance may be welfare improving. However, in their model
liquidity constraints have no productive role. But we know there may be good reasons
why we force individuals to save for retirement, which they can not undo via private sav-
ings/borrowing due to liquidity constraints. Individuals may have hyperbolic preferences,
or expect others to buy them out when the time comes. An integrated analysis seems to
be called for, where these considerations are also taken into account.
Regarding employment protection, there is still a lack of thorough empirical studies
on the impact of employment protection. Cross-country studies have their downsides,
systems are hard to compare across countries and there is little variation in EPL. Over
the past decade we also have seen some changes in EPL in the Netherlands for example.
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There has been some work into the effect of these changes,1 but their scope is still partial
and limited.
Considering theoretical challenges, it would be interesting to study the role of sever-
ance pay (notice periods) and firing procedures more closely. In the typical model, the
former are neutral and the latter are simply a social waste. However, the prevalence and
persistence of these arrangements, in so many countries and also in private contracts, sug-
gest they have some productive role to play. Severance pay may provide insurance against
the risk of losing the returns to match specific human capital. It would be interesting to
study what role severance pay (and notice periods) has to play next to unemployment
insurance. Pissarides (2004) and Fella (2007) provide an interesting start, but they take
unemployment benefits as exogenous.
Also of interest is the lifecycle pattern of EPL. Older workers are typically harder to
fire, and typically also get more severance pay. Why does EPL have this lifecycle pattern,
and is it optimal?2
As for active labour market policies, first and foremost we need more empirical knowl-
edge on their effects on the individual level. Preferably, this knowledge would come from
randomised experiments. The budgetary outlays warrant a thorough evaluation on the
individual and aggregate level. Most active labour market policies have a rather poor
track record in terms of raising the regular employment prospects of participants. Appar-
ently we are not putting people’s lives at stake, and the benefits of experiments are likely
to outweigh the costs in terms of heterogeneous outcomes.
Furthermore, as we get longer and longer data series with changes in ALMPs, empirical
tests on the impact of ALMPs at the aggregate level become more powerful. This study
has shown that in the evaluation of ALMPs, we should typically look beyond the effects
on the individual level. A dif-in-dif estimate on the treatment and the control group will
not tell you the effect of additional taxes or wage pressure on both of them.
1See e.g. Gielen and Van Ours (2006).
2See Deelen and Jongen (2009) for some preliminary thoughts on this.
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Modellen voor het effect van arbeids-
marktbeleid in Nederland
Arbeidsmarkt en beleid in Nederland
Nederland scoort sinds het midden van de jaren ’90 internationaal gezien goed met een
laag niveau van werkloosheid, hoewel een deel wellicht verborgen zit in de regelingen voor
arbeidsongeschiktheid en vroegpensioen. Kijken we naar de stromen op de Nederlandse ar-
beidsmarkt, dan krijgen we een ander beeld. De stromen tussen werk en werkloosheid be-
horen tot de laagste in de OESO. Dit houdt vermoedelijk verband met de relatief genereuze
uitkering tijdens werkloosheid in Nederland, en de stringente ontslagbescherming bij vaste
contracten. De relatief hoge uitkeringen verlagen de uitstroom uit de werkloosheid, en
de stringente ontslagbescherming verlaagt zowel de uitstroom als de instroom. Daarnaast
blijken de relatief hoge uitgaven aan actief arbeidsmarktbeleid in Nederland niet samen
te gaan met een hoge uitstroom uit de werkloosheid. In de volgende hoofdstukken on-
derzoeken wij of de uitkering tijdens werkloosheid te hoog is, of de ontslagbescherming te
stringent is en of het actief arbeidsmarktbeleid werklozen inderdaad activeert.
Werkloosheidsuitkering
We onderzoeken de optimale werkloosheidsuitkering in een levensloopmodel met werk-
loosheidsrisico. De kans op werkloosheid en de duur van de werkloosheid variëren daarbij
over de levensloop. In het model bepalen werknemers in iedere periode hoe hard zij op zoek
gaan naar een baan in geval van werkloosheid, hoeveel zij willen consumeren en hoeveel
zij willen sparen. Door te sparen en te ontsparen kunnen werknemers zichzelf verzekeren
tegen het inkomensverlies ten tijde van werkloosheid, door de schok uit te smeren over de
rest van de levensloop. De mate waarin werknemers inkomensschokken kunnen uitsmeren
over de levensloop wordt echter beperkt door de aanwezigheid van kredietrestricties.
Het model is gekalibreerd op de panel data van De Koning et al. (2006) wat betreft de
kans op en duur van werkloosheid, en de empirische literatuur over de uitkeringselasticiteit
van de werkloosheid en de consumptie.
In de basiskalibratie ligt het optimale niveau van de werkloosheidsuitkering in de buurt
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van het huidige niveau van ongeveer 70% van het loon. Bij alternatieve aannames over
moreel gevaar, risicoaversie en het belang van kredietrestricties is de uitkering wat lager
of hoger. De welvaartskosten van een uitkeringsvoet die 10 procentpunt te hoog of te laag
is, is echter klein (in de orde van .1% in consumptie-eenheden).
Uit de analyse volgt verder dat de uitkeringsvoet hoger moet zijn voor oudere werkne-
mers en voor lager opgeleide werknemers. Dit is in lijn met het huidige stelsel, waarin
de uitkeringsduur is gekoppeld aan het arbeidsverleden, en het inkomen dat is verzekerd
wordt gemaximeerd.
De relatief genereuze werkloosheidsuitkering in Nederland is een van de oorzaken van
de relatief lage uitstroom uit de werkloosheid. Het huidige niveau ligt echter dicht bij het
punt waar het marginale verlies aan moreel gevaar in balans is met de marginale winst van
risicodeling. Het niveau ligt dus in de buurt van het zogenaamde second best optimum,
en is daarmee niet te hoog.
Individuele spaarrekeningen voor werkloosheid
In het levensloopmodel analyseren we ook de introductie van zogenaamde individuele
spaarrekeningen voor werkloosheid. In het huidige stelsel betalen werknemers een pre-
mie in een collectieve pot waaruit de individuele uitkeringen tijdens werkloosheid worden
betaald. Bij een spaarsysteem wordt de premie vervangen door een verplichte besparing
in een individuele spaarpot, waaruit de uitkeringen tijdens werkloosheid worden betaald.
Werklozen kunnen ook rood staan, en zijn daarmee verzekerd van inkomen tijdens werk-
loosheid. In een populair voorstel van Feldstein en Altman (1998) worden negatieve saldi
aan het eind van het werkzame leven kwijtgescholden (dit wordt nog gefinancierd door
een premie), en positieve saldi aan het eind van het werkzame leven worden bijgeschreven
op de individuele pensioenrekening.
Een gevolg hiervan is dat werknemers die verwachten met een positief saldo te eindigen
een grotere prikkel krijgen om niet werkloos te raken of te blijven. Zij betalen dit immers
uit eigen zak. Werknemers die verwachten met een negatief saldo te eindigen krijgen juist
een wat lagere prikkel (voor hen is de verplichte besparing de facto ook een belasting).
Maar omdat de meeste personen met een positief saldo zullen eindigen stijgen per saldo
de prikkels om werkloosheid te beperken, en daalt de werkloosheid.
De keerzijde is dat ook de risicodeling tussen personen afneemt. Werknemers die vaak
en/of lang werkloos zijn, hebben een lager levensinkomen onder het spaarsysteem (zij het
dat een deel van de risicodeling blijft wanneer het negatieve saldo aan het eind wordt
kwijtgescholden). Ook individuele spaarrekeningen voor werkloosheid ontsnappen dus
niet aan de uitruil tussen moreel gevaar en risicodeling.
Individuele spaarrekeningen kunnen deze uitruil echter wel verbeteren. Wanneer werk-
lozen geen vermogen hebben en niet kunnen lenen, dan worden hun uitgaven bepaald door
de uitkering. Individuele spaarrekeningen zorgen ervoor dat werknemers wat vermogen
opbouwen voor werkloosheid, en dat zij kunnen lenen tijdens werkloosheid. Hierdoor zijn
werknemers beter in staat om de inkomensschok van de werkloosheid uit te smeren over
de levensloop. Hierdoor is er minder noodzaak voor risicodeling tussen personen, en daalt
het optimale niveau van de werkloosheidsuitkering.
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Bij het huidige uitkeringsniveau lopen de meeste werknemers echter niet tegen kredietre-
stricties aan als ze werkloos worden. Werkloosheid duurt voor de meeste werknemers
niet lang, en de meeste werklozen hebben voldoende vermogen of toegang tot krediet om
het resterende inkomensverlies zelfstandig uit te smeren over de levensloop. Empirische
studies naar het effect van werkloosheid op de consumptie vinden dat de consumptie maar
licht daalt zelfs als de uitkering aanzienlijk daalt.
De analyse geeft aan dat de welvaartswinst van individuele spaarrekeningen in Ned-
erland beperkt is. De werkloosheid daalt sterk, maar hier staat een sterke daling in de
risicodeling tegenover. Wanneer we beginnen in het punt waarbij de werkloosheidsuitk-
ering is geoptimaliseerd (in de buurt van het huidige niveau), dan is de welvaartswinst
minder dan .1% in consumptie-eenheden. In lijn met empirische studies lopen ook in het
model weinig werklozen tegen kredietrestricties aan. De mogelijkheid om tijdens werk-
loosheid te kunnen lenen via het voornoemde spaarsysteem voegt daarom weinig toe.
Ontslagbescherming
Vervolgens onderzoeken we het effect van het stelsel van ontslagbescherming. We bekijken
het effect van ontslagvergoedingen, -kosten en -belastingen in een jaargangenmodel met
matchspecifieke investeringen door werknemers en werkgevers, in algemeen evenwicht.
Een kwalitatieve analyse van het gebalanceerde groeipad laat zien dat het samen-
nemen van de verschillende vormen van ontslagbescherming, zoals in de populaire OESO
indicator voor ontslagbescherming, een slechte idee is vanuit het oogpunt van empirisch
onderzoek. De verschillende vormen van ontslagbescherming verschillen in hun effecten,
zoals we met behulp van eigen empirisch onderzoek laten zien. Wanneer ontslagvergoedin-
gen aan het begin van de match nul zijn, in lijn met bijvoorbeeld het huidige Nederlandse
stelsel, dan hebben ontslagvergoedingen in algemeen evenwicht geen effect op baancreatie
en -vernietiging. Wel leiden ontslagvergoedingen tot een stijgend loonprofiel, waarbij de
lonen van werknemers met lange baanduren stijgen en met korte baanduren dalen.
We laten verder zien dat ontslagkosten die toenemen met de baanduur, populair in de
praktijk, minder verstorend werken op de baancreatie dan ontslagkosten die constant zijn
met de baanduur, populair in theoretische modellen (de uiteindelijke kosten bij ontslag
zijn daarbij hetzelfde). Voorgaande kwantitatieve analyses, welke meestal veronderstellen
dat ontslagkosten constant zijn met de baanduur, overschatten daarom vaak het negatieve
effect van ontslagkosten op de baancreatie.
In de kwalitatieve analyse vergelijken we ook de zogenaamde first best (sociale planner)
oplossing voor baancreatie, -vernietiging en specifieke investeringen met de marktoploss-
ing. Het zogenaamde hold-up probleem, waarbij de werkgever dan wel de werknemer zich
via de loononderhandelingen een deel van het rendement van een specifieke investering
van de andere partij toeeigent, zorgt ervoor dat de markt leidt tot te weinig matchspec-
ifieke investeringen. Daarnaast drijven werkloosheidsuitkeringen en hun premies een wig
tussen het private en sociale rendement van een baan. Door beide verstoringen is de
baanvernietiging te hoog en de baancreatie te laag. In dat geval is er een second best
rol voor ontslagbelastingen. Door ontslagbelastingen wordt de excessieve baanvernietig-
ing afgeremd. Wanneer de opbrengsten van de ontslagbelasting worden gebruikt voor
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premieverlaging dan treedt er bovendien geen onbedoelde schade op bij de baancreatie.
De verschillende punten worden kwantitatief geïllustreerd voor Nederland. Wanneer
er een groot onderinvesteringsprobleem is bij matchspecifieke investeringen dan leiden
hogere ontslagkosten via een langere baanduur tot een stijging van de werkgelegenheid
en de productiviteit. De welvaart gaat daarbij overigens niet noodzakelijk omhoog, er
worden ook meer investeringskosten worden gemaakt.
Zonder onderinvesteringsprobleem bij matchspecifieke investeringen verlagen ontslag-
kosten de productiviteit en de welvaart, maar kunnen per saldo nog steeds leiden tot
een hogere werkgelegenheid (de baanvernietiging daalt meer dan de baancreatie). Zonder
onderinvesteringsprobleem bij matchspecifieke investeringen leiden ontslagbelastingen nog
steeds tot een hogere welvaart, werkloosheidsuitkeringen en -premies ervoor zorgen dat
werknemers te snel worden ontslagen. Wanneer we de opbrengsten van de ontslagbelasting
worden gebruikt voor premieverlaging dan gaat de baancreatie ook nog steeds omhoog.
In een extensie met endogeen arbeidsaanbod laten we zien dat hogere ontslagkosten ook
kunnen leiden tot een daling van de werkgelegenheid (in lijn met verschillende empirische
studies). Hogere ontslagkosten verlagen de opbrengst van en de kans op een baan. Zij
verlagen daarom de participatie, wat de werkgelegenheid doet dalen.
De analyse van ontslagbescherming leert ons dat ontslagkosten leiden tot lagere stromen
tussen werk en werkloosheid. De stringente ontslagbescherming van vaste contracten in
Nederland is daarom deels debet aan de lage stromen tussen werk en werkloosheid in Ned-
erland. Maar ook ontslagbescherming blijkt een belangrijke second best rol te vervullen.
Zonder ontslagbescherming worden werknemers te snel ontslagen. Dit geldt met name
wanneer er sprake is van genereuze werkloosheidsuitkeringen en een groot onderinvester-
ingsprobleem bij specifieke investeringen.
Echter, ontslagbescherming is een indirecte manier om het probleem van onderin-
vesteringen aan te pakken. Het mitigeren van het hold-up probleem bij specifieke in-
vesteringen op een meer directe manier levert wellicht minder zijdelingse schade op bij
de baancreatie. Verder rust het huidige stelsel van ontslagbescherming in belangrijke
mate op procedures, Nederland staat wat dat betreft volgens de OESO op ’nummer 1’.
Een ontslagbelasting lijkt een minder kostbare rem op ontslag. Bovendien kunnen de
opbrengsten gebruikt worden voor premieverlaging, wat de baancreatie stimuleert.
De theoretische en empirische analyse suggereert verder dat ontslagvergoedingen weinig
invloed hebben op baancreatie en -vernietiging. De focus in de Nederlandse beleidsdis-
cussie op ontslagvergoedingen in relatie tot baancreatie en -vernietiging lijkt daarom mis-
plaatst.
Actief arbeidsmarktbeleid
Tot slot onderzoeken we het effect van zogenaamd actief arbeidsmarktbeleid op de baan-
vindkans en de productiviteit, wederom in algemeen evenwicht.
We analyseren het effect van een aantal populaire vormen van actief arbeidsmarkt-
beleid in een versimpelde versie van het zogenaamde MIMIC model. De focus is op het
matching proces en de loonvorming, welke de belangrijkste mechanismen vangen via welke
actief arbeidsmarktbeleid de werking van de arbeidsmarkt beïnvloeden.
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In het model analyseren we: a) gesubsidieerde werkgelegenheid in de publieke sector, waar
deelnemers wat produceren maar geen vaardigheden op doen, b) trainingsprogramma’s,
waar deelnemers niets produceren maar wel vaardigheden opdoen, en c) tijdelijke loonkosten-
subsidies voor laagproductieve werklozen in de private sector. a) en b) vangen de twee
extremen van gesubsidieerde programma’s in de publieke sector in Nederland, waarbij
echte programma’s elementen van beide combineren. Wanneer we de individuele uitkom-
sten uit het model vergelijken met internationale micro-econometrische studies dan zijn de
gesubsidieerde banen wat pessimistisch wat betreft de uitstroomkans naar regulier werk,
en de trainingsprogramma’s wat optimistisch wat betreft de uitstroomkans naar regulier
werk.
Voor de vergelijkbaarheid analyseren we het effect van een budgettaire impuls van 115
miljoen euro in elk van de bovenstaande vormen van actief arbeidsmarktbeleid. Wanneer
werknemers participeren in een gesubsidieerde baan in de publieke sector dan daalt hun
zoekinspanning naar regulier werk. Hierdoor wordt het moeilijker voor werkgevers om
werknemers te vinden. Daarnaast verbetert de hogere beloning in de publieke baan dan
in de voorgaande uitkeringssituatie de onderhandelingspositie van de potentiële werkne-
mer. Hierdoor stijgen de lonen en daarmee de loonkosten. Ook de financiering van de
publieke banen leidt via hogere belastingen tot hogere loonkosten. Hierdoor daalt de
private werkgelegenheid. Uiteindelijk gaan er in de basiskalibratie voor elke 100 gesub-
sidieerde banen in de publieke sector een kleine 70 banen verloren in de private sector.
De beperkte productie in de publieke banen is daarbij onvoldoende om de daling van de
productie in de private sector te compenseren. De totale productie daalt.
Het publieke trainingsprogramma zorgt ervoor dat deelnemers sneller een baan vin-
den, de zoekkosten van werkgevers dalen. De hogere beloning voor deelnemers dan hun
voormalige uitkering en de financiering van de programma’s leiden echter wederom tot
hogere loonkosten. Het positieve effect op de baanvindkans van deelnemers wordt op
macroniveau gedomineerd door een lagere baanvindkans van niet-deelnemers. De private
werkgelegenheid daalt, in de basiskalibratie met ongeveer de helft procent van het aantal
plaatsen in het trainingsprogramma. Ook de totale productie daalt licht. De hogere pro-
ductiviteit van ex-deelnemers aan het publieke trainingsprogramma is onvoldoende om de
daling in de private werkgelegenheid op te vangen.
De werkgelegenheid in de private sector stijgt wel door de tijdelijke loonkostensubsidies
voor laagproductieve werklozen. De loonkostensubsidies zorgen voor een daling van de
loonkosten, en verhogen niet direct de beloning buiten de private sector. De werkgelegen-
heidswinst is in de basiskalibratie echter slechts 2% van het totale aantal werkzoekenden
dat met subsidie een baan vindt. De totale productie stijgt, maar slechts marginaal.
Wanneer we de uitkomsten voor de publieke banen en trainingsprogramma’s vergeli-
jken met studies in het buitenland, dan lijkt de netto werkgelegenheidswinst van beiden
relatief hoog. In de basiskalibratie gaan we ervan uit dat deelnemers aan publieke banen
en trainingsprogramma’s het minimumloon ontvangen. Het soort programma’s dat we
analyseren bood in Nederland echter vaak een hogere compensatie. We bekijken daarom
ook het effect wanneer deelnemers 115% van het minimumloon ontvangen. In dat geval is
de verdringing van private werkgelegenheid groter, meer in lijn met buitenlandse studies.
Wanneer we een minder gunstige aanname maken voor de toename in vaardigheden door
de publieke trainingsprogramma’s, dan verdringen ook deze programma’s meer private
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werkgelegenheid, wederom in lijn met buitenlandse studies.
Studies die kijken naar het totale werkgelegenheidseffect van loonkostensubsidies baser-
en zich vaak op enquêteresultaten. Werkgevers geven daarin aan in welke mate werkne-
mers ook waren aangenomen zonder subsidie. Deze studies suggereren een hogere netto
werkgelegenheidswinst dan onze analyse. Maar in tegenstelling tot de enquêtes houden
wij in onze analyse wel rekening met een verlies aan werkgelegenheid door de financiering
van de loonkostensubsidies.
Tot besluit, voor alle vormen van actief arbeidsmarktbeleid vinden wij dat het effect op
macro niveau (nog) minder gunstig is dan op individueel niveau, door extra loondruk en/of
hogere belastingen. De bevinding van bijvoorbeeld Kluve (2006) dat loonkostensubsidies
de kans op werk bevorderen op individueel niveau betekent nog niet dat dit ook geldt voor
de gemiddelde baanvindkans van alle werkzoekenden. Ook trainingprogramma’s die op
individueel niveau de baanvindkans bevorderen kunnen op macro niveau de gemiddelde
baanvindkans juist verlagen. Gesubsidieerde banen in de publieke sector blijken voorts
een nog groter negatief effect te hebben op de baanvindkans in de private sector op
macro niveau dan op individueel niveau. De bevinding dat de baanvindkans in Nederland
relatief laag is ondanks aanzienlijke uitgaven aan actief arbeidsmarktbeleid, is gezien het
bovenstaande dan ook weinig verrassend.
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